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Abstract
This dissertation will explore conspiracy theories from a psychological viewpoint—both
theoretically and empirically. Conspiracy theories are introduced here as a phenomenon
relevant for many aspects of entertainment, history, popular culture, society, politics, and
ideology. The phenomenon is defined and discussed, with its epistemic characteristics
and ramifications, from a philosophical viewpoint. It is argued that there is no standard
practice for the judgement of conspiracy theories, and that a case-by-case consideration
is a pragmatic resolution for this epistemic problem.
Along with proposing and implementing a new means of measurement for the be-
lief in conspiracy theories in Raab, Ortlieb, Auer, Guthmann, and Carbon (2013) called
narrative construction, it is argued that nearly everyone will construct a conspiracy
theory for an important event (exemplified with the 9/11 attacks), which is probably
not a sign of delusion, but of identity construction and management. However, the
genesis of such beliefs is prone to distortions. The mere presence of extreme (in terms
of conspiratorial value) information might foster the construction of narrations signifi-
cantly more extreme—without people noticing it. In Raab, Auer, Ortlieb, and Carbon
(2013), we have called this the Sarrazin effect. To better understand why conspiratorial
narrations are so widespread, powerful and possibly dangerous, psychological and philo-
sophical theories are applied; for example, narrations (and thus conspiracy theories) can
be considered cognitive simulations of possible states of the world. Here, it would also
be desirable to understand why a given person adheres to a specific narrative content,
so the link between personal values (in a psychological sense) and conspiracy belief was
analysed empirically. The results were reported in a conference paper (Raab, Kammerl,
& Carbon, 2015). Also, a current research question is if people automatically begin to
elaborate conspiracy beliefs for a new event, or if it takes psychological triggers to start
this process. We found empirical evidence in Gebauer, Raab, and Carbon (2016) that
information has to include testimony of causation (someone causing an event directly)
and purpose (someone causing this deliberately), so that people begin to assume a con-
spiracy at work. To make the knowledge presented here, as well as the results gathered
by researchers in the past years and decades, available to a larger audience, a work-in-
progress project for a popular science book on conspiracy theories is presented.
The conspiracy theory is the message then (speaking with Marshall McLuhan), as
those theories extend our realm of human affairs. To integrate the findings of this thesis,
a construction kit for conspiracy theories is proposed; and dangers as well as chances of
such narrations are discussed with regard to societal progress.
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1 Conspiracy theories: a research program
War is Peace
Freedom is Slavery
Ignorance is Strength
(George Orwell,
Nineteen Eighty-Four)
In 2015 the canary has died. The miner’s canary was a caged bird that, in a coal mine,
was (by dying) supposed to warn miners of toxic gases. Information is more important
than coal in our days, and the canary is now a virtual one.
The social news aggregator site reddit.com1 is a site with over 230 million unique
visitors per month (Smith, 2016), sharing content and information about virtually ev-
erything: from world news over DIY projects, from funny cat videos to chronic illnesses,
over sophisticated nature and fashion photography, up to gore, and to niche pornog-
raphy. Thus, log files of user activity have the potential to reveal very much—and
very intimate—information about a single user. Reddit publishes a yearly transparency
report and had included a passage in the 2014 report stating:
As of January 29, 2015, reddit has never received a National Security Letter,
an order under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, or any other classified
request for user information. If we ever receive such a request, we would seek to
let the public know it existed. (Reddit, 2015)
1The site reddit.com consists of (at the time of writing) over 850,000 so-called subreddits. Such a
“sub” can be created by any registered user (registration is free and does not require personal data,
just a nickname and an active e-mail address; with 36 million registered users so far) and usually is
dedicated to a particular topic. Registered users can post links to images, videos, websites or any
other content on the web to such a subreddit. The sub is moderated by a small number of users; the
first and most powerful moderator is the sub’s creator, any moderator can acclaim new moderators
down this hierarchy, and can get dismissed by moderators above him. If someone wants to post
own media, like a nude picture of him-/herself in a sub dedicated to exhibitionism, he/ she has to
upload it to a free image hoster like imgur.com and then link to it from reddit. Reddit itself does
not hold the content, only the references. For each single post created this way, any registered user
can participate in a discussion tied to the post. Posts can be up- and downvoted by users; this way,
a post’s visibility is determined. For a popular sub, any post might get thousands of contributions
and votes, where some of these contributions reference other content in turn. While any posting
requires registration, browsing the subs including the linked content and the discussions does not
require registration. Statistics from Smith (2016).
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US companies are not allowed to disclose when government agencies make requests
that are classified (see Doyle, 2015), but so far the companies were not hindered to state
when they have not received such a request. When such a paragraph (like the one cited
above) is missing, users might conclude that this was done deliberately. It would be the
absence of information—like the absence of a bird that is alive—that signifies something
is wrong. This special kind of information is colloquially known as a canary.
In the following year, the transparency report for 2015 was published. It did not
include such a paragraph (see Reddit, 2016). This was interpreted by the site’s users that
the canary has died: National security organs had requested information (probably user
data) and at the same time had forbidden to release any information about the request.
The US government might now posses data that reveal the reddit users’ political views
as well as their most intimate hopes, fears and desires. Matched with a database that
relates IP addresses (unique identifiers at the technical level of internet communication)
for a given time stamp with, say, facebook access log files, these data become person-
related.
That is a conspiracy theory (while the facts stated here are true). Presumably,
the US government—with an administration elected by the US people—is spying on
millions of said US people, under laws ensuring absolute secrecy, with means and ends
unknown. What was happening with reddit seems ominous, threatening; but we have
at the moment no means to verify or refute the claim about secret data leeching. But
if we value an open society that is democratic, liberal, and transparent in its processes
and actions, we are facing the question how to handle this conspiracy theory: ignore
it, although society’s most important values might be endangered; believe it although
authoritative facts are sparse; or remain in an indecisive state until we eventually forget
about it? While there is no easy answer, this thesis will try to tackle the phenomenon
from a psychological perspective.
This dissertation is set out to contribute to a better understanding of conspiracy
theories. A conspiracy theory (CT) is, using a preliminary definition, the more or less
elaborate accusation directed at two or more people trying to achieve something in
secret. Usually, such secret plots are sinister, affect the lives of many people, and touch
existential concerns like freedom and the question of war or peace. This section will
outline the many facets—and consequently, desiderata for psychological research—of
conspiracy theories; and then sketch the theoretical and empirical approaches of this
thesis.
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1.1 The many shades of conspiracy (theory)
One of the most well-known causes for conspiracy theories in recent times is the attack
on the World Trade Center in New York on September 11th, 2001 (hence known as
9/11): An uncounted number of theories making out the true masterminds and the true
reasons for the attack are floating around in the world wide web (Swami, Chamorro-
Premuzic, & Furnham, 2010; M. J. Wood & Douglas, 2013). Such alternative theories
are not a privilege of shady on-line discussions and are also discussed by scholars and
intellectuals (see Griffin and Scott, 2006).
Other common topics of conspiracy theories that have come under the scrutiny of
researchers are the death of Princess Diana (Douglas & Sutton, 2008), climate change
(Feinberg & Willer, 2011; Douglas & Sutton, 2015), advertising tricks of companies
(Furnham, 2013), the assassination of John F. Kennedy (McHoskey, 1995) and many
more. There are conspiracy theories full of hate that target minorities. There are
conspiracy theories defending civil rights, advocating liberty and a transparent, open
society. And in between, there are many petty theories floating around: that the German
city Bielefeld does not exist; that John Lennon was killed by Stephen King; that Julius
Caesar was not the victim of a conspiracy, but has engaged Brutus to arrange the
assassination (so Caesar’s death would be perceived just as epic as his life as emperor);
or that the Denver airport is in truth a portal to Hell. Psychologists should be concerned
with CTs for a number of reasons:
• Conspiracy theories are widespread. For example, in 1992 a representative sample
of adult Americans was asked: “Do you think one man—Lee Harvey Oswald—was
responsible for the assassination of President Kennedy, or do you think there were
others involved?” Seventy-five percent (n=1282) of participants answered that Os-
wald did not act alone (CBS News, 1993). With 69 percent assuming a conspiracy
(N=348) behind the JFK murder, Goertzel (1994) got very similar results when
asking New Jersey residents. Bartoschek (2015), for a German sample in 2011, has
found an approval rating of 52.31 percent (n=598) for the item “J. F. Kennedy
wurde nicht von Lee Harvey Oswald (alleine) erschossen. [J. F. Kennedy was not
shot by Lee Harvey Oswald (alone).]“. Oliver and Wood (2014) found that at least
half of the American public does endorse at least one conspiracy theory. General
psychology is targeting cognitive and emotional processes common to all people
and should be concerned by the pervasive distribution of those theories; while the
psychology of personality examines individual differences in such processes and
might help us to explain why not all people are susceptible.
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• Conspiracies can be entertaining. The iconic TV series The X-Files (Carter et al.,
1993–2002, 2016) that ran from 1993 to 2002 and that has been revived in 2016,
has become paradigmatic for the entertaining aspects of CTs (see, for example,
Knight, 2000, already referring to the series in the book title; and Kelley-Romano,
2008, using The X-Files for an analysis of the functions of the conspiracy genre in
television). A recent example is also the hugely successful (Kissel, 2015) TV series
Game of Thrones, that basically is an epic saga about cabal, intrigue and nefarious
attempts to seize power in a medieval world. To explore what is entertaining to
us, and why, is a question of media psychology.
• In Game of Thrones, that is based on the books A Song of Ice and Fire by George
R.R. Martin, many of the conspiracies depicted have parallels in the English his-
tory; a fact that was appreciated by many fans (for an example, see Pleasance,
2014). The intrigues in William Shakespeare’s works might be considered a literary
mirror of an epoch when distrust and paranoia were normality for the ruling class,
and secret plots were a commonplace means of politics (MacGregor, 2013). This
points to the rather obvious fact that conspiracies can be real. A well-documented
case for our time is Watergate, a scandal in the 1970s in Washington, D.C., in-
cluding wire-tapping of Democratic politicians and cover-ups by the Central Intel-
ligence Agency (CIA), that culminated in the resignation of US president Richard
Nixon in 1974. For the past few years, Western intelligence agencies like the US
National Security Agency (NSA) spying on virtually any communication world-
wide come to mind as an example for a huge conspiracy that turned out to be
true. As conspiracies can be real, it is not wise to regard a belief in a conspiracy
theory as a false belief per se. It is essential to examine people’s predispositions,
beliefs, values, and motivation, to make substantial claims when and why someone
is prone to believe a specific theory. Again, beliefs and motivations are core topics
of psychology.
• The term ‘conspiracy theory’ has become a buzzword in political debate. The
British Prime Minister Tony Blair, for example, has—in parliament—called it a
“conspiracy theory that [the invasion in Iraq] is somehow to do with oil” (Commons
and Lords Hansard, 2003). The British Prime Minister David Cameron has deval-
uated accusations by his prime opponent, Labour leader Ed Miliband, as “feeble
conspiracy theories” (Faiola, 2011). Cameron has also accused extremist Muslims
in Britain of adhering to an anti-Semitic conspiracy theory (Deacon, 2015). These
examples raise the question if the term conspiracy has a quality to shape a debate
that other rhetoric devices lack—begging a question that can be answered with
psychological means.
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• To understand and to measure why some people believe that 9/11 was an inside
job (that is, an action planned and carried out by the US government, and not by
al-Qaeda) is a challenge. Standard questionnaires might not be able to grasp the
complexity and the many facets of such complex narrations. Questionnaires alone
also are limited to beliefs people already hold. The acquisition of a conspiracy
theory can be seen as a process, and consequently, measuring this process asks
for means that are able to grasp these dynamics. To develop new methods for
measuring complex phenomena is an important mission for psychologists.
• Turning from the people (the recipients) to the information (the message), we
might also ask: Are there cues and triggers in everyday information that might
provoke the formation of a conspiracy theory with some people? Cognitive psy-
chology is based upon the idea that people perceive and process information.
• Sometimes, believers in CTs are regarded as paranoid (with the article by Hofs-
tadter, 1964, on The paranoid style in American politics as a famous example of
using this term). When a term of psychiatry is used, the viewpoint of clinical
psychology might help us to determine if such a categorization is justified.
• Millions of people have been humiliated, persecuted, tortured and died under ide-
ologies with conspiracy theories as central narratives. Adolf Hitler (1936, p.135)
wrote inMein Kampf : “. . . zwischen allem aber als ewiger Spaltpilz der Menschheit
– Juden und wieder Juden [between all, as eternal fission fungus—Jews and Jews,
ever and anon]”. Hitler drew upon a conspiracy theory that had been cultivated in
Germany for many hundred years (Wippermann, 2007), depicting Jews as a cal-
lous, greedy and evil people not stopping for murder. At the latest since Stanley
Milgram’s experiments in 1961, (experimental) psychology tries to fathom what
turns ordinary men into ruthless villains torturing and killing for ideas like the
Nazi ideology.
• All these interesting and sometimes horrendous features of conspiracy theories—
and the desiderata for psychological research—, however, beg a question that tran-
scends psychology: What can we know about the world? How might we handle
uncertainties and imperfections, in a way that is scientifically sound. And how do
we handle a topic that has played its part in the worst crimes against humanity
(with the persecution and murder of Jewish people) and at the same time asks us to
defend liberty, trust and human rights (against espionage beyond democratic con-
trol)? Those epistemic questions touch on fundamental questions of our existence
and should be examined from the viewpoint of philosophy.
10
Conspiracy theories: a research program
In sum: The study of CTs might be regarded a burning glass of psychology. Many
aspects and disciplines can contribute to a research question that comprises perception,
cognition, emotion and motivation. War and peace, freedom and slavery, ignorance
and strength—the dystopia Nineteen Eigthy-Four by George Orwell (1949/1989) gives
a picture what society might look like when the conspiracy theory of total surveillance
and control would become reality—that is the dark side of conspiracy. However, even
the lighter aspect, the entertainment by and with conspiracy theories, is not without
danger. Aldous Huxley (1932/2005) also envisioned a society that is controlled by a few.
But here, total surveillance is not necessary. People are too consumed by entertainment,
sex and drugs to think of anything else.
Conspiracy and totalitarianism have been a part of highbrow as well as popular
culture for hundreds of years, be it Shakespeare, Orwell, Huxley or Martin. It is a task for
psychology to contribute to research on conspiracy theories, together with philosophers,
communication scientists and historians, to understand the power, the magic and also
the danger of this narrative.
1.2 Advance organizer
Conspiracy theories can be considered a full-fledged research program. This thesis will
try to make a contribution. First, in chapter 2 I will define conspiracy theory and
give a short account of the phenomenon’s philosophical ramifications and its epistemic
qualities. Then, drawing on the article
Raab, M. H., Ortlieb, S., Auer, N., Guthmann, K., & Carbon, C. C. (2013).
Thirty shades of truth: conspiracy theories as stories of individuation, not
of pathological delusion. Frontiers in Psychology, 4. doi:10.3389/fpsyg.
2013.00406
(full article in section A.1 on page 74)
in section 3 I will introduce a new means of measuring the belief in conspiracy
theories—narrative construction—that accounts for the diversity of such beliefs, and that
tries to simulate the process of acquiring information with regard to a controversial topic
under controlled conditions—using the 9/11 attacks as an example (Grasping dynamic
cognitive-emotional processes is a methodological problem that is not unique to CTs; it
is discussed for user experience (UX) in Raab, Muth, and Carbon, 2013, reprinted here
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in section A.2 on page 83; and for aesthetics in Muth, Raab, and Carbon, 2015). Here,
I will also discuss possible psychological functions of the belief in conspiracy theories.
Using this method of narrative construction, I will (in section 4) show that extreme
information often found in conspiracy theories is dangerous, as the recipient’s opinion
might get shifted towards a more extreme narration—without him noticing this shift,
which is probably due to adaptation. The publication
Raab, M. H., Auer, N., Ortlieb, S. A., & Carbon, C. C. (2013). The
Sarrazin effect: the presence of absurd statements in conspiracy theories
makes canonical information less plausible. Frontiers in Psychology, 4.
doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2013.00453
(full article in section A.3 on page 92)
discusses these findings with respect to one of Germany’s most controversial books
of recent years, Deutschland schafft sich ab [Germany is abolishing itself] by Thilo Sar-
razin (2010).
In the mentioned articles, I argue that conspiracy theories should be regarded as
narrations that, as kind of a mental simulation, help us to better understand ourselves
and our complex, social world. I will engross these thoughts in section 5.
To better understand why different people hold different conspiratorial beliefs,
the psychological concept of personal values (for an overwiew, see Schwartz, 2012) was
applied to conspiracy theories in an experimental setting. In the conference paper
Raab, M. H., Kammerl, B., & Carbon, C. C. (2015, March). Conspiracy
belief and personal beliefs—exploring the linkage between a person’s value
system and the tendency for conspiracy beliefs. Paper presented at the
Conference on Conspiracy Theories, Miami, FL
(full paper in section A.4 on page 100)
in section 6, I will discuss why this concept might be a worthwhile extension of
existing research on individual differences and the belief in CTs. Personality psychology
examines why some people are more prone to assume a conspiracy behind a given event.
I will focus here on the question if and how the ‘group of conspirers’ voluntary included
in a person’s conspiratorial narration for a given event relates to the person’s personal
beliefs.
Most research on CTs is concerned with beliefs people already hold, as it is hard to
pinpoint when and why someone will generate a new conspiratorial explanation. When
12
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the scandal about corruption and bribery in the Fédération Internationale de Football
Association (FIFA), revealed by the US Department of Justice, was hitting the front
pages in 2015, we took the chance of immediately running two studies, confronting
participants with different versions of newspaper-styled information. In
Gebauer, F., Raab, M. H., & Carbon, C. C. (2016). Conspiracy formation
is in the detail: on the interaction of conspiratorial predispositions and
semantical cues. Manuscript under revision
(final manuscript in section A.5 on page 113)
we were thus able to examine which aspects of information regarding the role of the
United States (varying direct and indirect agency; and purposeful and non-purposeful
agency) made it more likely that someone will spontaneously assume hidden intentions
by the US—here, to discredit the FIFAWorld Cup 2018 to harm Russia. This manuscript
is discussed in section 7.
To demonstrate the importance of a balanced and scientifically thorough exami-
nation of conspiracy theories for our society, I will sketch a popular-science book project
that is currently work in progress (working title: In the beginning there was the conspir-
acy theory) in section 8. For a phenomenon so pervasive and omnipresent like conspiracy
theories, science has a duty to make its findings available to a larger audience. The book
is scheduled to be released in spring 2017 by Springer Verlag (excerpt in section A.6 on
page 138) and targets interested laymen. The book will also include a construction kit
for conspiracy theories, as sketched in section 9.
Finally, in section 10 I will discuss benefits and challenges from a general viewpoint.
I will integrate thoughts on opportunities and dangers for a democratic, open society with
respect to conspiracy theories.
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2 On the nature of conspiracy theory
Today we are engaged
in a final, all-out
battle between
communistic atheism
and Christianity.
(Joseph McCarthy, 1950)
Karl R. Popper (1958/1980) has introduced the term conspiracy theory of society. He
considered it the belief that the explanation for a given social phenomenon can be made
by disclosing the people and groups being interested in the phenomenon’s incidence (and
which had made plans accordingly). He saw secularization as the main reason for this
widespread belief. With the gods being abolished, powerful men and groups had to step
in. While Popper acknowledged that real conspiracies do happen, he claimed that in
reality, conspirators will fail to accomplish their goals in most cases—because they, too,
face unforeseen repercussions of their own deeds.
Popper attacked the idea that there is a manifest truth, and that this truth would
be recognized once discovered, to attack Marxism: “The conspiracy theory of ignorance
is fairly well known in its Marxian form as a conspiracy of a capitalist press that perverts
and suppresses truth [. . . ]” (Popper, 1976, p.7) He considered this kind of belief “the
almost inevitable consequence of the optimistic belief that truth, and therefore goodness,
must prevail if only truth is given a fair chance” (Popper, 1976, p.7f).
So Popper gives us a definition (a belief in people who plot in secret to achieve
their plans), the primary cause for this belief (the abolishment of gods) and also a
psychological motive (the belief that truth and goodness will prevail in the end). While
he clearly identifies conspiracy theories as an epistemic pitfall, the impetus assumed here
is not a bad one: the belief in goodness and truth.
Things are different for Hofstadter (1964). He has spotted a conspiracy belief,
not among the leftist but among right-wing politicians he calls “paranoid”, where the
imagined (and usually Communist) enemy is “a perfect model of malice, a kind of
amoral superman—sinister, ubiquitous, powerful, cruel, sensual, luxury-loving.” (p.85)
Hofstadter speculated that a projection of ideal as well as unacceptable aspects of the
self might be behind this. Another important cause for developing such a mindset: being
separated from political participation. “Having no access to political bargaining or the
14
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making of decisions, they find their original conception that the world of power is sinister
and malicious fully confirmed.” (Hofstadter, 1964, p.86)
Those two approaches—early approaches with regard to research in this subject
matter—have anchored the debate. The one assumes a naive and all-too-simple belief in
goodness and truth within the believer ; the other one insinuates a paranoid imagination
and an exaggeration of an omnipotent enemy. This section will give an account what
constitutes a conspiracy theory; and how we should deal with them from an epistemic-
philosophical point of view “between the intellectual vices of paranoia and naivety”
(Coady, 2006a, p.126, emphasis in original).
2.1 Defining the phenomenon
Many attempts to define the term conspiracy theory since Popper (1958/1980) are closely
related to a lexical definition. They take the meaning of conspiracy as a “secret plot
of two or more people” and extend it. According to Douglas and Sutton (2008, p.211),
a CT sees “the ultimate cause of an event (usually one that is political or social) as a
secret plot by a covert alliance of powerful individuals or organizations, rather than as
an overt activity or natural occurrence.”
Other scholars focus on the historical dimension. In their view, a constitutive
feature is an underlying event:
A conspiracy theory is a proposed explanation of an historical event in
which conspiracy (i.e. agents acting secretly in concert) has a significant
causal role. Furthermore, the conspiracy postulated by the proposed expla-
nation must be a conspiracy to bring about the historical event which it
purports to explain. Finally, the proposed explanation must conflict with an
‘official’ explanation of the same historical event. (Coady, 2006a, p.117)
Here, Coady (2006a) mentions that usually an official explanation for the said
event exists that conflicts with the conspiracy theory. That point is also stressed by
Keeley (2006) who has introduced the term unwarranted conspiracy theories (UCTs).
He uses this expression to draw a line between conspiratorial explanations that are
warranted (like Watergate), and the unwarranted ones that in the end lead to a “nihilistic
degree of skepticism” (p.59). The latter he deems dangerous, as trust in the public, the
fact-gathering institutions and the individuals working for them would erode.
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Keeley (2006) defines unwarranted conspiracy theories as: running counter to
some official or obvious account; assuming hidden, nefarious intentions; tying together
seemingly unrelated events; with well-guarded secrets; and making use of errant data
(that is, explaining accounts that are not explained in or even contradicting the official
account). In other words: A theory that explains too much should make us suspicious.
Douglas and Sutton (2008, p.211) state that a conspiracy theory is the assumption
of “a secret plot by a covert alliance of powerful individuals or organizations, rather than
[. . . ] an overt activity or natural occurrence”. The assumption of bad intentions on the
side of the conspirators is stressed in the definition by Brotherton and French (2014,
p.238) with the “unverified and relatively implausible allegation of conspiracy, claiming
that significant events are the result of a secret plot carried out by a preternaturally
sinister and powerful group of people”.
This multitude of definitions, beginning with Popper (1958/1980), has led Jolley
(2013, p.60) to the diagnosis: “Conspiracy theories can be defined in a variety of ways,
and it appears each scholar refers to their own definition.”
The bottom line is: A conspiracy theory is a theory about a conspiracy. And
with a theory, we are likely to expect explanations for—or at least more or less founded
speculations about—the relationships of some things. However, the term conspiracy
theory is not an academic definition, and consequently theory here bears the layman
notion of a speculative account; and not necessarily the scientific notion of a mesh of
related assertions backed up by evidence. The following subsection will use philosophical
accounts to determine whether the epistemic qualities of such theories imply some special
treatment of CTs.
2.2 The philosophical debate
The conspiracy theory of society has been described and decried by Popper (1958/1980).
Popper’s critique, however, was also regarded as an “intellectually respectable smoke-
screen behind which [right-wing conspirators] can conceal their conspiratorial machina-
tions” (Pigden, 2006b, p.18). It is this conspiracy theory of society that Pigden (2006b)
rejects as absurd, because necessary beliefs for adhering to it would be: believing that all
societal chance is brought about by conspiracy, that finding conspirators is the endpoint
of investigation, and that conspirators always get what they want. Such an extreme
belief would probably not be upheld even by hardcore CT believers.
16
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But what would be a reasonable way to deal with conspiracy theories? Reason is
one of the most important topics and tools of philosophy. Do conspiracy theories exhibit
epistemic qualities that might allow for some general rules—or, at least, heuristics—to
deal with the phenomenon?
Illies (2015), discussing the legitimation for a universal system of morale, demands
for any reasonable request that it is clear, internally consistent, and that performance
of said request does not hinder other people from performing likewise. There are two
general rules we can think of when dealing with conspiracy theories:
General Acceptance: You should accept any conspiracy theory, that
is: believe any set of statements that assumes hidden and possi-
bly nefarious deeds by a group of people.
General Rejection: You should dismiss any conspiracy theory, that
is: reject any set of statements that assumes hidden and possibly
nefarious deeds by a group of people.
Both rules are clear, internally consistent, and can be executed by anyone. How-
ever, there is a third requirement that Illies (2015) calls evolutionary universalizability.
The rule should, when embedded in a larger set of rules like a system of morale, stabilize
the system. If it would allow for competing models to emerge and get selected, it is not
evolutionary stable. Selection rules would be rules advancing a society where freedom of
judgement, the freedom to do what is right, and mutual respect are always given—pretty
much what Popper (1958/1980) would call an open society.
Both of the general rules fail to meet this demand. Accepting every conspiracy
theory is obviously not reasonable: That would deny the freedom of individual judgement
when being confronted with new information. Lies would be able to spread without
checks and balances then.
The general rejection is not so straightforward. Embedded in a larger set of morale,
there are things we should not do in any case, no matter the circumstances: murder,
torture, and sexual abuse for instance are not permissible, as they negate the victim’s
basic freedoms and would destroy essential mutual trust in society. Would the belief in
conspiracy theories be of such an unambiguous quality to justify a general rejection?
As long as there is even the faintest possibility that two or more people might
conspire to secretly benefit at the expense of others, the answer is no! If a real conspiracy
is a possibility, an open society must have means to deal with it. Organized crime we
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clearly should not tolerate. Public authorities bound by law that engage in investigations
to stop such criminal conspiracies are part of any democratic society.
The consequence would be: to assess any conspiracy theory by content, individ-
ually. A general rejection would, as well as a general acceptance, not support a stable,
open society.
Yet, an often-heard objection reason why we should refrain from doing so is:
Conspiracy theories are unfalsifiable (Heins, 2007; M. J. Wood, Douglas, & Sutton,
2012; Grimes, 2016). For instance, when somebody claims the HI virus was designed in a
Soviet lab (or an American lab, depending on the theory), this claim would be impossible
to refute2; and any theory offering no criteria for falsification would be worthless. Keeley
(2006) and Basham (2006) object, arguing that such a requirement would preclude initial
inquiries into any presumed conspiracy. Furthermore, falsifiability would be a criterion
of natural sciences, not of political discourse; so the question of falsifiability should not
be made a global argument against any CT.
What these authors do not note: The claim that an arbitrary conspiracy exists
can, from an epistemic viewpoint, never be falsified. It is an existential proposition (∃),
and as such it can only be verified. To falsify the claim that the US government has seized
data from reddit to derive psychological profiles would require: to get hold of absolutely
all governmental plans, decisions, datasets, . . . in order to judge if such user/ citizen
profiles are rendered. That is not possible in principle, as there is no epistemic safe way
to recognize if and when all necessary information to reach a decision is available. That
is a feature of all existential propositions and not an exclusive property of CTs.
Only the very broad conspiracy theories— making universal propositions (∀) like
“every government member in every country is essentially a reptile in human disguise”—
could in principle be falsified, by crucially inspecting a politician’s body immediately post
mortem (and before his reptile colleagues were able to exchange the body with a human
cadaver). That is not a realistic scenario, but again, that is not an exclusive problem
of conspiracy theories. There are many theories, for instance in physics, neurobiology,
and economics, we cannot falsify in the classical sense, as we lack (at the moment) the
devices of measurement.
2One could imagine to find evidence that the virus was already present in, say, stuffed primates from
the 19th century. However, this would not exclude the possibility that said evidence is forged, that
the HI virus was designed independently, or that the Soviets took the primate virus DNA as a
blueprint for a much deadlier variant.
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In applied sciences as well as in everyday life we have to resort to indicators that
make a given assumption more or less likely. This is no strong verification or falsification
in an epistemic sense, and consequentially we can not derive conclusions that make the
assumption in question definitely true or untrue. If we should happen to meet the Queen
of England on a skiing holiday, this would be a strong indicator that she is not a reptile
(comparable to reptiles we usually meet on earth), as she would have to be stiff as a stick
then. But maybe she wears heating gear, or her reptile body has adapted to earthly
climate?
So falsifiability is not a demand we should make when confronted with a conspiracy
theory. We can try to find indicators by deriving secondary assumptions or by inferring
necessary premises for a conspiracy claim, but that does not give us the absolute certitude
we may have hoped for. That holds for conspiracy theories, as it does hold for most
assumptions and theories in everyday life and in science.
Another argument for a general rejection of CTs is that real conspiracies are very
unlikely, as they would blow up soon. Grimes (2016) postulates a mathematical model
to predict how soon—on average—a conspiracy will get publicly known given a number
of insiders. He derives the parameters of his model by accounting for the time real
conspiracies were able to stay hidden. For example, he takes 30,000 NSA employees
as “maximum involved” (Grimes, 2016, p.7) in the PRISM program (one of the NSA
spy programs), with a time of six years from the start of PRISM to its uncovering by
Edward Snowden. The model then predicts that a suppressed cancer cure would get
public after roughly three years (assuming over 700,000 insiders, that is, all employees
of all pharma companies). Likewise, a faked moon landing (with over 400,000 NASA
employees involved) would have blown up after 3.68 years.
These model parameters are questionable at least. 30,000 NSA employees, that
means: no staff fluctuation, no foreign agencies involved, no other government agencies
involved, no subcontractors and third-party companies, no overlapping with other NSA
programs, and no precursors or plans before the PRISM start five to six years before
Snowden. 700,000 employees of big pharma means, on the other hand: Everybody
working there would be an insider in knowledge of a suppressed cancer cure, from the
plant service technician over marketing and accounting staff up to the CEO.
Furthermore, Grimes (2016) underestimates the secrecy a hierarchical organization
is capable of. Indeed, the extremely hierarchical nature of institutions and companies
leads Basham (2006) to assume that a global malevolent conspiracy is possible. Yet,
fear and threat, as assumed by Basham (2006), are not necessarily the most important
factors. As long as all members of a conspiracy are convinced to act morally right,
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no one involved is likely to bail out. It were ethical reasons, after all, that Edward
Snowden gave as motive: “I don’t want to live in a society that does these sort of
things.” (MacAskill, 2013) Other conspiracies were able to keep hidden much longer. In
documents of Operation Moongoose (that was just a part of US efforts to overthrow Fidel
Castro in Cuba in the 1960s, so it seems not exaggerated to assume thousands of people
involved in the government, the military, in three-letter agencies, and among Cuban
exiles supporting the US) written-down suggestions circulated, for example by the US
Joint Chiefs of Staffs: “We could blow up a US ship in Guantanamo Bay and blame
Cuba” (Elliston, 2002, p.93). These strategies were made public 35 years later, not leaked
by a whistleblower, but by journalistic effort that accomplished the de-classification of
those documents under the US Freedom of Information Act (that alllows appelations to
the US federal government in order to get secret documents de-classified).
2.3 A pragmatic resolution
Pigden (2006a) sums up the epistemic debate that “the idea that conspiracy theories as
such are somehow intellectually suspect is a superstitious or irrational belief” (p.165),
and also a dangerous one, as it might protect the lies of criminals. Without a general
rule to treat conspiracy theories, and the abundance of ‘real’ conspiracies throughout
history, the “issue before us is one of degree [. . . ] between the trusting and distrusting
background theories of our civilization” (Basham, 2006, p.99, emphasis in original).
As researchers, we have to be aware of a fallacy that might misguide our reasoning:
We should not conflate the irrationality of some conspiracy theories (for Germany, the
books by Jan van Helsing alias Jan Udo Holey come to mind3) or the irrationality
exhibited by some prominent characters like David Vaughan Icke 4 with the phenomenon
in general (a point made by Dentith, 2014). While these are important psychological
aspects, they are but a part of a larger and more ambiguous phenomenon.
In the view of Clarke (2002, p.91), conspiracy theorizing has its benefits, too: It
“challenges us to improve our social explanations”, it “occasionally identifies a genuine
3Jan Udo Holey writes about flying saucers built by ‘Third Reich’ engineers, Atlantis, and many more
off-wall topics, for example in van Helsing, 1995a, 1995b, 2010. Already in 1996, his book sales had
exceeded 100,000 copies, see Benz (2009).
4David Vaughan Icke spreads the idea that important world leaders are reptilian humanoids. He
has claimed in interviews to be the "Son of God", documented for instance here: https://www.
youtube.com/watch?v=BiyrHZCksDM. Icke’s theories are analysed in Barkun (2003).
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conspiracy” and it “helps to maintain openness in society”. This leaves us with a guide-
line that is on the one hand startling, given the extensive debate going on for decades;
but on the other hand evident and simple:
[C]laims of conspiracy should not be seen as facing a higher burden of
proof than other explanations of complex, social processes.[. . . ] [M]any of
the suspicions we have about conspiracy theories are part of a set of worries
we should have about explanations in general. [. . . ] [I]f someone has an
argument for some claim, then we should assess that argument. It does
not matter whether it is a radical claim about String Theory or the claim
that the president’s backtracking on taxing the super-rich was due to the
behind-the-scenes machinations of the Illuminati; if an argument has been
put forward, we should look at it if we are going to pass judgement. (Dentith,
2014, p.171pp)
This conclusion by Dentith (2014) is an incentive to explore the phenomenon
theoretically and empirically. It points out that CTs are complex beliefs about complex
social processes that must not be dismissed in general. We should develop new methods,
regarding the dangers as well as the benefits of conspiracy theories, and should take a
closer look at the cognitive processes associated with the belief in such theories.
In the following section, I will discuss the article Thirty shades of truth by Raab,
Ortlieb, et al. (2013). It will introduce a new method to assess conspiracy theories; and
it will discuss that CTs might be, for the believer, a means to better understand the
world and oneself.
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3 Article: Thirty shades of truth
I’ve set the bar quite
high in terms of
storytelling.
(E.L. James, author of
Fifty Shades of Grey)
Well say, what’s your take on conspiracy theories?When we set out for the
article “Thirty shades of truth: conspiracy theories as stories of individuation, not of
pathological delusion,” there was no generally accepted measure for the Gretchenfrage
of conspiracy theories. So we developed a measure.
Motivation We were aiming to develop a method that goes beyond a standard ques-
tionnaire. In Raab, Muth, and Carbon (2013) we have argued, for the domains of
aesthetics and user experience (UX), that questionnaires often do not live up to the dy-
namic qualities of our cognitive and emotional processes. And when it comes to design
evaluation, for example, the responsible cognitive-affective processes might run ’in the
background’ of our minds over several months (without coming to a final conclusion at
all).
Presumably, generating and elaborating a conspiratorial belief is not something
that happens once and at a definite point in time. We might compare it to the evaluation
process taking place for, say, the all-new BMW i series. Once in a while, we might read
about the new BMW models in a newspaper or magazine; at times, we discuss electro
mobility with our friends; and every now and then, we might encounter an i3 or even
an i8 on the streets.
Reading, discussing, seeing evidence—and, all along, forming an opinion: Grasping
the dynamics of such cognitive-emotional processes is a demanding task for psychology.
This holds for design appreciation, and it holds for conspiracy theories, too.
Theory and method5 We were inspired by card-based methods like the Q-Sort (see,
for instance, Brown, 1996) and by the repeated evaluation technique (RET; Carbon and
5Further details regarding theory, method and results can be found in the respective parts of the full
article reproduced in Section A.1
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Leder, 2005). The goal was to simulate the process of a) acquiring information concern-
ing an important event and b) the sense-making regarding that event in a controlled
environment, with controlled information, in a short, manageable time-span.
We developed a technique that tried to balance restrictions (regarding available
information) and freedom (regarding the handling of information) and have called it
narrative construction. The preparation for an experiment:
• Information about an event (in our case 9/11) is compiled from real-world sources
(like web sites).
• Information fragments are reduced to short (one to three sentence) statements.
• The information is selected to cover pre-defined categories (in our case, ingredients
of conspiracy theories: odd event, evidence, non-transparency, publicity, group of
conspirers, myth). These categories can be thought of as ranks in a card game.
• Within each category, information is graded, so that there are different shades
of information—comparable to colours in a suit of playing cards. We used three
shades/ colours, referring to the conspiracy classification by Ganser (2006) and
applying it to our 9/11 scenario: official story (officials were surprised by the al-
Qaeda attack), Let it Happen on Purpose (LiHoP; the officials knew beforehand
of al-Qaeda’s plans but did not step in) and Make it Happen on Purpose (MiHoP;
the officials themselves were behind the attack).
• The information is written on cards, ensuring that there are only complete sets
of shades/ colours (in our example, triplets), and that there is at least one set for
each category.
Participants are given the resulting card set and are asked to construct “a most
plausible story for the event”, without time restriction. People then can elaborate the
information and include these statements (=cards) into their personal narration they
deem most plausible. They are asked to lay out the resulting story.
By looking at the categories that were used, we can infer which aspects are most
important for people’s stories. By counting and comparing from which shade/ colour
information was used, we can infer to what extent a story can be regarded a conspiracy
theory.
In our study, 30 participants were asked to construct a 9/11 narration. As we
wanted to address an additional research question (that is described in the next section),
15 participants received the official and the LiHoP cards, and 15 additional participants
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(all students from the University of Bamberg, naïve to the study’s aims and receiving
course credit for participation) received the official, the LiHoP and the MiHoP cards
Results Constructing a conspiratorial narration as most plausible explanation for 9/11
was not a fringe phenomenon. Indeed, when using a (deliberate) threshold that a non-
conspiratorial theory does contain less than 33 percent of conspiratorial (LiHoP and
MiHoP) parts, only five out of 30 resulting theories were not a conspiracy theory.
Discussion Usually, the belief in a conspiratorial explanation is considered a deviation
from ‘normal’ reasoning. For example, conspiracy theories are thought to establish sense-
making when threatening events occur (Franks, Bangerter, & Bauer, 2013), as a kind
of sense-making that is related to political extremism (van Prooijen, Krouwel, & Pollet,
2015), especially when emotions that reduce control were experienced, regardless of the
emotion’s valence (Whitson, Galinsky, & Kay, 2015).
Our findings suggest that constructing a conspiracy theory as most plausible ex-
planation for one of recent history’s most important event is the normal case—and
generating an ‘official explanation’ the deviation. This does not imply a normative
assessment—it would be highly dependent on event and CT content whether a given
conspiracy theory should make us worry—, but we should consider the possibility that
assuming hidden and possibly nefarious causes is the standard narrative.
In the article, we consequently discuss the option that story-telling regarding im-
portant events, as prominently elaborated by McAdams (1993), in general tends to be
a conspiracy theory rather than a non-conspiratorial account. We draw, for example,
on Bischof (1996) and argue that the discovery of agency and knowledge is a narrative
that most people in Western societies personally experience in puberty. Coming of age
usually is s struggle against adversary forces, namely parents and established society.
To eke out agency, against resistance, might be a narrative at the core of our self. And
consequently, narrations for events of personal relevance might be shaped regarding to
this narrative.
Critical appraisal The method we have developed—called narrative construction—
tries to condense a complex cognitive and emotional process. It offers much more degrees
of freedom than a standard questionnaire, as it allows for active elaboration of infor-
mation. Participants can connect assertions and form temporal and causal relations
between statements. At the same time, the cards restrict participants to pre-defined
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categories and shades. In contrast to an interview, it is much more easy to evaluate and
compare the results between subjects.
Of great importance is the compilation of information that goes into the cards’
statements. Should that information be skewed, the results might suffer. To better
assess reliability and validity of the method, additional tests should be run.
However, the evaluation of such quality factors would depend on some kind of
standard that our measure can be compared to. In parallel to our article, Bruder,
Haffke, Neave, Nouripanah, and Imhoff (2013) and Brotherton, French, and Pickering
(2013) have developed and published CT questionnaires.
In the best case, these questionnaires can provide valuable insights on people’s
general tendency to believe in conspiracy theories, that is, the people’s trait; and the
method of narrative construction will help us to understand how individuals perform,
how they process and produce CTs for a given event—that is, we would measure the
state.
Narrative construction should not be the only method to explore conspiracy the-
ories. Yet, it can be a valuable addition to a toolbox that also contains questionnaires,
guidelines for interviews, and—extremely important for this topic—standards and pro-
cedures for assessing documents (like website). Like in the science of aesthetics, a multi-
faceted phenomenon is best explored with a mix of methods.
With the possibility to vary the shades of information that are available to a
participant, we took a closer look at a feature of some conspiracy theories that is strik-
ing and uncanny at the same time: What happens when extreme information—in our
case, information indicating that 9/11 was an inside job by the US government—is
available?
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4 Article: The Sarrazin effect
O believers, if an
evildoer comes to you
with some news, verify
it (investigate to
ascertain the truth),
lest you should harm
others unwittingly and
then regret what you
have done.
(Surah 49. Al-Hujurat, Ayah 6)
It is not wise to dismiss conspiracy theories per se. Yet, CTs can be dangerous. Lies
and misinformation might be embedded in any communication, but with the allega-
tion to hidden actors and secret information, it is easy to transport—deliberately or
by negligence—wrong information. It is in the nature of a conspiracy (theory) that
validation of the claims is hard.
One of histories most detrimental conspiracy theories, traced through the centuries
by Wippermann (2007), and among others discussed by von Bieberstein (1976), by
Groh (1987), by Billig (1987) and by Soyer (2014), with recent empirical work e.g. by
Grzesiak-Feldman and Irzycka (2009), is the theory about Jews striving for (secret)
global dominance by controlling money, by instigating wars, and by spreading lies in the
media.
Maybe the most disturbing artefact of anti-Semitic conspiracy theory is a book
called The Protocols of the Elders of Zion (in America published by Henry Ford, in
Germany by Fritsch, 1924). It first began to circulate at the beginning of the 20th
century in the Russian Empire. The text is essentially a manual how to subjugate the
people to achieve world dominance and was at that time attributed to a secret committee
of influential Zionists. The text was debunked as a forgery already in the 1930s (e.g.,
see Hagemeister, 2001).
The anti-Semitic agitation in these Protocols is one aspect. Additionally, as Wip-
permann (2007) notes with reference to Hannah Arendt, the ideas in this ‘manual to
world domination’ were implemented by Hitler as well as by Stalin: aggressive propa-
ganda, a policy of full employment, taxes based on possession, and “even the ‘central
court of audit’ already mentioned in the ‘protocols’ was not lacking” (Wippermann,
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2007, p.71). The anti-Semitic conspiracy narrative has come full circle here: agitation
imputing a secret plot by Jews, with a plot so efficient that it could be used as a blueprint
by anti-Semitic ideology.
A conspiracy theory as a medium to carry agitation, with disguising the dubious-
ness of the information by referring to secret sources: There is a danger to such theories
that must be regarded. Would people recognize extreme information as such; or would
off-wall statements just get absorbed in the process of constructing a narration?
Motivation The article Raab, Auer, et al. (2013) (Appendix A.3 on page 92) was
set out to explore what happens when extreme statements are made available to people
in a constructive-narrative process. The question had become topical with the book
Deutschland schafft sich ab [Germany is abolishing itself] by Thilo Sarrazin (2010).
Highly successful in sales, the book sketched a theory of Muslims infiltrating the German
people. It included highly controversial statements about a supposed higher fertility of
Muslims, and about Jews having a considerably higher IQ than other people. We wanted
to explore what happens to the stories people generate about an important event when
extreme, debatable information is present in the narrative-constructive process.
Neil Postman (1993) warns us about Technopoly, a society where technology is
not only used any more by society, but where society is shaped by technology. The
“continued and uncontrolled production and dissemination” (p.71) of information would
result in tries to “employ technology itself as a means of providing clear direction and
humane purpose” (p.72). This is a result of institutions like the state and religion losing
influence. Their demise is a demise of information filters, too; and successors like science
have no answers to questions on ethics. Conspiracy theories then might be like a filter
system that tells us which sources should be regarded at all, also in terms of morality.
The way people filter the information that is present could be used to learn more about
the people; and also about how conspiratorial story-telling works.
Method6 Using the approach of narrative construction in Raab, Ortlieb, et al. (2013),
we evenly and randomly assigned 30 students (26 female, Mage = 22.4 years, range: 19–
55 years) of the University of Bamberg (naïve to the aim of the study) to either the (1)
modest contents group or (2) extreme contents group.
6Further details regarding theory, method and results can be found in the respective parts of the full
article reproduced in Section A.3
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The modest group participants received 29 cards with information fragments re-
garding 9/11 (from the categories odd event, evidence, non-transparency, publicity, group
of conspirators, and myth). The statements all were compiled from online sources and
were 13 official accounts with respect to 9/11, and 13 indicated a moderate conspir-
acy (a LiHoP conspiracy in the sense of Ganser, 2006, were the US administration was
not responsible for the attacks, but knew of al-Qaeda’s plans and did nothing to stop
them).
The extreme contents group got all these cards and additionally 13 cards with
extreme conspiratorial items. These items were MiHoP in the sense of Ganser (2006),
with an US government that has planned and executed 9/11.
All participants were asked to “construct a plausible story of the events of Septem-
ber 11th 2001, as a single coherent story or consisting of coherent or controversial frag-
ments,” without time restrictions. When the participant had indicated the story com-
plete, the chosen items were written down. The participant was then asked to rate “how
plausible the 9/11 story version just laid out is” on a five-point Likert scale (among
other questions related to other hypotheses). Participants took between eight and well
over 30 minutes to construct the story (with 21 minutes on average).
Results For each participant, we summed up the items he/ she had chosen from each
conspiracy-category (official, LiHoP, MiHoP). Using a one-way Analysis of Variance
(ANOVA), we tested whether the number of items selected from the official as well as
from the LiHoP item pool differed between the two groups. The difference in the number
of official items selected was significant, F(1,28)=6.92, p=.0137, η2p=.198, with M=7.7
(SD=2.6) for the official and M=4.9 (SD=3.2) for the LiHoP items. We found no
difference in the number of selected limited conspirational items, F(1,28)<1, p=.9537,
n.s. We found no difference in the self-perceived story plausibilty (for group 1 M=3.8,
SD=.9, for group 2 M=4.0, SD=.5; F(1,28)=.58, p=.45, n.s.).
Discussion Including rather extreme statements in a story for sure grants public
awareness. Strong opposition is a form of attention, too, and we can safely assert that
Thilo Sarrazin was successful in starting a debate, and in fuelling it over the course of
several months.
Additionally, we could show that in principle the kind of mixture of information
Sarrazin has provided—comprising official facts and figures, speculations about a danger
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for the German people, and rather off-wall ideas, for example about a Jewish IQ gene—
can be dangerous. When people actively construct a story, that is, an account with
temporal and causal relations tying together pieces of information, they tend to use all
the information available.
In our study, this came at a price: official accounts regarding 9/11 were chosen
significantly less often, not only relative to LiHoP information, but also in absolute
terms. When ‘facts’ from the extreme end of the spectrum enter the stage, moderate
facts get dropped. In terms of self-perceived story plausibility, there was no difference.
Critical appraisal The rather small sample and the focus on 9/11 require further
studies for a generalization. One would have to assert what the effects would be for
very emotional content (e.g., some very recent catastrophe in the own country), for
very boring content (say, family trees of farmers in the Tundra), for information where
participants have a very high expertise, and so on.
However, while the study’s results are quite manifest in hindsight, there would
have been other possible outcomes. For instance, participants might have just ignored
the more extreme facts; they even might have acted in defiance, choosing more official
and less LiHoP items when extreme views are present. Another option for them would
have been to include extreme views without dropping official data.
Yet, people adopted to the information and shifted their stories. In a small and
controlled setting, we have shown what might happen when extreme and even rather off-
wall voices enter a debate: the official, factual accounts might just get lost. Confronted
with, say, The Protocols of the Elders of Zion, people might forget about basic and true
assertions about Jewish history first.
Our method tries to bring a small-scale model of active information acquisition to
the laboratory. It resembles the acquisition process for facts and opinions people engage
in when they are, for example, browsing the web. Maybe the most important difference:
In reality, people engage again and again in information-seeking behaviour for a topic
they deem relevant. Over time, the mechanism we have isolated might explain why some
people believe in reptile aliens leading the world—because their narration has shifted
over time.
The slippery slope The argument by Keeley (2006) that conspiracy theories are a
slippery slope and erode public trust is compatible with empirical findings that essentially
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say: If you believe in one conspiracy theory, then you are likely to believe in many
other as well (Goertzel, 1994; Lewandowsky, Oberauer, & Gignac, 2013). At the same
time, belief in CTs is associated with low levels of trust and a feeling of powerlessness
(Goertzel, 1994; Abalakina-Paap, Stephan, Craig, & Gregory, 1999; Wagner-Egger &
Bangerter, 2007; M. J. Wood & Douglas, 2013). Due to the correlative nature of these
studies, it cannot be ascertained if conspiracy belief leads to distrust; vice versa; if
both are mediated by a third factor; or if distrust and CT belief interact in a positive
reinforcement loop, a vicious circle.
We have shown that the slope is indeed slippery. And that people do not necessar-
ily notice when they are slipping. With an experimental manipulation of the available
information, we have demonstrated the first step, the engagement in a process that
might become a vicious circle of opinion-shifting and distrust.
When our experiment took place, the 9/11 events were over a decade old. Par-
ticipants will inevitably know a good deal about the event, about possible conspiracy
theories, about solid facts, speculations and open questions. That, however, is a prob-
lem most studies about CTs face: Either you include a real-world conspiracy and accept
that participants have prior knowledge; or you include a fictitious story, accepting the
possibility that this story lacks some characteristics a real conspiracy theory has.
After considerations on the power of narrations in section 5, I will present a study
in section 6 that uses a fictitious scenario to determine the role of personal values in
conspiracy belief formation.
In section 7, a study is presented that tries to overcome the limitations of existing
and fictitious conspiracy scenarios. It took the opportunity to explore which kind of
information might lead people to assume (or to reject) a conspiracy—for information
where no conspiratorial narrative was present so far. The study was conducted in 2015
right when it became public that the USA have arrested FIFA officials for bribery, and
consequently the FIFA world cup in Russia 2018 was at stake.
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5 The narrative power of conspiracy theories
They sat silently
(for a while),
tight-lipped.
(Finally they spoke)
Will no (other)
god come forward?
Is [fate] fixed?
(Enuma Elis)
Researchers like Clarke (2002) see a similarity between the emotional involvement
of CT believers and the emotions David Hume (1748/2008) has identified for the belief
in miracles. Hume (1748/2008, p.84, emphasis in original) wrote that “[t]he passion of
suprize and wonder [. . . ] gives a sensible tendency towards the belief of those events.”
The following fact might for some readers be able to stir such emotions: There was a
TV series called The Lone Gunmen (Bowman, 2001, an X-Files spin-off) in the USA
that had a conspiracy in the pilot episode’s main plot; a conspiracy by the government
to fly a commercial aircraft into the World Trade Center in order to increase the sales of
weapons made by the United States. The episode was aired six months before 9/11.
It is pleasurable (and yet, as in the example of The Lone Gunmen, sometimes a
bit creepy) to detect hidden structures and meaning, connecting information, gaining
insights and having aha effects (Muth & Carbon, 2013; Muth et al., 2015; Muth &
Carbon, 2016). This is likely to contribute to the experience people are having when
finding and elaborating conspiratorial explanations. But there seems to be a difference:
The insights I might gain in uncovering a conspiracy might be rewarding, but they come
at a price an artwork usually does not ask from us. Insights into a large-scale conspiracy
potentially shatter our basic knowledge about society and our place in it.
5.1 Conspiracies: making it big
Conspiracy theories often affect society as a whole—they are big: for unnecessary vacci-
nations and a withheld cancer cure, Big Pharma is to blame; the erosion of privacy is a
result of Big Data; the shallowness of media that makes us amuse ourselves to death, as
Postman (1987) has feared years before the advent of commonly-accessible internet, is
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driven by global media companies; and finally, the government is to blame for all the rest.
In the worst case, these stakeholders are, in reality, a single group, the one percent of the
one percent. As we have seen, we cannot refute such theories in principle, and Basham
(2006) deems it not unlikely that at least one malevolent global conspiracy is going on.
Given the technical means of our age, it probably is the first age where such a global
network could work effectively without relying on cabalistic means of coordination.
Is it this hugeness that gives CTs their emotional-motivational spirit in our days?
Mythologies once, comprising cosmogology and eschatology, had been the huge systemic
narrations. In the Enûma Eliš, the gods fought Tiamat and were desperately looking for
help; Marduk took up the quest, conquered and split Tiamat, and heaven and earth were
created. Marduk became the mightiest god there ever was in the Sumerian pantheon
(Kramer, 1981). Later, in Europe, it was Loki in Germanic myth and later on the
devil in medieval Europe, who is a destroyer as well as a master-builder. In the final
days, Loki will oppose the other gods; but Ragnarök is not the end, and a new world
will follow (Simek, 2004, 2007). This eschatology is similar to the Christian revelation.
The difference: The devil does have its share in bringing about the rapture, but gets
vanquished; God does prevail here and can establish the new kingdom himself. So,
common to these mythologies is a figure with features of a trickster, a force in the
system bringing about division and radical change. The trickster is an archetype in the
sense of Carl Gustav Jung (1986), that is, an intelligent and subversive character that
is destined and self-empowered at the same time, that opposes the prevailing power and
introduces chaos.
The argument here is not that a Jungian collective unconscious might exist;
Bischof (1996), for instance, assumes these stories reflect an individual’s ontogenesis.
However, we might ascertain that stories that involve a “reframing of the imposing uni-
versal dimension, the imposing of a new universality” (Žižek, 2014, p.184) are as old
as written history. As such, they appear successfully in popular culture. The teenager
series Buffy the Vampire Slayer (Whedon, Greenwalt, Noxon, Kuzui, & Kuzui, 1997–
2003), for instance, went beyond the usual coming-of-age story. Protagonist Buffy, an
attractive teenage girl, was bound by fate to protect our world from demonic carnage.
These dark powers often manifested in worldly leaders; for example, in the town’s mayor.
By accepting her destiny and by getting self-empowered, by hard training, by the help
of her friends and by using her wits, Buffy is able to outsmart the demons and to save
the day.
In literary fiction,the character Harry Potter from the novel series by Rowling
(1997–2007) rises from an inconspicuous boy to the world’s most powerful magician—by
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accepting his fate, empowering himself, relying on his friends and using his wits. So in
the end, he conquers the evil lord Voldemort who was plotting in secret against Harry
Potter all along, and who had even killed Harry Potter’s parents shortly after Harry’s
birth.
These are not pure tricksters in the Jungian sense. These popular characters are
heroes as well as tricksters. Yet, their coming-of-age is a battle against secret plots, dark
powers, and against ever-impending doom. They fight and often ridicule these powers,
and by doing so they make visible the secret deeds of their enemies. Maybe these nar-
ratives are so powerful because they reflect our own coming-of-age, as Bischof (1996)
suggests. In any case, they are extremely widespread and can therefore be considered
well-known and cognitively accessible (at least in Western culture). Heroes and trick-
sters, sometimes unified in one person, opposing those in power, and an all-pervasive
division (heaven and earth, good and evil) are integral part of such stories.
5.2 Waiting for the Event
Should Marduk, Loki and Lucifer as well as Buffy and Harry Potter concern us when
considering the emotional-motivational impact of conspiracy theories in our days? The
philosopher Slavoj Žižek, in his analysis of Western society today, reflects about the
possibility of an Event, a complete shattering and re-arrangement of politics, religion
and art:
In the last couple of years, we thus have dwelt in a continuous pre-evental situation
in which an invisible barrier seems to prevent again and again the genesis of a
proper Event, the rise of something New. One of the reasons for this invisible
barrier is the latest ideological triumph of capitalism: each worker becomes his or
her own capitalist, the ‘entrepreneur-of-the-self’ who decides how much to invest
in his or her own future education, health and so on, paying for these investments
by getting indebted. (Žižek, 2014, p.181)
When the change and something New should come about, it would be an Event
changing the dimensions of judgement itself. It would also split the people: “In situations
of deep crisis, an authentic division is urgently needed—a division between those who
want to drag on within the old parameters and those of the necessary change.” (Žižek,
2014, p.185)
We know from the myths and narrations we grew up with that such a rupture—or
better, rapture—is in its beginning a story of power and conspiracy. But at some time,
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a hero-trickster comes and stirs it all up. Loki, by mocking the gods, makes visible the
power of those gods for the common people. A visible power, however, can be challenged
and eventually conquered.
In a sense, Popper (1958/1980) would have been right to identify secularization
as a reason for the growing prevalence of conspiracy theories: not necessarily because
we attribute absolute power to the conspirators; but because we ourselves have taken
the roles of Marduk, Loki and Lucifer, by identifying with Buffy and Harry. When
people are longing for a thorough change in the system, the age-old stories still give a
reasonable plan of action: spot the power; make visible the deeds and means of that
power; challenge the power; divide people in preservers and changers; and hope for the
Event that will change everything.
Getting control over threatening secret powers is a narrative embodied in proba-
bly the most well-known and influential theory of psychology: Freudian psychoanalysis.
A therapy that, as noted by Melley (2000), bears a striking resemblance to common
conspiratorial narratives: an individual, powerless and desperate, begins to look for hid-
den signs and meanings in dreams and childhood memories. The uncovered information
makes visible the powers responsible for suffering: the id and the super-ego with their
demands. Once dragged to light, the individual can begin to tame these hostile pow-
ers. The frame of reference changes completely (as it shifts from the unconsious to the
conscious I ) and a concious, self-determinate life becomes possible.
5.3 Narration as a simulation of reality
But does narration work this way? It is one thing to identify recurring patterns in
literature and television; and it seems likely that these narrations are an expression of
some kind, a symbolic rendition of inner states. While that is interesting in its own
right, it does not follow automatically that narrations also retro-act on people in the
way just described.
Mar and Oatley (2008) argue that narrations are not only a model of the outside
world. They also serve as a “simulation that allows us to know what another might
be wanting, thinking, and feeling.” (p.175) With respect to McAdams (1993), this gain
in knowledge would not be limited to other people, but would also help to understand
oneself, although Mar and Oatley (2008) point out that life narratives are probably
different from literary narratives.
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Narrations for Mar and Oatley (2008) are abstractions of the social world disclosing
the schemata of complex social processes, and at the same time “substantially less simple
than other more explicitly didactic representations of social information that tend to be
nonnarrative in structure.” (p.177) These stories can be regarded as simulations of reality
and help us to understand the past, to predict the future, and to be prepared for difficult
encounters. Even works from genres usually frowned upon, like thrillers and mystery
novels, have their merits according to Mar and Oatley (2008): They might help to avoid
deception in real life and lay bare the dangers of intra- and interpersonal conflict. This
might even hold for the confrontation with propaganda, which “could prompt thoughts
about how our own response would be quite different.” (p.186)
Reisenzein (2009) fully acknowledges the power of narrations to gain knowledge
about ourselves and others. In contrast to computer simulations, however, he sees an
important difference:
However, at least for the purpose of hypothesis testing, using existing
literary works as simulation input may not be the best available option. From
the perspective of simulation science, simulations are particularly informative
if they are run repeatedly with varying parameters. This suggests that the
simulation of a multiplicity of scenarios depicting different developments of
the same basic predicament (a form of thought experimentation) will be more
revealing than that of a single literary work describing only one possible
course of events. (Reisenzein, 2009, p.36)
These arguments can help us to re-evaluate the findings by M. J. Wood et al.
(2012). Participants were found to believe in different conspiracy theories at the same
time (in one study regarding the death of Princess Diana, in another one the death of
Osama bin Laden), even when the theories were mutually exclusive. The authors con-
clude that “conspiracism constitutes a monological belief system, drawing its coherence
from central beliefs.” (p.6) However, we could think of the participants’ belief systems
as instances of simulations in the sense of Reisenzein (2009), with varying parameters of
input and outcome. This kind of conspiracy belief would not be a hackneyed and close-
minded account of reality, but a rather sophisticated way to deal with the uncertainties
and possibilities of a complex world.
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5.4 The post-modern trap
Taking this view to extremes, reality itself is not defined by facts any more, “and the
search for proof, indeed the objectivity of the facts does not put an end to this vertigo
of information”, as Baudrillard (1994, p.16) writes; the countless models that can be
generated for any fact precede the facts themselves. This so-called “logic of simulation”
(p.16) negates any determined discursive position.
There is a caveat, however, when introducing the post-modern view by Bau-
drillard (1994) or Lyotard (2005) into the discourse on conspiracy theories. We can—and
should—read these accounts as a diagnosis of a society where narratives become inter-
changeable. Of course, there is an aesthetic appeal to this idea. The movie The Ma-
trix (Wachowski Brothers, 1999), for example, has become iconic as a new-millennium-
motion-picture where reality and simulation, free will and determinism, and justice and
injustice blend in and become exchangeable. The main plot can be considered a con-
spiracy on the largest possible scale: All of our reality is just a simulation in a computer
system run by evil machines. Neo, the main character, is the saviour to end this greatest
of all deceptions. In the first minutes of the motion picture, Neo is caught reading the
book by Baudrillard (1994).
As researchers, we should not confuse this aesthetic game—and this diagnosis of
society—with the academic perspective we take on the phenomenon. There are conspir-
acy theories that do not just speculate about the causes of Princess Diana’s fatal accident,
but that postulate devilish Semitic/ Islamic/ African/ . . . deeds and thus might foster
prejudice and hate. It is our task to treat such conspiracy theories as a phenomenon
that is not interchangeable with any other simulation of reality. Not all narrations are
equal; narrations that are a medium for prejudice are special. It is psychology’s task to
tackle them.
5.5 Know thyself!
The thoughts on narration presented in this section are a speculative account; so they
must not be treated as an explanation, but should be seen as a kind of heuristics. It
might give us an idea why people, after the initial suprize and wonder sparked by a
conspiracy theory, continue to go down the rabbit hole. Maybe spotting the enemy down
there—down, like down in the unconscious—is just the first step. Yet, the promise is to
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get in control again. We might learn what drives ourselves by learning what drives the
enemy.
The next section describes a first empirical attempt to explore the relation between
conspiracy theories and self-knowledge. The rationale will be to show that people will
spontaneously construct conspiracy theories that are in accordance with their personal
values, with these values endangered by an enemy that represents the opposite notion
of those values.
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6 Conference paper: Conspiracy belief
and personal beliefs
If you know your enemies
and know yourself, you
will not be imperiled in
a hundred battles.
(Sun Tzu)
Our personal values describe our goals in life: What do we want? What do we fear?
Do we favour independence in our thoughts and actions, or do we prefer conformity and
adhere to the rules of society?
Values not only describe our personal, trans-situational goals. They might also
help us to describe societies as a whole. The Western ideal of an autonomous and self-
reliant individual might, for example, be a stereotype frowned upon in Asian culture.
The following section describes a first attempt to relate the psychological concept of
values to an engagement in conspiracy theories.
Motivation7 One of the most influential concepts of values in psychology was de-
scribed by Shalom H. Schwartz, for example in Schwartz (2012). If the assumption
should hold that conspiracy theories help us to recognize and express what is most im-
portant to us, then one’s personal values should relate to the conspiracy theories he or
she engages in.
The vantage point for our approach was an infamous building project in Germany:
Stuttgart 21, the federal state government’s plan in Stuttgart (Baden-Württemberg, Ger-
many) to relocate the city’s train station, that is: to build it from scratch, underground;
in order to free up overground space for urban development.
As the projected building costs exploded and reached several billions, in 2010
people began to demonstrate, with over 100,000 people on the streets of Stuttgart (a
chronology of the protests can be found at Südwestrundfunk, 2014). The demonstrations
7Further details regarding theory, method and results can be found in the respective parts of the
full manuscript, reproduced in Section A.4 exactly as it was submitted for and circulated at the
conference on conspiracy theories in Miami, FL, 2015.
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culminated in clashes between protesters and police, leaving some protesters severely
wounded.
It is far from usual that a supposed waste of taxpayers’ money is taken to the
streets. And Stuttgart 21 was even more special: The protesters’ education was above
average with 40 percent holding a university degree, and the large majority strongly
identified with democratic values (Bebnowski et al., 2010). Not only did these people
decry the project cost; they insinuated the true intent behind Stuttgart 21 was to fill
the bags of some top politicians and entrepreneurs, and the public was told lies. The
main narration thus was: a conspiracy theory.
Theory We decided to base our study on the theory by Schwartz (2012). In its original
form, it assumes ten basic values, that is, beliefs that refer to desirable goals and tran-
scend specific situations. These values are: universalism, benevolence, tradition, con-
formity, security, power, achievement, hedonism, stimulation and self-direction. They
can be imagined as a circumplex with mutually exclusive values at opposite ends of the
circle (like, for example, achievement and universalism).
In later publications, Schwartz has extended the set to 19 values (Schwartz et
al., 2012). For our approach, the earlier model was sufficient, as we only used the
coarse circumplex model with four circle quarters: openness to change and conservation
(opposed in the circumplex, i.e., mutually exclusive), and self-enhancement and self-
transcendence (again, these two being opposed). Also, questionnaires with published
German translations were available for the ten-value-model.
Under the assumption that narrations help us to recognize what is important to
us, people should construct conspiracy theories that put their most important values at
risk. Knowing the enemy helps to know oneself.
Method We fabricated a news story with mock printouts of internet news magazines
that in Berlin a new program of study was to be established, a school called future
of humanity. Stakeholders for this new course program were left-wing student groups
(threatening self-enhancement by propagating communist ideas), McKinsey consulting
(threatening self-transcendence by propagating egoism), “lesbian gay bisexual trans-
gender”–groups (LGBT) threatening conservative values, and the archbishop of Berlin
(threatening openness to change by propagating conservative values). According to the
fabricated news stories, there was a breakdown in negotiations, but so far it was unclear
why.
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Using the paradigm of narrative construction, we had compiled cards with state-
ments attributing the responsibility for the breakdown of negotiations to either one of
these stakeholders, using again the tripartite categorization with official story, LiHoP
and MiHoP. There were, for example, cards stating that LGBT groups were insisting on
more gender-related studies for the school (LGBT–official), that accused McKinsey of
secretly not supporting the process any more (McKinsey–LiHoP); and of the archbishop
actively and secretly torpedoing the process (archbishop-MiHoP). In total, there were
48 cards.
The 35 students that participated in the study had to construct theirmost plausible
course of events why the negotiations had stalled. They also filled out questionnaires
related to Schwartz (2012): the Short Schwartz’s Value Survey (SSVS) by Lindeman and
Verkasalo (2005) and the Portrait Value Questionnaire (PVQ) by Schmidt, Bamberg,
Davidov, Herrmann, and Schwartz (2007); and the conspiracy scales by Brotherton et al.
(2013), and by Bruder et al. (2013).
Results Using Kendall’s τb (which does not require assumptions about the underlying
distribution of values), we found significant correlations with the PVQ for the LGBT
stakeholder group only.
• The higher the value for openness to change, the lower the conspiracy score re-
garding the LGBT community (τb=-.289, p=.029)
• The higher the value for conservatism, the higher the conspiracy score regarding
the LGBT community (τb=.317, p=.016)
• The higher the value for self-transcendence, the lower the conspiracy score regard-
ing the LGBT community (τb=-.434, p=.001)
To get a score for each person indicating how much conspiracy was assumed, we
counted each official card that was selected with 0, each LiHoP item with 1 and each
MiHoP item with 2. Participants scored a median value of 15.00 (SD=10.32), indicating
that including LiHoP and MiHoP items in one’s story was common. There was no
correlation with the conspiracy questionnaires.
Discussion Our results are compatible with the hypothesis that people spot an ‘en-
emy’ that endangers one’s most important values. Conservative people were prone to
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assume an LGTB conspiracy. People open to change and self-transcendent people were
significantly less inclined to blame the LGTB community.
However, for the other stakeholders, we did not find significant effects. It might
be possible that ‘McKinsey’ and the ‘archbishop of Berlin’ were too far from the living
reality of our Bavarian student sample. And ‘left-wing student groups’ are, in Bavaria,
quite tame and not very present at the University of Bamberg.
Further studies would have to explore whether the hypothesis has to be refined;
or if the stakeholder groups were not suitable. Stakeholders more relevant for the par-
ticipants might give better insights.
Critical appraisal Being the first study—to our knowledge—to link the full spectrum
of personal values and the content of conspiracy theories, our results were encouraging.
Although only one of four stakeholder groups did relate significantly to the participants’
values, this relation was in accordance with our assumptions. Consequently, further
studies with refined content might be promising.
It should be noted here that participants were in no need to construct any con-
spiracy at all. By using the official items only, a full and plausible account for the
breakdown of negotiations would have been possible. This, again, supports our idea
that thinking in conspiratorial narrations is the rule and not the exception. However,
this does not explain the missing correlation with the two standard questionnaires on
CTs. Further research might clarify whether these instruments are sensitive only to an
established and elaborated conspiratorial mindset; while our method might be able to
evoke conspiratorial thinking that is compatible with everyday reasoning.
The assumption that spotting the ‘enemy’ is a part of everyday reasoning might
help to integrate results by other authors. For example, Lewandowsky, Gignac, and
Oberauer (2013) found that conservatism and the belief in a benevolent free market
strongly predicted the rejection of climate change, but there was no such effect for
genetically modified foods. Oliver and Wood (2014) did not find a connection between
CT belief and conservative beliefs. The belief that US president Barack Obama was not
born in the United States (an opinion voiced by the so-called Birthers), however, was
predominant among Republicans, that is, conservative people (Pasek, Stark, Krosnick,
& Tompson, 2015).
It is plausible to assume that conservative people are opposed to scientists that
propagate a reduction of traditional means of power generation and advocate green
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technology. Genetically modified food, however, might help to strengthen domestic
agricultural industry and would thus be consistent with conservative beliefs. Just re-
cently, Nefes (2015) has found that American left- and right-wing adherents pick their
conspiracies according to their worldview.
Yet, the research available so far points out a cultural gap between Anglo-American
research and European approaches. The bipartite political system in the USA (and also
in the UK) lends itself to a comparison of Republicans and Democrats. One just has
to ask which of the two parties one would vote, with a third option being no vote at
all—referring to the concept of partisanship, as used in Uscinski, Klofstad, and Atkinson
(2016).
In Germany, for example, with five to six parties having realistic chances of being
part of the next federal government8, in addition to non-voters, inferring participants’
beliefs is more demanding.
As noted, the vast majority of participants did construct a conspiracy theory;
already in Raab, Ortlieb, et al. (2013), this was the case. Do people construct conspiracy
theories, no matter what, when given the chance? Or does it take some kind of trigger,
to make people engage in conspiratorial thinking? In the next section, I will address
this question.
8According to voter research in May 2016, condensed for example at http://www.wahlrecht.de/
umfragen/
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7 Article: Conspiracy formation is in the detail
In my opinion the World
Cup in Russia will be
able to stabilize all
the situation in this
region of Europe that is
suffering now.
(Sepp Blatter in 2015,
at that time Fifa president)
Media carry meaning and countermeaning: Baudrillard (1994, p.84) reminds
us here that there is no single—or simple—truth for important events. The analysis of
US media by Herman and Chomsky (2002) proposes filter mechanisms in the flow of
information from news source to a newspaper’s front page. Media company ownership,
pressure by advertising companies, sources with a spin, and flak9.
The fifth filter identified by Herman and Chomsky (2002) is the ideology of anti-
communism Even half a century after Joseph McCarthy, “issues tend to be framed in
terms of a dichotomized world of Communist and anti-Communist powers, with gains
and losses allocated to contesting sides” (p.30). The supposed Bulgarian-KGB connec-
tion behind Mehmet Ali Ağca who shot Pope John Paul II in 1981 is at the heart of
an extensive case study by Herman and Chomsky (2002). The KGB connection was
favoured by US media in the years after the assassination attempt, and alternatives
were not evaluated; that is, connections between Ağca and the Turkish fascist group
Grey Wolves were not discussed publicly. Ganser (2005), too, points out the gap be-
tween evidence and news stories, even insinuating there might have been CIA support.
Why was Pope John Paul II shot? We will not find definitive answers here; yet,
we can take the diagnosis by Herman and Chomsky (2002) that the media, and even
reputable media, transport a meaning that is just one meaning—one simulation—of
many possible ones. So we set out to explore the effect of slight differences in meaning
in a journalistic text on the recipients.
9Colloquial term for heavy criticism in the form of telephone calls, e-mails, letters, tweets, etc.; prob-
ably deriving from the German Flak, that is, Flugabwehrkanone (anti-aircraft cannon)
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Motivation Conspiracy theory research in most cases targets beliefs about important
and well-known events (like 9/11, the death of Princess Diana, climate change, . . . ).
Using these well-known events precludes research from analysing how a conspiracy belief
begins to develop in the first place. An alternative might be to use fictional scenarios,
employed for instance by Bost and Prunier (2013) and Raab et al. (2015). Yet, fictional
settings might be perceived as artificial, not relevant, and thus run the danger of being
processed differently (in cognitive and emotional terms) than real conspiracy theories.
We took the chance when an event suddenly hit the front pages in May 2015
that was unforeseen and bore the potential for a conspiracy theory of global dimensions:
In May 2015, the USA indicted 16 Fifa officials for conspiracy and corruption. Soon
there were speculations that these arrests were motivated by political motives; that the
USA might try to impede the Fifa world cup 2018 in Russia. The investigations by
Attorney General Loretta E. Lynch, then, would have been a proxy revenge scenario for
the Crimean crisis.
We know from seminal studies like those by Loftus and Palmer (1974) that even
very tiny bits of information—for instance, the verb indicating the cars’ speed in a
question about a car crash—might considerably influence what people remember and
express. The research question in our approach: To determine whether hints at causation
as well as intention—that is, aspects of agency—are necessary that people start to engage
in conspiratorial thinking; with regard to an event they do not already hold a CT belief
for.
We devised a study that was run in full just 48 hours after the US investigations
became public. While many of our participants had heard of the investigations, the
scenario was too fresh to have provoked conspiratorial thinking.
Theory10 The attribution of agency might relate to conspiracy belief, as a conspiracy
always is a deliberate plan by some agents. The data so far is inconclusive on the
question whether CT believers are people who over-estimate the role of conscious agency
and structure in the course of important events.
Dieguez, Wagner-Egger, and Gauvrit (2015) found no evidence that CT believ-
ers adhere to a “nothing happens by accident”–heuristics. They even found that CT
belief was positively correlated with the attitude that bad events happen to people at
random.
10Further details regarding theory, method and results can be found in the respective parts of the full
manuscript reproduced in Section A.5
44
Article: Conspiracy formation
In contrast, for Oliver and Wood (2014), a belief in strong and unseen forces
was the best predictor for belief in CTs. A hyperactive agency detection, that is, the
assumption of agency behind very small changes in the environment, was identified by
van der Tempel and Alcock (2015) to correlate with conspiracy mentality. The idea of
hyper-sensitive agency in connection with conspiracy theories was previously put forward
by Franks et al. (2013). For Douglas, Sutton, Callan, Dawtry, and Harvey (2016), too,
such agency detection (e.g., for inanimate objects) was positively associated with CT
belief.
However, the correlations reported between conspiracy belief and hypersensitive
agency detection are weak in general. A correlation of .26 is reported by van der Tempel
and Alcock, 2015, for n=209 undergraduates. Correlations of .17 and .22 respectively
were reported in the studies by Douglas et al. (2016) (N=202 and N=330, both via
Amazon’s Mechanical Turk).
So agency detection might be related to conspiracy belief. It is yet unclear, how-
ever, if this agency detection is a general trait by CT believers, or if it needs to be
triggered by a special kind of information. Furthermore, it is unclear whether the attri-
bution of agency grows parallel to the belief in a specific conspiracy theory (and thus
is present when elaborated CT beliefs are involved), or if it is a feature already present
when a conspiracy belief (for a given event) starts to form.
For our purpose, we used the culpable control model by Alicke (2000). It is rooted
in the psychology of blame and differentiates aspects of processing evidence for harmful
events. We also integrated the LiHoP-MiHoP-categorization by Ganser (2006). We ar-
rived at two studies, one varying causation and one varying intention in the relationship
of US investigations, the Fifa, and the world cup in Russia.
Methods Drawing from on-line newspaper reports on the Fifa investigations, we com-
piled a short, newspaper-style text reporting some facts:
Zurich/New York (dpa) - US Attorney General Loretta Lynch defended
the investigations against world football federation FIFA, and the detention
of seven FIFA officials in Zurich, at a press conference in New York. “This
kind of corruption and the bribery in international soccer has been going
on for two decades.” US authorities are accusing the seven detained FIFA
officials of corruption over a period of at least 24 years. “They corrupted
the worldwide soccer business to enrich themselves.” said Ms. Lynch. “They
have done it again and again, year after year, tournament after tournament.”
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We devised a short questionnaire with socio-demographic questions on page one.
Page two showed the newspaper text (that differed in its last sentences between groups
and studies). On page three, participants were asked to answer twelve items on politics
and soccer, with four explicitly referring to hidden and harmful intentions:
• The investigations are part of a global power game,
• The USA is trying to harm Russia with their investigations,
• The investigations becoming public right now is no coincidence,
• FIFA is just a pawn sacrifice in the USA’s striving for global dominance.
On the last page, participants answered the GCB scale by Brotherton et al. (2013).
The whole procedure took about ten minutes. All participants were naïve to the aims
of the study, volunteered to participate and did not receive any compensation.
The Fifa investigations were revealed on Wednesday, March 27th 2015. We con-
ducted our studies on Friday, 29th of May 2015, starting at 10:00 a.m. (CET) and
finishing on the same day at 04:00 p.m. Participants were asked to participate in a
study on the perception of journalism regarding the Fifa revelations.
In Study 1 (causation) 102 students of the University of Bamberg were given the
newspaper text on the US investigations and returned complete questionnaires. One
half were randomly assigned to a group where the text was ending with the sentences:
“There is the suspicion ‘that there have been irregularities in the allocations for the
World Cups in 2018 (Russia) and 2022 (Qatar).’ This might lead to a reallocation of the
upcoming World Cups. Due to the US investigations, the carrying out of the World Cup
in Russia in three years is no longer certain.” (direct causation, that is, direct connection
between investigation and the world cup)
The other half of participants received the same text, but ending with the sen-
tences: “There is the suspicion that there have been irregularities in the allocations for
the World Cups in 2018 (Russia) and 2022 (Qatar).’ This might lead to a reallocation of
the upcoming World Cups. The investigations additionally led to political discussions
beyond FIFA.” (indirect causation, that is, no direct connection between investigations
and the world cup is made)
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In Study 2 (purpose) 100 students of the University of Bamberg completed the
questionnaires. One half received the text ending with: “The Russian president subse-
quently denounced the act as a plot against Russia to impede the Russian World Cup in
three years: ‘The USA and the media try in an obvious campaign to harm Russia and
to withdraw the World Cup’, said Vladimir Putin.” (purposeful intention; MiHoP, that
is, the USA want to impede the world cup in Russia on purpose)
The other half received a text ending in: “There is the suspicion ‘that there
have been irregularities in the allocations for the World Cups in 2018 (Russia) and 2022
(Qatar).’ This might lead to a reallocation of the upcoming World Cups. Some members
of the Russian Duma now blame the USA that, due to their action, they approvingly
accept the consequence of withdrawing the Russian World Cup in three years.” (non-
purposeful intention; LiHoP, that is, the USA might have known that their actions might
impede their world cup, but that was a side effect and not their intention in the first
place)
Results We used the subscale government malfeasance from the GCB scale by Broth-
erton et al. (2013), as it relates to conspiracies wrought by the government, to assess
the predisposition of a participant to engage in government-related conspiracy theories.
The dependent variable was derived from the four items insinuating a US conspiracy.
In Study 1 a simple slope analysis of our regression model showed that conspirato-
rial predispositions significantly and positively predicted conspiracy belief in the direct
causation condition, β= .56, SE = .13, t(93) = 4.22, p <.001, 95% CIβ = [.30, .82], but
not in the indirect causation condition, β = .15, SE = .13, t(93) = 1.11, p = .268, 95%
CIβ = [-.17, .41].
In Study 2 a simple slope analysis of our regression model showed that conspiratorial
predispositions significantly and positively predicted conspiracy belief in the MiHoP
condition, β = .52, SE = .12, t(96) = 4.22, p < .001, 95% CIβ = [.27, .77], but not in
the LiHoP condition, β = .15, SE = .16, t(96) = .95, p = .346, 95% CIβ = [-.17, .47].
Discussion Study 1 revealed that people with a high conspiratorial predisposition
begin to sense a conspiracy only when they are confronted with the implication of a direct
causation. Study 2 supported this result: Only the notion of a purposeful (MiHoP) act
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by the USA made people with high conspiratorial predispositions assume a conspiracy,
whereas participants scoring low on the government malfeasance scale rejected the idea
of a conspiracy even more. The LiHoP condition failed to provoke this effect.
These results indicate that the belief in a conspiracy theory does not come ‘out
of nowhere’. It is not imposed on every new information a person receives. It rather
takes specific facts and evidences—here, the notion of direct causal relation and/ or
purposeful intention—that a person biased towards conspiratorial thinking will take this
view. Interestingly, this seems to work both ways: People being sceptical of conspiracies
will, confronted with such causal relations and purposeful intentions, begin to outright
reject the idea of a conspiracy.
Our results support Dieguez et al. (2015), but are contrary to van der Tempel and
Alcock (2015) as well as Douglas et al. (2016). A solution would be an interactionist view:
People inclined to believe in CTs do not look for them behind every tree and under every
stone. Yet, when the information available to these people gives rise to the suspicion
that a purposeful bad intention has caused some bad effects, these people will be inclined
to follow the conspiracy trail. In doing so, they will find additional information with
evidence for causality and intent. It would be an interplay of disposition, information
and situation.
Critical appraisal Our studies were the first to address conspiracy formation right
when an important event begins to unfold. In hindsight, some aspects of our study
might be improved. For instance, causality and purpose are—in reality and in our
items—confounded to some extent. Although a manipulation check has assured that our
assumed categories were perceived the way we designed them, a more careful wording
might have made the distinction sharper.
There was a third study, too, which had to be dropped from analysis. There we had
German protagonists commenting on the affair, and one fictitious quote in the text was
by Lutz Bachmann, mastermind of the German anti-Muslim, anti-immigration grass-
roots movement PEGIDA (Patriotische Europäer gegen die Islamisierung des Abendlan-
des, that translates to Patriotic Europeans opposing the Islamization of Occident). His
quote was nearly identical with the Putin quote in Study 2. However, from oral feedback
we got from participants, many of them did not know Lutz Bachmann, and thus any
results from this condition would have been vulnerable.
Uscinski et al. (2016) recently published a study where participants were asked
about the media coverage in the lead up to the Congress election 2012 on YouGov.
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503 participants responded to a question where a ‘media conspiracy’ was given as a
possible cause for discussions about journalistic quality, and 512 to a question where the
reason for quality problems was seen in ‘poor journalism’. Only those people who had
the conspiracy cue and at the same time scored high in conspiratorial predisposition
assumed that the media acted with a bias, so “the effects are highly dependent on an
individual’s predispositions.” (Uscinski et al., 2016, p.12)
So our studies as well as the results by Uscinski et al. (2016) suggest that people
do not constantly develop conspiracy theories. It is a combination of predisposition and
cues in the information—namely, assumptions about causality and purpose—that make
people engage in conspiratorial narrations.
While this can be considered one milestone in the understanding of the formation
of conspiracy theories, there are further questions that need to be addressed for a full
picture. For example, the properties of the supposed conspirators might make a differ-
ence (as the results presented in section 6 suggest). Uscinski et al. (2016) found that
Republicans were most likely to assume a media conspiracy; probably because the en-
emy image of leftist media fits some stereotypes held by some Republicans. It would be
interesting to explore whether it really is just some stereotype that is responsible here;
or if a sophisticated system of beliefs and values is at the heart of such judgements.
Another very important point would be the credibility of the source. Uscinski et
al. (2016) used anonymous allegations of conspiracy. In the studies presented here, we
had used anonymous allegations, too, in Study 1; in Study 2, we referred to Vladimir
Putin as a source. Credibility of the news medium and of the quoted source might
make a difference. Which kind of difference, however, is not trivial. The Protocols of
the Elders of Zion, in Germany published by Fritsch (1924), are supposed to have been
found by “Russian police [. . . ] in the year 1901 in the course of a house search in a
Jewish domicile” (p.4). So people who wanted to believe these protocols to be genuine
had to rely on an anonymous and shady source. It did not hinder (or maybe it did even
foster) the rapid dissemination of this pamphlet.
In any case the procedure presented here should be refined and standardized. The
goal would be a blueprint with generic scales and questions, and fields like:
Do you think that the actions by [insert conspirator here] will
affect [insert victiom here] and lead to [insert conspirator’s
goal here]?
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Whenever a new scandal arises—in latest times, the Volkswagen emissions scan-
dal and the Panama Papers come to mind—researchers could adopt the blueprint and
investigate how conspiracy theories originate.
Fifa, Volkswagen, tax evasion: Obviously these topics are important to many
people. They relate to leisure and recreation; to economy and personal experience; and
to questions about politics and society. Conspiracy theories concern everyone. To make
knowledge about CTs more widespread, a popular science book on conspiracy theories
is currently work in progress. It will look at history, present scientific research, and
illustrate the appeal as well as the danger of conspiratorial narrations. This book will
be sketched in the following section.
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8 A popular-science book on conspiracy theories
I think that the task
of philosophy is not
to provide answers, but
to show how the way
we perceive a problem
can be itself part
of a problem.
(Slavoj Zizek 2011,
lecture `Year of Distraction')
In the beginning there was the conspiracy theory: This work-in-progress
title for a popular-science book that is scheduled to be printed in 2017 acknowledges
that conspiracy theories are as old as human history. Yet, in the book (to be issued
by Springer Verlag; a small excerpt is reprinted here in section A.6) the historical
perspective will be just the vantage point.
We know from Pagan (2005, 2012) and MacGregor (2013) that conspiracies, and
consequently theories about conspiracies, have been a part of political and everyday life
at least for the last 2000 years. Some authors (like deHaven-Smith and Witt, 2013)
claim that a fear of conspiracy is deeply embedded in American culture because of the
US’s political history. Works like the books by Uscinski and Parent (2014) and Melley
(2000) take a closer look at the phenomenon in the US.
But what does that mean for us? Maybe we are living in a technopoly world
(Postman, 1993) and society is becoming a global village (McLuhan & Powers, 1989).
Questions of agency, as addressed in this thesis, might become more important than ever.
At the same time, conventional grand narratives like religion lose their explanatory power
(Lyotard, 2005).
Conspiracy theories might help us to shape our selves, to identify important agents,
and to find like-minded people. They can be part of a life-story in the sense of McAdams
(1993). Thus, they might be a meta-narrative that creates meaning. Here, we will
include reports like the book by Kay (2009) who delved into the conspiracist under-
ground.
We will take this perspective in the book. Yet, this will be a cumbersome task: It
is manifest—and has been addressed in this thesis, too—that conspiracy theories might
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be dangerous, even deadly. Anti-Semitic theories are a huge problem (the Protocols,
for example, have been around for over 100 years). Anti-Muslim theories are gaining
momentum (and are even best-sellers, like Sarrazin, 2010). The media’s reputation has
suffered (seen with the infamous rallying cry Lügenpresse [liar press] by Pegida). We
are, epistemically, on a slippery slope (Keeley, 2006).
One of our main objectives thus will be to present—understandable for the
layman—the philosophical debate (for instance, from Coady, 2006b; Dentith, 2014;
Clarke, 2002; Heins, 2007) and enrich it with own ideas, drawing for example on the
works by Illies (2015) and Žižek (1991, 2014).
We will also introduce the reader to narrative psychology (Laszlo, 2008; Som-
mer, 2009; Zunshine, 2006), narratology (Koschorke, 2012), and theories related to the
spreading of information, like the meme theory (Dawkins, 1989; Blackmore, 2005) and
the science of rumours (DiFonzo, 2009; Gelfert, 2013).
Building upon this knowledge, we will develop a guideline how to deal with con-
spiracy theories. In doing so, we will show that epistemic problems with conspiracy
theories do not justify rejection or acceptance per se. A CT recipient is rather asked:
• to explicate premises, that is, necessary and sufficient antecedents that would have
to be true when the conspiracy theory was true; so the recipient has a broader basis
for judgement
• to complement his epistemic judgements on the theory with ethical judgements;
by asking: Who gets blamed? Who might be interested in blaming this group of
people? What would be implications for society if the conspiracy theory was true?
And what would be the implications for society be if the theory was false, but
deliberately spread to foster distrust and hate?
We will conclude by showing that the open society proposed by Popper
(1958/1980) is not only compatible with conspiracy theories; we will even argue that
conspiracy theories help us in making power visible and help us in spotting dangers
to a democracy (as voiced, for instance, by Moore, 2015). The best way to prevent a
Nineteen Eighty-Four as well as a Brave new world scenario is to always imagine its
possibility (a similar point was made by Horstmann, 2012, for apocalyptic scenarios).
This will only work, however, when people have the tools as well as the knowledge
to really deal with conspiracy theories. It would, for instance, not be enough to simply
reject the gross agitation in the Protocols of the Elders of Zion. They have been forged
for a reason (although the reason itself we might not know for sure), and they are still
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spread from powers that follow an anti-Semitic agenda. To put it another way: There
really is a hidden evildoing behind these protocols. To make visible these powers and to
actively fight this conspiracy would be even better than just fighting the pamphlet this
conspiracy uses.
To achieve a deep understanding of a phenomenon, it is desirable to understand its
elements, the interactions between these different features, and the psychological func-
tion it implements. In other words: As soon as I would be able to create a phenomenon, I
am likely to have grasped the essential constituents, and how they relate. The book will
thus include a construction kit, a blueprint to generate a successful conspiracy theory.
A preliminary version is sketched in the following section.
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9 A preliminary construction kit
What I cannot create,
I do not understand.
(Richard Feynman)
The famous quote “What I cannot create, I do not understand” was found on the
blackboard of Richard Feynman at the time of his death. As soon as we know the
elements of a phenomenon, and how they interact, we can try to create it. If we are
successful, we are assured that we have gained a deep understanding of the phenomenon
in question.
The theoretical and empirical accounts given in this thesis might be used to de-
rive a—preliminary—construction kit for conspiracy theories. It will very likely not be
complete, but it might very well be good enough to deepen our understanding. After
all, when we know how to create something, we might get better in destroying it as
well. Knowing the generic blueprint can guide us in the deconstruction of conspiracy
theories, for example when confronted with anti-Semitic or anti-Muslim narrations. The
following elements might be considered as important constituents and features of any
CT:
1. There should be an odd event, as described in Raab, Ortlieb, et al. (2013): some-
thing that defies an easy explanation, something that is very complex—and that
is, at the same time, relevant for the recipients.
2. With regard to this odd event, the conspiracy theory should provide a lot of in-
formation. Official statements and known facts should be mixed with information
pointing at a cover-up of negligence, and also with information indicating mali-
cious and deliberate actions by some powerful people. This mixture ensures that
everyone can compile his or her most plausible narration, as shown in Raab, Or-
tlieb, et al. (2013); and it also ensures that the resulting narrations are shifted
towards the conspiratorial spectrum, as shown in Raab, Auer, et al. (2013).
3. To foster the recipient’s story-building process, it is wise not only to include in-
formation regarding the odd event, but also information showing evidence for the
conspiracy, hints that there is significant non-transparency at work, statements
relating to publicly available sources and opinions, speculations about the group of
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conspirators, and finally a pinch of myth to elevate the story to an above-everyday
narrative level. (Raab, Ortlieb, et al., 2013)
4. The envisaged conspiracy theory has to relate to the recipient’s personal values.
It would allow him/ her to see his/ her values endangered by the conspiracy, and
would empower him/ her to fight those evil forces. Fist evidence for this idea was
given in Raab et al. (2015). The best way to ensure this is an odd event that
is so complex and stratified that, in the sense of P.T. Barnum, offers something
for everybody. A right-wing republican might interpret 9/11 as a cover-up by a
weak and incompetent government. Left-wing liberals might assume, for the same
event, that the government has at least welcomed the attack as false pretences
to strengthen surveillance and to boost weapon sales. Anti-Semites will see the
workings of Jewish capitalists at work. And so on.
5. To facilitate that people take the first step and embark on conspiratorial thinking,
there should be an opportunity to present the odd event in combination with
allegations that there might be causality and purpose behind, as shown in Gebauer
et al. (2016).
6. And finally, there is a feature that more often than not follows from the complexity
of the supposed conspiracy: There should be missing and contradicting informa-
tion. This might encourage the potential CT believer to elaborate and extend
the theory. This aspect has not been examined in this thesis, but might be an
important avenue for future research. Koschorke (2016) speculates that inconsis-
tencies and contradictions made a very important contribution to the success of
Mein Kampf (Hitler, 1936). Especially intelligent and well-educated people would
have felt the need to support the ideology by explaining inconsistencies and by
contributing own ideas.
This construction kit recognizes the psychological qualities of conspiracy theories.
It makes transparent what it takes; but also why people might benefit (in psychological
terms) from conspiratorial theorizing. Understanding the functions of psychological
processes goes beyond describing a phenomenon; it is an explanation and might guide
us in predictions of human behaviour.
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10 Conclusion
There is a crack,
a crack in everything.
That’s how the light
gets in.
(Leonard Cohen, Anthem)
Conspiracy theories are a crack in the system. That is, to speak with Leonard Cohen,
how the light gets in. There are parallels between conspiratorial thinking and scientific
reasoning: In both cases, we try to look behind the things and into them. Describing
our reality is but the first step of academic progress. We try to understand the mech-
anisms at the heart of the phenomenon, that are only visible to skilled and systematic
observation.
To look into the things, we can either break them (which is not the path of wisdom
according to the sage Gandalf in Tolkien, 1954); or we can use cracks in the structure
of reality to illuminate the inner workings of society; and of our own psyche.
10.1 Enlightenment by conspiracy theory
Conspiracy theories illuminate the fact that many people in our society are longing for
a change; for an Event in the sense of Žižek (2014). Demands from the fringe of society,
uttered by those marginalized by the system, in the narrative pattern of a conspiracy
theory, would be kynical in the view of Blanusa (2011) and fulfil a positive function:
“[D]eliberate restriction of freedoms and rights, usurpation of power and illegitimacy of
its operation, manipulation, corruption, betrayal of trust, etc.” (p.104) are decried. An
extreme form would be what Melley (2000) has called agency panic: The fear that our
lives are completely controlled by external forces in modern society.
With the Internet of Things (IoT), where ordinary household devices like refrig-
erators, central heating control devices and electric toothbrushes collect data and send
these data into the Cloud, our daily lives become penetrated by technology, not because
there is any benefit; but simply because technology can. Such concerns were already
raised and discussed by Postman (1993). This kind of all-encompassing surveillance is
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dangerous: “[W]hen privacy and the domestic sphere are dramatically eroded, and in-
dividual activity stands to be quite literally absorbed in to a larger power apparatus,
society closes down and popular democracy ends.” (Tracy, 2015, p.24)
The Center for Long-Term Cybersecurity evaluates different scenarios for our dig-
ital future (Center for Long-Term Cybersecurity, 2016). The probably most threatening
is the Bubble 2.0 scenario where a chain-reaction of collapsing internet firms—previously
over-rated at the stock markets—would create a new situation for cybercriminals: They
might be able then to just buy huge datasets—for example, health-related data from a
fitness start-up, or data related to sexual desires from a dating site—on the licit market
from bankruptcy assets.
The fear of a live completely penetrated by technology is nothing we can dismiss
lightly then. Huge and anonymous conglomerates—like Alphabet, the holding of which
Google is just a part of—are extremely powerful in fact, not just in a paranoid mind.
Also, democratic institutions are not the transparent entities they should be. The gov-
ernmental bodies are becoming faceless, too, and according to Haase (2015) this is not
happening by chance: Politicians conceal power and responsibility behind an ambigu-
ous communication Haase (2015) has called fogspeech. Instead of a nameable agent, an
all-encompassing we or an anonymous passive is communicated as decider.
The danger of a loss of agency is real. This would imply that conspiracy theories
can be a means for people pushed to the edge of society to perceive self-efficacy again.
By connecting to like-minded people who feel the same (and fear the same enemy),
people might face better odds when fighting their marginalization. The metaphorical
crack here is a sign of a society running the danger of losing its social cohesion. The
conspiracy theory lets some light in, and it shines on the marginalized people as a light
of hope. For society, it might be a wake-up light.
But it would be naïve nevertheless to consider CTs by people feeling marginalized
a positive thing per se. Not only does it mean that there is a substantial number
of people at the edge of society, which can hardly be called a good property of the
general public. Also, the so-called anti-vaxxers, a phenomenon investigated by Jolley
and Douglas (2014) as well as by Stojanov (2015), are an example that such accusations
might backfire on society.
Anti-vaxxers (which need not even be marginalized in the usual sense; well-paid
academics can be anti-vaxxers, too) assume that Big Pharma exaggerates the benefits
and downplays the risks of vaccinations. These parents opposing vaccination claim, for
example, that flu shots cause autism. The recurrence of potentially deadly diseases
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in Western countries would be the outcome if this movement should gain enough mo-
mentum. It is a sign of kynical thinking gone wrong: It targets big and anonymous
organizations and endangers the life of ordinary people. This kind of light is bound to
fool us, like a will-o’-the-wisp.
Another crack that lets in some light that shines upon society and the people
living in it is something Blanusa (2011) has diagnosed as conspiracy-theory panic and
cynical thinking. CTs perpetuated by a political system are a means of homogenizing
society. The Other is blamed to create unity. In totalitarian systems, those conspiracy
theories also ‘explain’ why the totalitarian state is not the paradise promised.
The Protocols of the Elders of Zion are paradigmatic here. They have been used
for anti-Semitic propaganda at the beginning of the 20th century. They have been used
as a means of agitation in the ‘Third Reich’. And even today, the text is used to convey
hate. The diagnosis by Blanusa (2011) fits perfectly here: From the perspective of the
ideology, the Protocols might have explained the shortcomings of the ‘Reich’ by blaming
the Jews. In an even more perfidious move, the mechanisms of totalitarian Germany—
control of economy, education, law and the press—were insinuated to be Zionist plans.
The Other is scapegoat and smokescreen at the same time. The light coming through
this crack is a warning light.
These considerations regard society and groups. On an individual level, the crack
exposed by a conspiracy theory is like a window to the soul of the believer. His or her
hopes, fears and personal values might manifest in the theory proposed. The conspira-
torial narration might help a person to find his or her place in the world and to focus on
important values. For a psychologist, this raises the opportunity to relate to this person
and to explore his or her subjective theories on important matters.
A conspiracy theory fosters knowledge here in areas where it is usually dark. Our
own personal values, for example, are not readily accessible to us. We have to recognize
and understand our thoughts and actions to recognize ourselves. Shed some light on
those aspects of our own psyche: A conspiracy theory can do that; a rather comforting
light.
10.2 And the message is ..?
When McLuhan (1964/2002) asserted that the medium is the message, he meant that
each new medium (be it, to name but a few, spoken word, written word, print, electric
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light, the telephone, or weapons) is an extension of man. The extension brings about
personal and social consequences that are specific to the medium, and not the content,
and “the ‘message’ of any technology is the change of scale or pace or pattern that it
introduces in human affairs.” (p.8)
Following this definition, a conspiracy theory is a medium. It is a bridge between
sender and receiver, it makes visible powers in society that are usually hidden, it identifies
malicious agents, and it reveals agendas otherwise unknown. Conspiracy theories do
change the scale and pattern of human affairs. For that, it does not even matter how
valid a given theory is. The message is: The truth is out there (a claim appearing in
most opening sequences of the X-Files by Carter et al., 1993–2002, 2016). The truth will,
however, not be a pleasant one, and it has to be acquired by hard and sometimes dirty
epistemic work. The proper response, then, to the message would be: I want to believe!
(an exclamation written on a poster in the office of Fox Mulder, a main protagonist in
the X-Files; he is the never-satisfied seeker for hidden information). However, do not
believe what you are told: Believe what you have found out yourself!
Completely independent from its content, any CT begs for a change in scale and
pattern of human affairs. The scale gets wider (when the enemies are powerful), and it
should be extended to include previously un-seen realms of reality (where the conspir-
ators operate). The pattern also is substantially altered: general distrust is amplified,
but bonds to like-minded are strengthened.
The results presented in this thesis might help us to better assess the cracks in
societal and personal narrations. CTs are a message in themselves. To better understand
the message, we should not stop to invent and refine methods to explore those theories.
We have to better understand the dangers of conspiracy theories; and at the same time
we have to acknowledge the positive sides of CTs, too. Yet, the message—the conspiracy
theory—is not created and sent at every opportunity; it takes an interaction of recipient,
information and event. As soon as we understand that the message I believe that [enter
conspiracy here] can tell us much about the sender of that message, psychology will help
us to connect disciplines like philosophy, communication sciences, politics, sociology, and
narratology.
It is unlikely that conspiracy theories will lose significance in the years to come.
The topic is here to stay, and psychology has to assume responsibility and engage in
research, together with other disciplines. At times, we might feel like Sisyphus, when
confronted with all those theories floating around in books, web logs, and internet mes-
sage boards; but we must imagine us to be happy doing this work. Maybe Horstmann
(2012) is right in assuming that narrations of impending danger help us to make a
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stand against that imagined peril. Then there would be one thing that would be even
more distressing than a society with many conspiracy theories around: A society where
its members have given up conspiratorial thinking at all. Either Brave new world or
Nineteen eighty-four would have become reality, then.
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Recent studies on conspiracy theories employ standardized questionnaires, thus
neglecting their narrative qualities by reducing them to mere statements. Recipients are
considered as consumers only. Two empirical studies—a conventional survey (n = 63)
and a study using the method of narrative construction (n = 30)—which were recently
conducted by the authors of this paper—suggest that the truth about conspiracy theories is
more complex. Given a set of statements about a dramatic historic event (in our case 9/11)
that includes ofﬁcial testimonies, allegations to a conspiracy and extremely conspiratorial
statements, the majority of participants created a narrative of 9/11 they deemed plausible
that might be considered a conspiracy theory. The resulting 30 idiosyncratic stories imply
that no clear distinction between ofﬁcial story and conspiratorial narrative is possible
any more when the common approach of questionnaires is abandoned. Based on these
ﬁndings, we present a new theoretical and methodological approach which acknowledges
conspiracy theories as a means of constructing and communicating a set of personal
values. While broadening the view upon such theories, we stay compatible with other
approaches that have focused on extreme theory types. In our view, accepting conspiracy
theories as a common, regulative and possibly benign phenomenon, we will be better
able to understand why some people cling to immunized, racist and off-wall stories—and
others do not.
Keywords: conspiracy theories, narrative construction, personality science, individual differences, external validity,
regulation, psychological methods
INTRODUCTION
“Superstition is actually a symptom of enlightenment, whoever is
superstitious is always, [. . . ] much more of a person; and a super-
stitious society is one in which there are many individuals and
more delight in individuality”
(Nietzsche, 1882/1974, p. 96).
So far, many psychological studies on conspiracy theories
have conﬁned themselves to a simple—yet often misleading—
paradigm: The assumption that a clear distinction between an
ofﬁcial truth and delusive idiosyncratic explanations can be made,
and that supporters of conspiracy theories must hence be con-
sidered as individuals who have lost touch with reality and are
in need for clear-cut explanations. Unfortunately, this reproach
of oversimpliﬁcation also applies to the methods commonly used
to investigate conspiracy theories: The frequent use of question-
naires implies that conspiracy theories can be reduced to simple
statements and that recipients of conspiracy theories can be seen
as passive consumers who can be “diagnosed” by speciﬁc items.
How do these basic assumptions account for the vast major-
ity of conspiracy theories emerging from the highly interactive
sphere of the new media? Why are conspiracy theories about
9/11 far more complex and disquieting than the ofﬁcial ver-
sion if they are supposed to provide simple answers? Why are
contradictory explanations for Princess Diana’s “disappearance”
deemed equally plausible (see Wood et al., 2012)? This contrasts
Goertzel (1994) who noted that conspiracy thinkers “offer the
same hackneyed explanation for every problem” (p. 741), and
not several contradicting explanations for one discrete event.
And ﬁnally: Why are conspiratorial plots nearly omnipresent
in contemporary literature, in movies and on television? The
entertainment value of conspiracies should also be taken into
account when explaining the unsolicited, excursive, and mutating
dissemination of such theories.
It seems that research on conspiracy theories has often empha-
sized cognitive peculiarities of people who adhere to conspiracy
theories, suggesting that believers in conspiracy theories are spe-
ciﬁc cases who have not much in common with the majority of
people. As such, the ordinary actor is often a blind spot of cur-
rent research, as has recently been pointed out by Sapountzis and
Condor (2013).
In sum, we feel that it is time to leave the beaten track and
to acknowledge conspiracy theories as a vibrant phenomenon of
popular culture which reﬂects far more than pathological delu-
sions or xenophobic attitudes. Inspired by the ground-breaking
work of Timothy Melley (2000) we interpret the increasing popu-
larity of conspiracy theories as an attempt to emphasize a personal
set of values and thus to organize and regulate one’s life expe-
rience in a meaningful way. According to Melley (2000), the
general motif behind conspiracy theories is to emphasize the
values of autonomy and individuality by inducing an intensive
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fear of being controlled by concealed external forces. For this
state of mind Melley has coined the term “agency panic.” By
suggesting that our personal freedom is at stake, conspiracy
theories create awareness for the (potential) threats to human
autonomy and individuality. At this point we transcend Melley
by stating that the self-affirmative mechanism behind conspir-
acy theories should work for any set of values a person wishes
to emphasize (e.g., freedom of speech, integrity of the tradi-
tional family, mental and physical health, etc.). Based on this
hypothesis, we interpret the widespread doubt in an official truth
and the great popularity of conspiracy theories as a crisis of
ideologies that goes hand in hand with a crisis of individual-
ity. Especially in pluralistic Western societies where the “grands
récits” (Lyotard, 2005) of the past have lost their credibility, con-
spiracy theories can help to express and to share an individual
system of values. When there is no generally accepted frame
of reference any more, individuation is in need for alternative
explanations.
From our point of view empirical studies on conspiracy theo-
ries have so far neglected the creative potential, the dynamic, the
interactive, and the narrative qualities of conspiracy theories. The
predominant paradigm of psychological research in the field of
conspiracy theories assumes that a clear distinction between an
official truth and delusive idiosyncratic explanations can bemade.
For instance, Lewandowsky et al. (2013) showed that taking the
moon landing for a hoax is correlated with a disbelief in climate
change and a rejection of the fact that smoking causes lung can-
cer. One can either believe that smoking causes lung cancer, or
one might not. Furthermore, as the authors point out, this is not
a question of belief in the first place; there is overwhelming scien-
tific evidence for negative side effects of smoking. To deny them
means to negate the validity of scientific knowledge in general.We
deem it questionable that doubts about the reasons for the inva-
sion of Iraq should generally be explained by the same cognitive
mechanisms.
Belief or disbelief in theories of conspiracy has been exam-
ined by reducing stories to simple statements (e.g., “9/11 was
an inside job”) that may serve as questionnaire items. First and
foremost, these items are designed to meet the psychometri-
cal requirements of questionnaire construction. Naturally, such
questionnaire items cannot reflect the complex and diverse nar-
rations entwined around ideas of conspiracy. We see dangers
in applying this approach to investigating conspiracy theories:
Without a psychological model, one can merely speculate which
latent variable or construct was measured after all. It gets hard
to distinguish possible facets of a trait—a supposed predispo-
sition to accept conspiracy theories—ex post without such a
model. Goertzel (1994) has already pointed to the weakness of
questionnaire data when it comes to people’s belief systems.
For instance, Swami et al. (2010) were able to explain 53.1%
of variance in “9/11 Conspiracist Beliefs” with a structural
equation model including personality variables. Importantly,
“General Conspiracy Beliefs” accounted for only 14.4% of vari-
ance. Wagner-Egger and Bangerter (2007) tried to identify pre-
dictors for belief in two types of conspiracy theories: Conspiracy
theories that accuse minorities (Type A) and conspiracy theo-
ries blaming authorities (Type B). No less than 18 personality
constructs were included. Regression analysis showed that these
constructs only accounted for less than 10% of variance in terms
of Type A theories (R2 = 0.09), respectively, 16% of variance in
terms of Type B theories (R2 = 0.16). Although these studies have
clearly delivered important insights, up to 90% of variance is left
unexplained.
Based on these findings and on our own questionnaire stud-
ies, we doubt whether these procedures are able to grasp the
appreciation and fascination of such theories in full. The low to
intermediary values of explained variance not only indicate that
the approaches did not cover some important factors. We also
do not know if a participant has merely adopted some overheard
notions; or if he or she has arrived at a conspiratorial belief after
time-consuming, extensive research. We also do not know if the
conspiratorial belief is stable, or if new information would be
regarded and integrated; if it is a merely personal opinion or if the
believer is eager to share his or her view with others; and finally, if
the belief would be guiding the person’s actions, e.g., if he or she
would engage in political activities.
Apart from some recent studies—e.g., Sapountzis and Condor
(2013) have evaluated the spontaneous use of conspiracy nar-
ratives in interviews of Greek citizens and Lewandowsky et al.
(2013) investigated conspiracist ideation in the blogosphere—
most studies have focused on the recipients of conspiracy theories
using questionnaires and drawing an artificial red line between
believers and disbelievers. To our understanding, this approach
reveals some misleading basic assumptions about conspiracy the-
ories: (a) Conspiracy theories are treated as invariant entities (b)
that can be reduced to single statements and (c) that recipients
of conspiracy theories can be regarded as passive consumers and
(d) that believers are always believers independently from the
“quality” of the regarding storyline. By contrast, we argue that
a majority of conspiracy theories emerge from the highly interac-
tive sphere of the newmedia. Today,millions of people around the
world create, compile, discuss, and reproduce conspiracy theories
on internet platforms, private websites, or blogs. This relent-
less process of creation, modification, and serial reproduction
blurs the classic difference of a distinction of production (sender)
and recipient. If our assumptions hold, people should—when
given the chance—construct a wide variety of stories, differing
greatly in conspiratorial characteristics. Questionnaires are hardly
able to capture the narrative process of acquisition, compilation,
and reproduction in an ecologically valid way. Consequently, we
suggest the method of narrative construction as a new means
to explore the multi-facet phenomenon of conspiracy theories.
This method allows an individual to construct their own story
for a given event like 9/11 from a set of pre-defined pieces of
information.
If a conspiracy theory is a dynamic narration reflecting an indi-
vidual’s values—built around a dramatic historic event—there
should be a plethora of different theories, not only concerning the
story’s nucleus, i.e., the historic event. The variety of personality
should, according to this assumption, lead to an evenly manifold
variety of conspiracy theories. Additionally, if it was a prevalent
method of identity shaping, almost everyone should be prone
to construct a conspiracy theory. We tested these assumptions
empirically.
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THE PRESENT PAPER
In the first section, we shortly describe a study that sought for
a link between cognitive self-efficacy and the belief in common
conspiracy theories—yet yielded no results. Subsequently, the
method of narrative construction1 is described. It was applied
in a study with 30 participants. In the following section, we
present the results of this study. Finally, we outline a theoret-
ically framework which accounts for our findings and allows
for an integration of other explanatory approaches. We then
outline the common ground of our and other models and
close with a short consideration of the dangers of conspiracy
theories.
METHODS
In our first study on conspiracy theories, we followed the estab-
lished research paradigm: A standardized questionnaire was
applied to investigate the relationship between self-efficacy and
belief in conspiracy theories. We shortly describe this study—that
yielded no positive results—before we illustrate the method of
narrative construction in detail.
In accordance with the premise that supporters of conspiracy
theories share some kind of cognitive or emotional disposition,
we expected people with a low level of self-efficacy to be more
susceptible for any kind of conspiracy theory than people who
reported a high level of self-efficacy.
Method
Our standardized questionnaire comprised the German version
of the General Self-Efficacy Scale by Schwarzer and Jerusalem
(1995). We modified some items to emphasize the cognitive
component of self-efficacy. For example, the item “Thanks to
my resourcefulness, I know how to handle unforeseen situa-
tions” was changed to “Thanks to my resourcefulness, I know
how to interpret unforeseen situations.” In addition, a scale was
designed for the assessment of endorsement in conspiracy the-
ories. The scale consisted of 10 items. For each item, the gist
of a popular conspiracy theory was condensed into a state-
ment (e.g., “The terrorist attacks of 9/11 were planned and
executed by the American government.”). The participants were
asked to rate the plausibility of each statement on a five-point
Likert-scale ranging from 1 (“very implausible”) to 5 (“very
plausible”).
Sample
Twenty-two males and 41 females participated in this study. The
sample included students, workers and senior citizens. The age of
the participants ranged from 18–76 years and the average age was
29.6 years (SD = 13.3).
Results
The relation between self-efficacy and belief in conspiracy theo-
ries turned out to be non-significant, Pearson’s r = −0.04, p =
0.73, n.s. There was no pattern to be found, neither linear trends
between variables nor higher-order relations by mere inspection
1Explained in more detail in a separate manuscript recently submitted to the
same Frontiers Research Topic
of plotted data. The analysis of particular items and ex-post-facto
attempts (splitting the sample by gender, by age, etc.) yielded no
results.
Discussion
The data did not justify—or even suggest—the assumption that
self-efficacy is related to endorsement in common conspiracy
theories. Nevertheless, this finding is relevant. These results are
well in line with the results of a study by Wagner-Egger and
Bangerter (2007) which examined the link between locus of con-
trol and belief in conspiracy theories. The authors reported a
low inter-correlation between externality ratings and belief in a
particular type of conspiracy theories which accuses minorities
(r = 0.15; p < 0.05). These findings clearly challenge the basic
assumption that supporters of conspiracy theories must be con-
sidered as helpless individuals in need for clear-cut explanations.
Left with no direction how to refine the hypothesis or the ques-
tionnaires, we decided to develop a new approach for exploring
conspiracy theories
THIRTY SHADES OF TRUTH: THE METHOD OF NARRATIVE
CONSTRUCTION
To analyze the phenomenon of conspiracy theories in an eco-
logically more valid way, we developed the method of narra-
tive construction. Given a set of statements about an impor-
tant event of contemporary history, people begin to build a
narrative that is, for the most part, neither a pure official
nor a clear conspiracy theory. Instead, people construct their
idiosyncratic “shade of truth.” A more detailed description of
this method can be found elsewhere1. In the present paper,
we focus on a different aspect, but give a short account of
material and procedure so the present paper is coherent and
understandable.
To test our hypotheses that conspiracy theories are frequently
occurring and that they are diverse and idiosyncratic stories built
around an important event, we developed the method of “narra-
tive construction.” Participants are provided with a deck of cards,
each card bearing a statement related to a specified event (in our
case 9/11). The deck was built to represent conspiracy-specific
categories we had generated before with an inductive procedure.
For each “fact,” there was one version (card) holding an offi-
cial/canonical claim, one version bearing a mildly conspiratorial
allusion, and one version holding a claim only compatible with an
extreme conspiracy.
MATERIAL FOR A NARRATIVE CONSTRUCTION
To identify the typical constituents of conspiracy theories, we
questioned 38 people to tell us which conspiracy theories they
know of; and afterwards asked them to describe their favorite the-
ory in detail. Subsequently, we asked “which elements are part
of most conspiracy theories” as an open question. The answers
were categorized by other interviewers; the resulting categories
had to be defended in a discussion, as described by Mayring
(2005), until all interviewers had agreed on a set of six categories
for “elements of conspiracy theories,” including category defini-
tions. The bottom-up generated items are odd event, evidence,
non-transparency, publicity, group of conspirers, andmyth. A more
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detailed description of this study and its results can be found
elsewhere1.
We compiled 14 subsets for the deck of cards. With respect to
the bottom-up derived elements of conspiracy theories: two for
group of conspirers, one for non-transparency, one for publicity,
three for odd event, three for evidence, and one for myth. Subset
group consisted of three items (i.e., 3 cards) fueled with con-
tents from typical (1) official, (2) limited conspiratorial, and (3)
unlimited conspiratorial viewpoints. The official card always bore
a category-related statement that was in accordance with official
9/11 reports and documents (drawing on respectable sources, e.g.,
governmental reports made public on the internet). For example,
an official group of conspirers-item was: “9/11 masterminds were
Islamist terrorists, led by Osama bin Laden, to attack the detested
Western culture.”
The limited conspiratorial card was prepared with an item that
contained an explanation describing a conspiracy of moderate
strength. Specifically, this level was formed in accordance with
Lutter’s (2001) categorization of conspiracies, corresponding to
a conspiracy limited in time and space. This can also be thought
as matching 9/11-view “let it happen on purpose” (“LIHOP” in
the terminology of Ganser, n.d.). In this view, the Bush admin-
istration did not initiate the attacks but knew beforehand and
did not take countermeasures. We compiled information from
web resources like Wikipedia that matched this level. The “group
of conspirers”-item here read: “The US administration had let
happen the 9/11 attack to justify the wars in Afghanistan and
Iraq.”
The unlimited conspiratorial card assumed a conspiracy with
no clear bounds within space and time, or a “make it happen
on purpose” (MIHOP) viewpoint in the sense of Ganser (n.d.)
For example, it read: “The US administration had planned and
conducted the 9/11 attack to justify the wars in Afghanistan and
Iraq.”
This three-level graduation was realized for each subset of
cards. Finally, for each of the six categories (odd event, evidence,
non-transparency, publicity, group of conspirers, and myth),
there was at least one three-part subset of cards (one card with an
official statement, one limited conspiratorial, and one unlimited
conspiratorial).
Additionally, we compiled a triplet of cards where all state-
ments were completely off-wall:
- The group “Scholars for 9/11 truth” assumes that energy
weapon fire, by killer satellites from outer space, led to the
World Trade Center collapse.
- The former officer of nuclear intelligence and author Dimitri
Khalezov postulates that the Twin Towers as well as build-
ing No. 7 were brought down by underground thermo-nuclear
devices.
- The Syrian newspaper Al-Thawra has reported that 4000 Jewish
WTC employees were warned beforehand and did not show up
on work on 9/11.
The resulting 42 cards—13 canonical statements, 13 state-
ments alluring to a limited conspiracy, 13 extremely/unlimited
conspiratorial statements, and 3 off-wall assumptions—were
printed on cards (each around 10× 6 cm; serif typeface, 12 pt.
size, black letters on white ground) and laminated.
PARTICIPANTS
Thirty persons (26 female,Mage = 22.4 years, range: 19–55 years)
took part in the study. Some were students at the University of
Bamberg and received course credit for participation; they were
naïve to the aim of the study and had not been involved in any
other study described in this paper. The participants were ran-
domly assigned to two groups: (1) modest contents group and (2)
extreme contents group. The first group received the off-wall, the
canonical, and the limited conspiratorial items only. The extreme
contents group was handed out the full set including the 13
unlimited conspiratorial items. The split-up was done to test a
hypothesis not discussed in this paper.
PROCEDURE
The modest contents group was handed out a card deck with 29
items, containing all official and limited conspiratorial items (plus
the three-card subset absurd). The extreme contents group received
the same deck and additionally 13 unlimited conspiratorial items.
All were asked to “construct a plausible story of the events of
September 11th 2001, as a single coherent story or consisting of
coherent or controversial fragments,” without time restrictions.
When the participant had considered the story finished, the cho-
sen items and their layout were written down. The participant was
then asked to rate “how plausible the 9/11 story version just laid
out is” on a five-point Likert-scale (among other questions related
to other hypotheses). Overall, the participants spent 21min on
average to construct their story, with a range from 8min to well
over 30min.
RESULTS
We will present quantitative data analysis first. In order to
acknowledge the diversity in story content, we will then present
three single cases, i.e., three individual theories about 9/11.
STATISTICAL ANALYSIS
We found no significant differences between groups with regard
to the number of items taken from the off-wall set, tested by
separate One-Way Analyses of Variance (ANOVA), F(1, 28) < 1,
p = 0.836, n.s.; with regard to self-rated plausibility of the story,
F(1, 28) < 1, p = 0.451, n.s.; and with regard to the number of
cards selected in total, F(1, 28) < 1, p = 0.80, n.s. In the aspects
relevant for the argumentation and discussion here the groups
do not differ, so we will aggregate both samples to a single one.
Detailed further analyses on the given data set can be found
elsewhere1.
On average, participants used 14.80 statements/cards (SD =
5.47; range: 5–28 cards) to construct a story, 0.50 cards (SD =
0.86, range: 0–3) of them were from the off-wall set. The average
self-rated plausibility was 3.90 (SD = 0.71, range: 2–5).
There was a wide variety of length and content with regard to
the theories produced. No two stories were alike; instead, highly
idiosyncratic mixtures of statements were created. Figure 1 gives
an impression of the diversity of compositions.
To reduce complexity and to test our hypotheses, we segre-
gated the stories according to the share of official vs. limited and
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FIGURE 1 | Each participant created a unique story, blending official, limited, and unlimited conspiratorial items to build a plausible 9/11 narrative.
unlimited conspiratorial items. Here, we regard stories containing
less than 33% conspiratorial items to be an “official version” of
9/11. Stories containing between 33 and 66% conspiratorial con-
tent were classified as a “hybrid version.” When more than 66%
conspiracy-items were present, we considered the narrative as a
“conspiracy version.”
With this deliberate categorization, 5 out of 30 stories (16.7%)
qualified as official, 16 out of 30 stories as hybrid (53.3%), and
the 9 remaining stories (30.0%) as conspiracy versions. We could
neither detect a significant correlation between the self-rated
plausibility and the number of off-wall items selected (r = 0.28,
p = 0.88, n.s.) nor between plausibility and the number of items
selected in total (r = −0.09, p = 0.62, n.s.). Regarding the con-
tent of the off-wall items, the killer satellites from outer space were
present in three stories. Nine times, the thermo-nuclear devices
were part of a story. The allegation of Jews knowing about the
attacks beforehand was selected four times.
A GAME OF CONSPIRACIES: EXAMPLES FOR 9/11 NARRATIVES
So far, we have analyzed only superficial information (e.g., num-
ber of items; composition of different item categories) of the
generated versions. To understand the stories behind these num-
bers, we present three examples in detail (yet, each example is
an abridged version; the full narratives were at least twice the
length). We begin with a corner-case, the most canonical version
that was produced. We proceed with a typical hybrid version that
integrates many official statements as well as some propositions
indicating a possible cover-up. Finally, we give an account of the
most extreme conspiracy version that was built.
A canonical story: On 9/11, four passenger planes got hijacked by
Islamist suicide attackers; two of these planes were directed into the
WTC twin towers. The resulting structural damage to the buildings
led to their collapse. When President Bush was told about the second
plane crashing into the towers, he kept sitting for five minutes—
with countenance unaffected and seemingly not surprised—in front
of the class at school, without interrupting the visit. On the day of the
attacks, there was great confusion among the leading action forces.
The chain of command expended too much time, as the US admin-
istration was not prepared for this kind of attack. Thus, the plane
heading for the Pentagon could not be brought down in time. The
9/11 course of events was examined by several US agencies, support-
ing the official view. This was written down, for example, in the ‘9/11
Commission Report’.
This is an abridged version of the only story (out of the sample
of 30) that contains virtually no allegation to any conspiracy or
cover-up. The originator, a 20-year-old woman, used seven items
in total. Subsequently, she rated her story as most plausible (5 out
of 5 points). The participant stated that she had “little interest
on the issue of 9/11,” and that she had “recognized conspirato-
rial items,” but had discarded them as being “too speculative”;
furthermore, she stated to have heard “about the unreliability of
eye-witness in a lecture” some days before, and stated this might
have made her “more cautious.”
A hybrid theory: The 9/11 perpetrators had been Islamist terror-
ists under guidance by Osama Bin Laden to attack the hated “West”.
Islamist terrorists had hijacked four passenger planes, two of which
were directed into the twin towers. Standard operating procedures
for hijackings were bureaucratic and chain of command operated
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slowly. There were lapses, failures, and precious time was lost. There
should be further inquiries to clear up the countless open questions.
The attack on Pearl Harbor was let happen by the US administra-
tion to get the own, war-weary people into WW II. Similar could
have happened on 9/11.
This is the abridged version of a typical hybrid story, con-
structed by a 25-year-old woman. The narrative combines official
as well as mildly/limited conspiratorial items. While Islamist
terrorists are identified as perpetrators, the possibility of a gov-
ernment letting happen the attack is included in the narrative.
The creator of the story rated her story with 4 on the 5-point
plausibility scale afterwards.
A conspiracy theory: The US administration has initiated 9/11
itself, to justify the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. There should be
further inquiries to clear up the countless open questions. The US
administration is lying. It was lying about the supposed nuclear
weapons in Iraq, about Vietnam, Watergate, about many things.
Why should one believe the ‘official’ 9/11 story? The WTC towers
had been built with fire-resistant steel. The question remains: How
could the towers had collapsed? The magazine Newsweek was report-
ing that high rank Pentagon officials had canceled flights scheduled
for 9/11. According to the Syrian newspaper Al-Thawra, 4,000 Jewish
employees did not show up at work on 9/11; they had been warned.
There was and is one constant in the USA’s policy: lie, deceit, and
deception of her enemies and the public. This can be seen with Pearl
Harbor, Watergate, the landing on the moon, and in recent times the
9/11 attacks.
This is the abridged version of the story constructed by a
26-year-old woman. She was the only participant to include
not a single item from the pool of official statements, using
nine mildly/limited and nine extremely/unlimited conspirato-
rial items. Concerning plausibility, she rated her story with 4
afterwards.
DISCUSSION
The multiplicity in the content of conspiracy theories that was
predicted by our assumption is clearly reflected by the obtained
data. There was no dichotomy between official and conspirato-
rial; instead, we found “thirty shades of truth.” There was no
restriction regarding the combination of items, and the state-
ments stemmed from real-world sources and had not been fitted
for representativeness (regarding the levels official, limited, and
unlimited conspiratorial). We therefore cannot infer a strict rank
ordering of the stories. Our deliberate trifold categorization must
hence be considered a rough measure. Yet, regarding the shares of
official and conspiratorial items, our data shows the tendency to
construct conspiracy theories, although in most cases, moderate
ones. Interestingly, the only strictly canonical story was delib-
erately constructed by a person that reported to have no great
interest in the matters of 9/11.
Furthermore, in the short survey after the experiment, many
participants stated that it was fun to compile an explanation for
the events on 9/11, while the plausibility of the stories was high,
assessed by ratings afterwards. In our view, this is a strong argu-
ment for ecological validity; it implies that people were engaged
in a cognitive as well as an emotional way.
A possible limitation can be seen in the fact that we asked
German people to construct a 9/11 narrative; for sure, a sam-
ple from the USA would yield other results. Yet, our goal was
to induce active story construction, so we deliberately chose this
topic: We could be sure every participant knew of this event; and
at the same time we could be fairly sure there was no personal
involvement—in a sense that a participant might have known one
of the 9/11 victims personally.
The hypothesis that people with a low feeling of security are
particularly prone to conspiracy theories—a hypothesis derived
from the literature (e.g., Goertzel, 1994)—was not confirmed by
the data of our first study. Statistical power was not sufficient
to refute this hypothesis in general, but low self-efficacy at least
does not seem to be a major factor. General racist beliefs as com-
mon drivers for conspiracies (e.g., Grüter, 2010) did not appear
to be a relevant factor of influence with our sample, either. Only
a minority (4 out of 30) chose to integrate the card claiming
that Jews knew of the attacks beforehand into their storyline.
The item explicitly ascribed the statement to a Syrian newspa-
per, so choosing it would have left a cognitive back door—the
anti-Semitic allegation could be attributed to the source; hence,
picking this card could be justified in the sense of “I do not
believe it, but I believe that a Syrian newspaper wrote it.” The
claim that thermo-nuclear devices had been mounted in the Twin
Towers seemed to be more plausible, as it was chosen by nine
participants.
In sum, two of the most common explanations for inter-
individual differences in terms of conspiracy endorsement—need
for security and racist attitudes toward minorities—could not
be confirmed as driving factors. What, then, could be motifs
to construct conspiracy theories? In the following sections we
present a theoretical framework which accounts for the subtle
“shades of truth” revealed by narrative construction, as well as
the common deficit-oriented approaches focusing on extreme
tendencies of conspiracy beliefs. This theoretical framework is
based on the assumption that conspiracy theories are means to
express personal beliefs and values, to relate these values to con-
temporary history, and to engage in discussions about values and
agency.
Our method of narrative construction does not aim at mea-
suring a latent variable as, by contrast, an intelligence test does.
Instead, its purpose is to initiate a process in an ecologically
valid way. Thus, we cannot determine reliability in the sense
of classical test theory. Stability, as a special case of reliability,
will have to be determined in a further study. If our hypothesis
holds and conspiracy theories are a means of expressing one’s
personal values, this does not imply that a participant chooses
exactly the same items on the following day. Nevertheless, it
implies that the set of values reflected by this individual’s sto-
ries should remain stable even over the course of months or
years.
Our next step will be to address reliability in terms of stability,
as it is crucial for our claims. A data-driven system of analysis will
be designed to categorize the beliefs and values implied by a story.
Moreover, participants will be asked to state their most important
values explicitly. By employing a longitudinal design changes and
invariants will be examined.
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THE TWILIGHT OF MYTH
The universality of certain narrative patterns and symbols
has already been pointed out by Sigmund Freud and Carl
Gustav Jung. They hypothesized that the exploration of myths—
individual stories like dreams as well as universal ones—is a via
regia for understanding the human psyche. Different academic
disciplines try to fathom out the universality of myth and religion,
emphasizing an interplay of nature and culture (Burkert, 2009) or
cognitive operators that were shaped by evolution (Newberg et al.,
2003). According to Bischof (1998), the structural universality of
myths about world creation can be explained without assuming
a collective unconscious. He argues that myths about world cre-
ation reflect the development of consciousness every individual
experiences during early ontogenesis.
The existence of myths was a cultural constant and served to
exemplify and consolidate group norms. The advent of the “self-
expressive individual” (Campbell, 2008), however, rendered these
myths meaningless and left the individual in the dark about desir-
able goals in life. With the beginning of enlightenment, assigning
an individual his or her place in society by a story has begun to
lose its importance. In return, the individual has to bear the bur-
den of shaping society: “It is not society that is to guide and save
the creative hero, but precisely the reverse. And so every one of us
shares the supreme ordeal—carries the cross of the redeemer—
not in the bright moments of his tribe’s great victories, but in the
silence of his personal despair” (Campbell, 2008, p. 337).
When stories, oral and written, have been the primordial and
most important means to negotiate the relation between individ-
ual and society, we might assume that the means might prevail,
even when the focus changes. It is desirable to know one’s own
motifs. At least, we deem it worthwhile to take this stance—
and to see if it will be generative. Consequently, we will consider
conspiracy theories as narrations that help people to recognize
themselves, to define and express their system of values, and also
to help them to articulate their demands on society. This does not
necessarily imply that conspiracy theories are modern myths. In
the first place, they are stories intertwined with defining society
and ourselves; and successors of stories called myths, which had
a distinctly different function, and distinctly different structural
features.
A similar viewpoint was taken by Kelley-Romano (2008). She
examined the television series The X-Files and concluded that the
function of ubiquitous conspiracy in the series “defines what it
means to be good or evil and simultaneously questions the pro-
cess of identity formation itself” (Kelley-Romano, 2008, p. 106).
Although the author recognized the psychological functions of
the series’ conspiratorial motives as crucial for its success, she did
not describe the psychological parts of her theory in more detail.
Today, identity formation (at least in Western cultures) might
be considered as the challenge to shape society and oneself. This
does not necessarily have to be a painful process. For some, anxi-
ety and a loss of control might be predominant, probably those of
them who show a low degree of ambiguity tolerance in the sense
of an “emotional and perceptual personality variable” (Frenkel-
Brunswik, 1949). Some will meet this challenge with indifference.
For others, it might appear as a playful and exciting endeavor to
shape one’s identity, probably on basis of the mere attempt to
bring order into the story (see the “Aesthetic Aha” effect in Muth
and Carbon, 2013), although a final solution might not be the
ultimate source of reward (Muth and Carbon, 2013; Muth et al.,
in press). Embracing this full rangemight help to understand why
conspiracy theories are not a well-separated niche of psychology
and society—but, according to our data, pervasive.
SHAPING THE PILLARS OF THE SELF
Dan McAdams assumed that “we are all tellers of tales”
(McAdams, 1993) by the mere fact. Tales appear to him as a
means to achieve self-insight, as a very basic way of organizing
information—and a way to share this information, also about the
coordinates of oneself within the society, in the world. McAdams
integrates biological, developmental and cognitive aspects to
explain why certain characters (like the Teacher, the Warrior, the
Maker, the Friend, and the Survivor) frequently appear in such
stories. During adolescence certain questions arise. For instance:
“What is good? What is true? What is beautiful? How does the
world work? How should the world work?” (McAdams, 1993,
p. 82) The benefit of stories for self-awareness, their potential to
render non-conscious ideas and values explicit, is also emphasized
by Wilson (2002).
Right after puberty, stories like legends andmyths are replaced
by “theories and creeds and other systematic explications”
(McAdams, 1993, p. 85). Such theories offer the opportunity to
define the goodness (and badness) of very specific actions, and
to evaluate them. The acquired belief and value system is likely
to stay—with changes in detail—for the rest of one’s lifetime
forming the basis for the story that reflects and forges our self
in adulthood.
It is noteworthy that a theory “impressively differentiated and
integrated” (McAdams, 1993, p. 90) might be considered “partic-
ularly mature, advanced and enlightened” (p. 90). McAdams did
not have conspiracy theories inmind; from a formal point of view,
however, conspiracy theories also match his criteria. Particularly,
the high degree of differentiation is one of the most striking fea-
tures of conspiracy theories. We also observe that several story
parts of a conspiracy theory are imperatively held together, at least
by ad-hoc explanations or flexible interpretations of several parts
toward a coherent Gestalt. This is also an important difference
between a conspiracy “theory” and a truly scientific theory—the
first one might be driven and put together by scientifically invalu-
able arguments but will yield a story which attracts people and
which invites to fill the logical gaps by own considerations. This
will raise the mere consumer to the position of the narrator and
the creator her/himself.
The shift from society to the individual when it comes to defin-
ing values, however, should not be seen as a burden alone. Gergen
(2006) sums up a debate about the consequences of emphasiz-
ing the distinction between oneself and the others: Becoming an
individual implies the danger of isolation and alienation. Melley
(2000) makes a similar point by hypothesizing that a certain
amount of paranoia is not only a defense, but even a part of liberal
individualism.
In La condition postmoderne, Jean-Francois Lyotard claims that
the collapse of the grand narratives does not necessarily imply an
atomization of society. Being part of a fabric of relations, even
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“the most underprivileged self” (Lyotard, 2005, p. 55) is not pow-
erless in the language games of global communication. The self
can treat messages as if it were the sender, the receiver, or the
relator (Lyotard, 2005). Likewise, a conspiracy theory is an invita-
tion to receive information, to share information, and also to add
new information, in the end: to be a part of the generation and
evolution process of a story.
Thus, conspiracy theories offer a further dimension interest-
ing from a psychological standpoint. They offer the possibility
to transfer one’s value system into the social domain: According
to Mason (1997), the moral self must learn to discern the val-
ues held by other persons and institutions; and should encourage
others to act morally. Fivush and Buckner (1997) argue that lan-
guage is not only a medium, but is both necessary to construct a
self-concept and to engage in moral-based interaction with oth-
ers. From this point of view, making stories that describe the
ethics of institutions as well as one’s own is not a possibility, but a
necessity in moral development. Also, sharing these narratives is
desirable.
A conspiracy theory, thus, could be seen as a differentiated
story of our beliefs and values helping us to understand and
express our non-conscious moral feelings. Historic or contempo-
rary events and developments which threaten these values may
become the initial nucleus for such a story. The need to construct
such a story arises from living in a society where the generally
acknowledged goal of individuation is no longer a mere adop-
tion of common beliefs, but where becoming individual is the
preferred goal.
Furthermore, a conspiracy theory would allow us to share our
beliefs with others and tomake us (and others) cautious about the
violation of ethical standards. Horstmann (2012) even hypothe-
sizes that apocalyptic scenarios, for example about WorldWar III,
are the main reason such scenarios have not become reality so far.
Narratives about dystopian developments make us aware of such
developments in the first place.
Likewise, in conspiracy theories such scenarios are a com-
mon topic. This need not end in a feeling of helplessness, or,
as Melley (2000) termed it, agency panic. A conspiracy the-
ory might be considered as a remedy; yet, not only in the way
described by Melley as a defense mechanism of individualism:
social exchange about a supposed conspiracy is comforting and
reassuring. Taking part in such language games requires a widely
known story nucleus (e.g., the terrorist attacks of 9/11), so others
recognize the importance of the story and can affiliate. We might
consider a good conspiracy theory as a kind of interface to find
like-minded people and to overcome alienation.
THE CONSPIRACY CODE
So far, we have considered:
- The importance of stories, to be more precise, of mythical
stories, in human history.
- The importance of stories that mirror a person’s belief and
value system as ameans of individuation. They explicate what is
good or bad and can be considered helpful to shape one’s value
system by organizing one’s life experience in a meaningful way.
- The potential to find like-minded people by engaging in the
active exchange of value-expressing stories.
However, the psychological importance of narratives does not
explain: Why is a conspiracy theory a method of choice? A story
about morale, i.e., what is right and wrong, will necessarily
include both moral extremes. A rivalry between good and bad
allows the storyteller to make clear which side he or she is on.
However, it would be comforting if evil deeds are done by a man-
ageable part of society, not by the majority; otherwise, one would
cast himself an outsider. Additionally, these deeds must be con-
cealed, too; in other respects, the majority of society would have
noticed andwould either approve of these deeds, or be indifferent.
Both options would be discomforting.
Here we meet with existing approaches to the phenomenon of
conspiracy theories. Many observed features suit perfectly with
our assertions sketched here:
- An immunization against counter-evidence makes a narration
invulnerable. If the story reflects a person’s most important
beliefs and values, it is quite understandable why immunization
is desirable.
- Four people had selected the item alleging to a Jewish involve-
ment. The result suggests that anti-Semitic beliefs were present
in our sample; but four out of 30 people might indicate that
xenophobia is not the heart of every conspiracy theory. Yet,
a conspiracy is in need for conspirers. We acknowledge the
danger that some peoplemight rely upon existing stereotypes—
e.g., prejudice about Jews or Muslims. Exploiting such biases
would indeed be a result of, not a reason for, conspiracy theo-
ries. An exemption would be a person who holds racist beliefs
as most important conviction. The whole theory would be built
around these convictions then—and mirror the psychological
motifs described by Moscovici (1987).
- A powerless and underprivileged person might be in need to
understand why he or she has failed in life; that means him or
her as a person, with beliefs about right and wrong. We indeed
could expect him or her to construct a rather extreme narrative
that mirrors the severity of his failure in life. Here, attributional
mechanisms to uphold the belief in a just world (Lerner, 1980)
would be relevant, as described by Farr (1987).
Of course, a highly immunized, racist, and extreme conspir-
acy theory stands out. It attracts the attention of society and,
consequently, of psychologists—and we indeed need to under-
stand and explain the person behind such stories. In our sample,
at least the one conspiracy theory we have stated in detail here
would qualify for this extreme. But aside from this extreme shade
of truth: there were 29 stories that demand deeper and more
differentiated psychological analysis. When we regard conspiracy
theories as a continuum of identity-shaping potential, the phe-
nomenon is demystified. This will be an important step toward
the appreciation “to what extent conspiracy theories reflect every-
day cognitions” (Swami and Coles, 2010, p. 563).
This, of course, does not render research on individual dif-
ferences useless. Actually, this specific research is highly rele-
vant for our approach. Stories in general—and life stories in
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particular—are highly intertwined with a storyteller’s personal-
ity. We assume that individual values determine the content of
a conspiracy theory. We further assume that personality moder-
ates if this theory is, for example, open for new evidence or highly
immunized. Consequently, we suggest to further explore and ana-
lyze these interdependencies between content and shape. Themere
form—a story about secret and potentially harmful deeds—would
then be of lesser psychological relevance.
However, we must not neglect the fact of the harmful potential
these theories bear. Considering them as an omnipresent and—in
principle—benign psychological phenomenon helps us to explore
why some people fall for extreme conspiratorial constructs of
ideas which might lead to xenophobic or even racist argu-
ments. It might also help us to understand how agitators delib-
erately use conspiracy theories to transport hateful ideology—
wrapped up in a plausible plot that masks these foul intentions
(Byford and Billig, 2001; Wood and Finlay, 2008). The question
should not be: Why does one believe a racist conspiracy theory?
Rather, we should ask: Why does one believe a racist conspiracy
theory?
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 M5oX: Methoden zur 
multidimensionalen und dynamischen 
Erfassung des Nutzererlebens 
Marius Hans Raab, Claudia Muth & Claus-Christian Carbon 
Lehrstuhl für Allgemeine Psychologie und Methodenlehre, Universität Bamberg  
Forschungsgruppe EPÆG, Ergonomie – Psychologische Æsthetik – Gestaltung, Bamberg 
1 Dimensionalität und Dynamik des Nutzererlebens 
Wie erleben wir Design? Welche kognitiven, affektiven und körperlichen Bestandteile 
zeichnen dieses Erleben aus? Welche Faktoren spielen bei der Bewertung und Nutzung von 
Objekten eine Rolle? Wie verändern sich Präferenzen von Objekten oder Kunstwerken im 
Laufe der Zeit? Diese Fragen verweisen auf verschiedene Perspektiven des Nutzererlebens, 
die spezifische methodologische Ansätze erfordern. Einerseits variiert hierbei die Erfassung 
in der Dimensionalität des Erlebens, andererseits wird sie in unterschiedlichem Maße der 
Dynamik des Erlebens gerecht (aufgeschlüsselt in Abbildung 1).  
 
 
 
 
 
Abbildung 1: Multidimensionalität und Dynamik als Facetten der User Experience. 
Wir stellen im Folgenden verschiedene Arten der methodischen Erfassung des Nutzererle-
bens unter diesen Gesichtspunkten dar und präsentieren konkrete Beispiele des Einsatzes 
kontinuierlicher Messungen. 
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1 Eine Toolbox für verschiedene Facetten des 
Nutzererlebens 
Die Erfassung von Produkt- oder Nutzereigenschaften mittels expliziter Abfrage durch Fra-
gebogen, aber auch durch indirekte Erfassung impliziter Haltungen zu Produkten [beispiels-
weise über Reaktionszeiten bei Assoziationsaufgaben durch den Test „md-IAT“ (Gattol, 
Sääksjärvi, & Carbon, 2011)] ermöglicht die Abbildung multidimensionaler Faktoren des 
Nutzererlebens. Veränderungen innerhalb des Erlebens lassen sich allerdings erst durch den 
Vergleich mehrerer Testzeitpunkte feststellen. Vor allem im Bereich des Designs und der 
Kunstbetrachtung spielen solche dynamischen Prozesse eine große Rolle: Bei der Erfassung 
des Gefallens von Produkten während eines einzigen Zeitpunkts schneiden beispielsweise 
innovative im Vergleich zu vertrauten Stimuli schlechter ab (Reber, Schwarz, & 
Winkielman, 2004), während bei wiederholter Abfrage nach einer intensiven Beschäftigung 
mit dem Material ein Anstieg der Präferenz innovativer Designs zu verzeichnen ist (Carbon 
& Leder, 2005). Die Methode der „Repeated Evaluation Technique (RET)“ (Carbon & 
Leder, 2005) erfasst in der Minimalversion mit zwei Messzeitpunkten bereits Veränderungen 
verschiedener Variablen der Wertschätzung; höhere Wiederholungsraten ermöglichen ein 
feineres zeitliches Abbild [bspw. k=4 in Carbon, Faerber, Gerger, Forster, & Leder (in 
press)]. Während sich, wie von Zajonc (1968) als „Mere-Exposure Effect“ beschrieben, 
Präferenzen bereits aufgrund mehrfacher bloßer Präsentation eines Stimulus ändern, konnten 
Muth und Carbon (2013) mit dem „Aesthetic Aha“-Effekt zeigen, dass nicht nur die Präsen-
tationshäufigkeit, sondern vielmehr die Dynamik des Erkennens eine Rolle spielt: Nur direkt 
nach einer perzeptuellen Einsicht (in Form plötzlicher Gestalterkennung) stieg das Gefallen 
signifikant an. Hier wurden Bilder alternierend je sechs Mal auf Erkennbarkeit der Gestalt 
und nach Gefallen bewertet, um eine wiederum feinere Abbildung der Prozesse zu ermögli-
chen und so einen bisher verborgenen Zusammenhang aufzudecken. Die nächste Stufe der 
zeitlichen Auflösung von dynamischen Prozessen des Erlebens stellen Erfassungsmethoden 
dar, die den temporalen Aspekt des Erlebens abbilden. Sie werden exemplarisch im nächsten 
Kapitel beschrieben. 
Abbildung 2 veranschaulicht den Zusammenhang der hier präsentierten Erfassungsmethoden 
mit den oben beschriebenen Facetten des Erlebens: Multidimensionalität und Dynamik. Mit 
der Abbildung dynamischer Prozesse gehen Einschränkungen der Erfassung von 
Multidimensionalität einher. Während zwei Messzeitpunkte noch ausführliche Befragungen 
und Testungen ermöglichen [bspw. 6 Dimensionen in Faerber, Leder, Gerger, & Carbon 
(2010)], muss bereits bei fünf Messzeitpunkten mit hohem Zeitaufwand und Störfaktoren 
wie Langeweile, Frustration und Ermüdung gerechnet werden, soll Multidimensionalität 
gewährt bleiben. Die Erfassung mittels kontinuierlicher Messmethoden ist im Falle von bei-
spielsweise der Posturographie, der Hautwiderstandsmessung oder auch dem Eye-tracking 
auf eine Modalität beschränkt. In Kombination mit anderen Methoden ermöglicht sie aller-
dings Multidimensionalität bezüglich der Prozessmodalitäten (wie affektive und kognitive 
Modi, siehe Abbildung 1) – beispielsweise durch die Erfassung des Hautwiderstands wäh-
rend einer kognitiven oder perzeptuellen Aufgabe. Im Folgenden stellen wir anhand von drei 
Studien beispielhaft verschiedene kontinuierliche Messmethoden vor und diskutieren Vor- 
und Nachteile für Fragestellungen aus dem Bereich des Nutzererlebens. 
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Abbildung 2: Verschiedene Erfassungsmethoden und ihre Positionierung hinsichtlich Dimensionalität und Dynamik 
des Nutzererlebens. Während ein Messzeitpunkt hohe Multidimensionalität ermöglicht, wird sie mit steigender 
Abbildungsfähigkeit dynamischer Prozesse geringer. In Klammern werden im Text besprochene Beispiele für die 
verschiedenen Methoden genannt. 
2 Kontinuierliche Messmethoden  
2.1 Posturographie mit dem Nintendo Balance Board 
Die Theorie der Ur-Affekte (Kafka, 1950), aufgegriffen und erweitert von Parrott (2009), 
verknüpft das emotionale Erleben untrennbar mit Motorik. Gemütsbewegung ist bei Kafka 
wörtlich zu verstehen, Objekte erzeugen bei uns Erregung und Spannung. Er nimmt Gibsons 
(1977) Affordance-Konzept vorweg, indem er in Objekten eine Aufforderung an das Indivi-
duum sieht, sie auf gewisse Art und Weise zu behandeln.  
Die mögliche Handlung, und daraus abgeleitet die möglichen Emotionen, verbindet er mit 
vier basalen Optionen: Das Objekt näher „heranbringen“ (Ingestion, zum Beispiel bei Gier), 
das Objekt „hinfortstoßen“ (Ejektion, zum Beispiel Widerwille), vor dem Objekt „fliehen“ 
(Rezession, etwa bei Furcht) und sich zum Objekt „hinbewegen“ (Profusion, beispielsweise 
als Liebe). Besonders interessant für die Erforschung des Nutzer-Erlebens sind Objekte, die 
eine Mischung aus verschiedenen Uraffekten hervorrufen, beispielsweise eine Mischung aus 
Drohung und Lockung. Dies resultiert in einer Mischung aus An- und Entspannung und 
dementsprechend in einer komplexen emotionalen Reaktion. Eine Integration dieser Theorie 
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in die User-Experience-Forschung würde ein Messinstrument erfordern, das schnell und 
genau auch subtile motorische Annäherungs- und Vermeidungsbewegungen registriert. Die-
sen Ansatz verfolgen wir mit dem Einsatz des Balance Boards von Nintendo. 
2.1.1 Technik und Schnittstelle 
Das Balance Board des japanischen Videospiel- und Konsolenherstellers Nintendo (siehe 
Abbildung 3) ist ein Zubehör zur populären Spielekonsole Wii. Die Konsole ist seit 2006 auf 
dem Markt und wurde jüngst durch den Nachfolger Wii U abgelöst. Seit 2008 ist für die Wii 
das Zusatzpaket Wii fit erhältlich (derzeitiger Marktpreis rund 80 Euro); es besteht aus dem 
Balance Board und einem dafür entwickelten Videospiel. 
 
Abbildung 3: Das Nintendo Balance Board von oben (links) und von unten mit geöffnetem Boden (Mitte).In die vier 
Füße sind elektronische Dehnungssensoren integriert (rechts, vergrößerte Darstellung). 
In einer eigenen Messreihe mit geeichten Gewichten stellten wir einen linear ansteigenden 
Messfehler von 100 g pro 15 kg Gewicht (auf dem gesamten Board, also über alle vier Sen-
soren) fest. Die tatsächliche Abtastrate betrug 100 Hz.  
2.1.2 Auswertung 
Ausgleichsbewegungen während des ruhigen Stehens folgen hoch komplexen Aktivierungen 
vieler und großer Muskelgruppen (Winter, Patla, Ishac & Gage, 2003). Schwankungen sind 
so als systematische Grundaktivität in den Daten vorhanden. Um sie weitgehend zu eliminie-
ren, errechnen wir für ereignisbezogene Abschnitte der Daten Fourier-Kurvenanpassungen 
höherer Ordnung und subtrahieren diese Idealkurven von den tatsächlichen Kurven. Harmo-
nische Schwingungsanteile werden so herausgerechnet. Übrig bleiben schnelle und ereignis-
korrelierte motorische Reaktionen des Gleichgewichtsapparates, die unwillkürliche Anzie-
hung und Abstoßung widerspiegeln. Entsprechend Kafkas Theorie würde ein hässliches Bild 
ein Weg-Bewegen induzieren, also eine Gewichtsverlagerung nach hinten  Durch Betrach-
tung sowohl der Gewichtsverlagerungskurve als auch ihrer ersten Ableitung können wir 
sowohl für einzelne Individuen als auch auf Gruppenebene motorische Reaktionen identifi-
zieren, beispielsweise im Vergleich von (zuvor entsprechend bewerteten) als schön und häss-
lich empfundenen Bildern (Abb. 4). Wir nennen diese Auswertung „Emotional Footprint“. 
2.1.3 Diskussion 
Das Balance Board erlaubt es, mit einfachen Mitteln einen zeitlich hoch aufgelösten und 
genauen „Emotional Footprint“ zu erstellen. In Kombination mit weiteren Verfahren – bei-
spielsweise einem klassischen Fragebogen vor oder nach dem eigentlichen Board-
Experiment – ist es ein wichtiger Baustein der M5oX-Toolbox. 
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Abbildung 4: Die erste Ableitung der Sensordaten (vordere Sensoren minus hintere Sensoren), gemittelt über 30 
Teilnehmer, zeigt charakteristische Unterschiede im Vergleich von schönen und hässlichen Bildstimuli. 
2.2 Dynamische Erfassung ästhetischer Filmwirkung 
Aus Erfahrungen mit optischen Illusionen und Suchbildern kennen wir das Gefühl des 
"Aha"-Erlebnisses, wenn wir etwas plötzlich deutlich erkennen. Muth und Carbon (2013) 
deckten diesen „Aesthetic Aha“-Effekt kürzlich anhand unbestimmter Darstellungen von 
Gesichtern auf. In einer aktuellen Studie untersuchen wir die Relevanz dieses Effekts für die 
Bewertung künstlerischen Filmmaterials, in dem eine Gestalt entsteht, sich verändert bzw. 
auflöst und wieder neu entsteht (siehe Beispiele ‚a‘-‚d‘ in Abbildung 5). Der Einsatz eines 
Schiebereglers ermöglicht die Erfassung der Dynamik der Bestimmtheit (respektive 
Eindeutigkeit) der verschiedenen Phasen des Films sowie der Dynamik des Gefallens. Dies 
ermöglicht die Betrachtung des Zusammenhangs zwischen Bestimmtheit und Gefallen mit 
hoher zeitlicher Auflösung. 
 
2.2.1 Technik und Schnittstelle 
Zur Erfassung kontinuierlicher Daten nutzen wir einen 10 cm langen Schieberegler mit 10 
k (lineare Kennlinie). Der gesamte Schiebeweg wird über 1024 einzelne Messwerte reali-
siert und über einen FTDI RS232-USB-Emulator an den Rechner übertragen.  
2.2.2 Experiment und Datengewinnung 
In den Räumen der Ausstellung „Irritation und Auflösung“ in der Griesbadgalerie Ulm be-
trachteten 28 Versuchspersonen vier Stop-Motion Filme (insgesamt 7 min, 15 s.). Sie bewer-
teten in zwei Blöcken zeitgleich mit der Betrachtung die Filmstadien auf Bestimmtheit res-
pektive Gefallen. 
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2.2.3 Auswertung 
Abbildung 5 zeigt den Verlauf der dynamischen Bestimmtheits- und Gefallensbewertung 
über alle fünf Filme. Auffällig ist hierbei die Kongruenz der Variablen zu Beginn des Films 
und ihr zunehmendes Auseinanderdriften (sichtbar durch die gesteigerte Differenzfläche). In 
Folgestudien möchten wir eruieren, ob sich v.a. bei unbestimmten Stadien andere Faktoren 
(z.B. Kontrast) auf Gefallen stärker auswirken und somit die erhöhten Differenzen erklärt 
werden können (siehe z. B. Standbild ‚b‘ und ‚d‘ in Abbildung 5). 
 
Abbildung 5:Verlauf und Differenz der dynamischen Bestimmtheits- und Gefallensbewertung des Filmmaterials 
gemittelt über 28 Versuchspersonen. Beispielhafte Standbilder (‚a‘-‚d‘) veranschaulichen interessante Stadien der 
Kongruenz und Inkongruenz der ermittelten Variablen.  
2.2.4 Diskussion 
Die kontinuierliche Erfassung dynamischer Bestimmtheits- und Gefallensbewertungen kann 
dynamische Prozesse während des Kunstbetrachtens abbilden. Gleichzeitig zeigt sich hier 
deutlich, dass Multidimensionalität erheblich zum Verständnis komplexer kognitiver und 
affektiver Prozesse beiträgt und in diesem Fall nötig ist, um das Zusammenspiel von Be-
stimmtheit und Gefallen während einer ästhetischen Erfahrung zu verstehen. 
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2.3 Kinect zur Erfassung motorischer Konzepte 
Bewegungsübungen zur Bewältigung von seelischen Belastungen – beispielsweise Yoga, Qi 
Gong und Tai Chi – sind weit verbreitet. Unter dem Schlagwort embodiment untersucht die 
Psychologie das Wechselspiel von Emotion, Kognition und Körperbewegungen (Koch & 
Fuchs, 2001). Einer Vielzahl an Studien zum Einfluss der Körperhaltung auf das psychische 
Erleben (beispielsweise Carney, Cuddy & Yap, 2010; Riskind & Gotay, 1982) stehen wenige 
Untersuchungen zu komplexen Bewegungsfolgen gegenüber. Dies könnte zum Teil an der 
Schwierigkeit liegen, solche Bewegungsmuster von unterschiedlichen Versuchspersonen 
möglichst ähnlich und damit vergleichbar ausführen zu lassen. 
3.3.1  Technik und Schnittstelle 
Der Microsoft Kinect-Sensor basiert auf Hardware der Firma PrimeSense. Ausgestattet1 ist 
er mit einem 3D-Mikrofon, einer VGA-Kamera (übliche Videoauflösung 640 x 480 Pixel) 
und einer IR-Tiefenkamera (57° horizontaler Erfassungswinkel, nutzbare Distanz 0.8 bis 4 
Meter2). Angesteuert wird Kinect in unseren Experimenten über die Processing 1.5.1, einer 
auf Java basierenden Grafik-API3. Über den Java-Wrapper SimpleOpenNI4 kann das 3D-
SDK OpenNI angesteuert werden, das alle Kinect-Funktionen nutzbar macht. 
3.3.2   Experiment und Datengewinnung 
In einer ersten Pilotstudie zur Auswirkung von Bewegungsübungen auf den affektiven Zu-
stand ahmten 29 Versuchspersonen eine Qi-Gong-Übung nach. Aus einem zuvor gedrehten 
Video einer Entspannungsübung extrahierten wir die Position der Hände. Dabei variierten 
wir einerseits die Länge des Videos sowie die Qualität der gezeigten Bewegung (a) Kreise 
folgen langsam der kompletten Bewegung, b) Kreise springen ca. pro Sekunde schlagartig 
zur nächsten Position) Die Versuchspersonen wurden instruiert, mit ihren eigenen Händen 
diesen Kreisen zu folgen. Dabei wurde die Position der Hände der Versuchsperson kontinu-
ierlich über Kinect erfasst und direkt auf dem angezeigten Video eingeblendet. So hatten die 
Versuchspersonen eine beständige Rückmeldung, wie gut sie der Bewegung gerade folgen. 
Vor und nach dieser Übung schätzten die Teilnehmerinnen und Teilnehmer ihren aktuellen 
emotionalen Zustand. Dazu bewerteten sie 14 Adjektive (wach, ruhig, zentriert,…) auf einer 
fünfstufigen Skala, die sie über Handbewegungen via Kinect auf der Leinwand „ankreuzten“. 
2.3.3 Auswertung 
Die über Kinect abgegeben Bewertungen wurden in eine Datenmatrix gespeichert und mit 
SPSS ausgewertet. Die Versuchspersonen fühlen sich nach der Imitation des kurzen Videos 
signifikant weniger zentriert als zuvor (Mixed ANOVA, repeated measurement, 
                                                          
1
 http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/jj131033.aspx 
2
 http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/hh973078.aspx#Depth_Ranges 
3
 http://www.processing.org/ 
4
 http://code.google.com/p/simple-openni/ 
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F(1,27)=4.99, p=.034); das Imitieren des langen Videos ließ die „Zentriertheit“ dagegen 
ansteigen (F(1,27)=5.98, p=.021). Eine Interaktion ergab sich bei Berücksichtigung der Be-
wegungsqualität (nur langes Video): Die langsamen, geführten Bewegungen ließen die 
„Zentriertheit“ ansteigen, das Video mit den Bewegungs-Sprüngen verringerte hingegen die 
„Zentriertheit“ signifikant (F(1,13)=6.086, p=.028). In der Nachbefragung konnten die Ver-
suchspersonen „zentriert“ in Worten schlecht beschreiben. Auch für weitere Adjektive, bei-
spielsweise „wach“, ergaben sich signifikante, hypothesenkonforme Ergebnisse. 
2.3.4 Diskussion 
Unsere Ergebnisse deuten darauf hin, dass die Bewegungsqualität selbst – und nicht nur das 
Wissen über den Sinn einer Bewegungsfolge – den affektiven Zustand einer Person verän-
dert. Kinect ermöglichte es, die Bewegung abstrahiert vom Entspannungs-Kontext vorzuge-
ben. Gleichzeitig konnten die Teilnehmerinnen und Teilnehmern die Bewegungen ohne 
vorheriges Üben genau nachvollziehen. Wir vermuten, dass das Rating des Adjektive über 
Kinect begünstigt hat, dass die Versuchspersonen nach dem Video im motorischen Fluss 
bleiben und Armbewegungen zum Antworten nutzen konnten – ein großer Vorteil zu einem 
klassischen Fragebogen. Besonders deutlich zeigten sich die vermuteten Effekte beim Be-
griff „zentriert“, den die Versuchspersonen verbal kaum definieren konnten. Offenbar ist 
dieser Begriff stark mit Körpergefühl und Emotionen verknüpft, die verbal schlecht zugäng-
lich sind, mit einer auf Kinect basierenden Testungen aber gezielt manipuliert und auch ab-
gefragt werden können. 
3 Allgemeine Diskussion 
Wir plädieren für ein Konzept des Nutzererlebens, das dynamische Prozesse auf der kogniti-
ven, affektiven und körperlichen Ebene einbezieht. Je nach Fragestellung bieten sich zur 
Erfassung der relevanten Faktoren und Effekte unterschiedliche Methoden an, deren Qualität 
sich an der erzielbaren Dimensionalität und Dynamik misst. Mit der Idee der M5oX präsen-
tieren wir eine Methoden-Toolbox, die Möglichkeiten und Einschränkungen der einzelnen 
Techniken systematisch veranschaulicht.  
Die beschriebenen Studien exemplifizieren das Potential kostengünstiger, robuster Techni-
ken zur detaillierten Erfassung dynamischer Prozesse. Ziel ist nun die Entwicklung von 
Standard-Auswertungsroutinen für kontinuierliche Messmethoden sowie eine Fortführung 
der Toolbox hinsichtlich sinnvoller Kombinationsmöglichkeiten zur Optimierung des Ver-
hältnisses von Dimensionalität und Dynamik.   
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Reptile prime ministers and flying Nazi saucers—extreme and sometimes off-wall
conclusion are typical ingredients of conspiracy theories. While individual differences
are a common research topic concerning conspiracy theories, the role of extreme
statements in the process of acquiring and passing on conspiratorial stories has not been
regarded in an experimental design so far. We identified six morphological components
of conspiracy theories empirically. On the basis of these content categories a set of
narrative elements for a 9/11 story was compiled. These elements varied systematically in
terms of conspiratorial allegation, i.e., they contained official statements concerning the
events of 9/11, statements alleging to a conspiracy limited in time and space as well
as extreme statements indicating an all-encompassing cover-up. Using the method of
narrative construction, 30 people were given a set of cards with these statements and
asked to construct the course of events of 9/11 they deem most plausible. When extreme
statements were present in the set, the resulting stories were more conspiratorial; the
number of official statements included in the narrative dropped significantly, whereas the
self-assessment of the story’s plausibility did not differ between conditions. This indicates
that blatant statements in a pool of information foster the synthesis of conspiracy theories
on an individual level. By relating these findings to one of Germany’s most successful (and
controversial) non-fiction books, we refer to the real-world dangers of this effect.
Keywords: conspiracy theories, narrative construction, adaptation, liking, preference, external validity, reframing,
assimilation
INTRODUCTION
A government arms the nation’smost prominent skyscrapers with
explosives and directs passenger planes right into these buildings:
taken at face value, such an evil scenario seems completely off-
wall. However, such accusations are a common, probably a typical
ingredient of conspiracy theories. While a government trying to
conceal acts of failure—for example, the underestimation of a
terrorist threat—might be seen in the realm of possibility, the
widespread acceptance of very complex malicious plots, such as
a government deliberately killing thousands of the own people, is
a challenge for psychology. On the one hand, we need to under-
stand why many people adhere to a world view which implies
permanent threat to every individual (including themselves).
On the other hand, disturbing revelations—such as the recent
PRISM 1 leak—make it clear that denying global conspiracies per
se would be ignorant.
This challenge has multiple theoretical as well as methodolog-
ical aspects: how and why does the presence of quite extreme
information influences the processes of opinion formation? How
1PRISM is an US government codename for an extensive data collection
effort, allegedly organized within an intelligence operation based on electronic
surveillance procedures. The existence of PRISM was leaked by IT developer
Edward Snowden in June, 2013.
can this process be captured and investigated in a valid and yet
standardized way? And how can research that addresses these
processes take a non-arbitrary stance in the assessment of an
individual’s conspiracy beliefs, when there is no clear distinction
between true and false?
There have been various research efforts on individual dif-
ferences in the endorsement of conspiracy theories (e.g., Swami
et al., 2010). There is a finding that people are willing to
adopt obviously contradictory conspiratorial facts at the same
time (Wood et al., 2012). Lewandowsky et al. (2013b) indi-
cate that belief in one conspiracy theory is correlated with the
belief of other theories. Swami and Coles (2010) provide a
comprehensive overview of research on this subject. The pro-
active and constructive aspect of creating a (conspiracy) the-
ory, however, has not been regarded in an experimental design
so far.
The analysis of documents like websites and books is appeal-
ing, but still has also clear limitations, as we cannot take for
granted that these published theories are representative for the
stories the majority of people would adopt. Millions of people
around the globe create, compile, process, discuss, and repro-
duce conspiracy theories not only on internet platforms, private
websites or blogs, but also in personal communication, which is
hard to assess in research. We assume these people to be active
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information seekers who construct views on important events
that match their beliefs and values; and whose beliefs are in turn
influenced by information. Extreme theories, in books as well as
on the web, would serve as a mixed bag, that (speaking with P.T.
Barnum) offer “something for everyone”; so everybody is free to
adopt some story fragments only. As we have no further informa-
tion about and control of the regarding creators, proliferators and
consumers of such content we needmethods—in addition to con-
tent analysis (e.g., Lewandowsky et al., 2013a), interviews (e.g.,
Sapountzis and Condor, 2013) and standardized questionnaires
(e.g., Lewandowsky et al., 2013b)—which allow for the dynamic
character of compiling, reframing and linking of information to
unfold.
Here, we suggest the method of narrative construction as a
new means to explore the multi-facet phenomenon of conspiracy
theories. It allows an individual to construct a story for a given
event (e.g., the terrorist attacks of 9/11) by selecting and com-
piling pieces of information related to this event from different
content categories. By doing so, we can assess how much conspir-
acy an individual assumes to be at work concerning the event;
without compelling the researcher to define what a “true” story
looks like.
This article consists of two main parts. In the first part, we
present an exploratory study that helped us to identify core
constituents of conspiracy theories in a bottom-up approach.
Subsequently, these constituents were used as templates, for pieces
of information about 9/11 (retrieved from the World Wide Web).
We compiled two sets of information: one set with official and
mildly conspiratorial (i.e., with limitations in space and time)
information and another set that comprised additional extremely
conspiratorial statements. In a laboratory setting test subjects
were asked to construct a plausible story of the events of 9/11
using one of these sets of information. This main study showed
that the presence of extreme information induced a signifi-
cant shift of the resulting stories toward a conspiracy theory;
importantly, this shift was not paid for by lower plausibility as
shown by ratings each test subject gave afterwards for his/her
story.
In the second part of this article, we discuss a recent pub-
lic debate on Sarrazin’s (2010) book Deutschland schafft sich ab
(Germany is abolishing itself ) in the light of these findings. The
book is among the most successful non-fiction works of the past
decade in Germany, (in-) famous for its polemic portrayal of
Islamic culture (Sarrazin had been prominent before this debate
as senator of finances in Berlin from 2002 to 2009 and as member
of the Executive Board of the Deutsche Bundesbank until 2010).
Sarrazin’s book was our point of origin: Not only was its impact
on political discourse huge; the author presented a patchwork
mixture of established facts, assumptions, wild speculations and
polemic accusations. We consider his book, at least compatible
with conspiracy theories, if not even a conspiracy theory on its
own, as we will discuss later on.
If the presence of extreme statements in a pool of given infor-
mation seduces people to disregard standard information, con-
spiracy theories can be dangerous indeed: It may shift the tenor
of public debate and the individual’s judgments of plausibility
toward the extreme.
MATERIALS ANDMETHODS
RATIONALE FOR USING THE METHOD OF NARRATIVE CONSTRUCTION
In spite of the numerous attempts to define what a conspiracy
theory is [e.g., Grüter, 2010, even dedicates a full monograph to
this question], we found it hard to derive distinct categories of
elements from any of such definitions. Many authors refer to the
definition of Hofstadter (1965), who claims that a conspiracy the-
ory of a vast, sinister and yet subtle machinery of influence to
destroy a way of life. This sums up the main features of com-
mon conspiracies, but is too vague to allow for the generation of
distinct narrative elements (Bale, 2007). Bale confines himself to
political conspiracies aiming at a more differentiated definition.
However, he presents discriminative features that mainly define
conspiracies by the attributes of the conspiring force. In other
words, he discusses a conspiracy’s characteristics, which is not
the same as a conspiracy theory’s narrative parts. Additionally, we
think that such an attempt would run the danger that primar-
ily the well-known and mostly extreme conspiracy theories—the
ones that were used to generate the definitions—become paradig-
matic. Research would then focus on such extremes while missing
the subtle shadings and nuances of individual theories and every-
day phenomena.
In his analysis of Russian folk tales, Propp (1972) has already
pointed to the problems of a classification without a guiding prin-
ciple for defining a story’s features. His solution was a bottom-up
categorization of 100 folk stories. He discriminated the tales’ con-
tents and the narrative functions of the elements he found and
finally arrived at seven essential story elements (like, the Hero or
the Adversary). Thus, to identify the morphological constants of
conspiracy theories, we decided to take a bottom-up empirical
stance.
PREREQUISITE: A BOTTOM-UP ASSEMBLY OF CONSPIRACY THEORY
BUILDING BLOCKS
In a preliminary study, we determined which elements are likely
to constitute a conspiracy theory. Major aim was to collect max-
imally diverse kinds of such theories. Five interviewers asked 38
people (students from the University of Bamberg, their friends
and relatives) which “intrigues and secret schemes, for exam-
ple conspiracy theories” they know of. Afterwards, we asked
them to reproduce their “favorite conspiracy theory” by their
own words. The interviewers also wanted to know where they
had heard this story, and why it is their favorite conspiracy the-
ory. As a next step, we asked “which elements are part of most
conspiracy theories” as open question, recording the answers
verbatim.
The recorded material formed the basis for a bottom-up
process of categorization. Each interviewer tried to rephrase
the answers from another interviewer’s participants on a more
abstract level. The derived categories had then to be defended
in an argument with the other interviewers. This kind of argu-
mentative validation, as described by Mayring (2005), went on
until all interviewers agreed on a set of six categories for “ele-
ments of conspiracy theories,” including category definitions. Due
to this inductive process, not all categories are strictly homoge-
nous; however, a further subdivision of categories could not be
justified in the argumentative process based on the given data.
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In order to evaluate the importance of these basic items of
conspiracy theories, we printed them on cards (one category
along with definition and examples on each card) and handed
out shuffled sets (each set containing all elements) to 28 partic-
ipants (undergraduate students of psychology, 23 female, Mage =
19.7 years) which had not participated in the initial interviews.
The participants were asked to rank these elements by “laying
out the cards in the order of subjective importance” and to write
down the rank of each item on the respective card when finished.
We aggregated these ratings by ordering the items according to
the mode of rank orders. The bottom-up generated categories
were odd event, evidence, non-transparency, publicity, group of
conspirers, andmyth (enlisted in Table 1).
METHOD OF NARRATIVE CONSTRUCTION
Our aim was to allow for the idiosyncratic process of construct-
ing a story under controlled and comparable conditions. We
developed the method of narrative construction that enables us
to observe the process, and to quantify each participant’s output
with regard to the hypothesis.
The material for the narrative construction paradigm is a com-
pilation of laminated paper cards (each about the size of a playing
card, i.e., 10× 6 cm). These cards are compiled according to the
hypotheses in the following manner (exemplified in Figure 1):
• For each independent variable there is a corresponding suit,
comparable to spades, hearts, diamonds and clubs in a deck of
playing cards. For example, if one would be interested to com-
pare internal vs. external attribution in a personal narrative,
there would be one suit of cards with statements compati-
ble with internal control beliefs, and one suit with cards all
assuming external control. For our case, we compiled one suit
containing official, one containing limited conspiratorial, and
one containing unlimited conspiratorial items (representing a
three-stepped approach).
• Within the suits, there are cards for the categories, i.e., the ele-
ments deemed important for the narrative. Each suit contains
corresponding cards, like there’s an ace of spades, an ace of
hearts, etc. For exploring a narrative of control beliefs, there
might be one card for work (in the card came metaphor, a
king), one for family (say, a queen), one for sports (a joker),
etc. (in contrast to playing cards, there is no rank order obvi-
ous to the participant). In our case, with six conspiracy theory
elements/categories, there should be at least six cards within
each suit—one per category, corresponding between suits.
• To allow for more complex narratives, it is possible to com-
pile more than one card per category. For example, one might
include three items concerning private life. This is not a feature
of playing cards, but can be thought of, e.g., several Queens, all
slightly different in their appearance. In conspiracy research,
for example more than one card concerning the odd event
might be useful
Each participant is handed out the set of shuffled cards at once.
They are asked to “construct a story that is—in his personal
view—a plausible explanation” for cause for a certain event or
process (for example, work-life balance; or, as in our case, 9/11).
In the beginning, the participant is instructed to read each card
and to coarsely categorize the items into two groups, a “plausi-
ble” one and a “not plausible” one. Each of these categorizations
could be revised in the course of the process. After the initial pre-
sorting, the participant is asked “to serialize the cards to produce
a stringent and plausible course of events using as few or as many
cards” as he wants. Again, removing or adding cards to the “not
plausible”-heap is still, and explicitly, allowed. Furthermore, no
time restriction is applied.
Table 1 | Items generated by a bottom-up process of categorization, ordered descending by importance.
Category label Category definition Standard examples
Odd event There is a relevant event that gains interest of many people. There are some
open questions concerning this event
• “Apollo-mission”
• “9/11”
• “Kennedy assassination”
Evidence There is evidence, observations, artefacts, and other indications, that are used by
conspiracy theorists to support their theories. There are secret signs and
symbols supporting the conspiracy theorists’ view
• “Symbols seen everywhere”
• “Undeniable facts”
Non-transparency The situation about available information concerning a topic is non-transparent.
Media coverage is obscure. There is cover-up and manipulation of information
• “Cover-up of reality”
• “Not enough inside-information available”
Publicity There is an official viewpoint for a topic. Public agents (e.g., government,
experts, scientists, intelligence agencies) acknowledge this viewpoint. However,
this account is regarded by some with scepticism and distrust. The official
viewpoint contradicts the non-official viewpoint by conspiracy theorists
• “The media spread information”
• “Experts that testify”
Group of conspirers There is a group of conspirers. These conspirers are evil and influential, and
strive to gain more and more money and power. They forge a secret plot at the
expense of other groups or individuals
• “Persons that work in secrecy”
• “A chosen or intricate minority”
Myth Historic myths exert a strong influence on conspiracy theories. There are
esoteric elements as part of conspiracy theories
• “Esotericism”
• “A fight between good and evil”
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FIGURE 1 | Overview of the narrative construction design.
By assigning participants to groups and varying the cards
between these groups, different research questions can be
addressed. To test the influence of the presence of a specific inde-
pendent variable (= suit), the presence of this suit can be varied.
To fathom whether the presence of a specific category influences
the selection behavior concerning the other categories, only one
group of participants receives cards of this category (for example,
Queens present vs. no Queens present).
After the participant has indicated that he/ she is satisfied with
his/ her story, he/ she is further asked to rate “how plausible
the laid-out story is” with regard to the event in question, on a
five-point Likert scale (1 = not plausible, 5 = plausible). Finally,
the generated narrative is recorded (by writing down each card’s
code, printed on the backside that indicates category and fac-
tor level in the laid-out order). This procedure is conceptually
similar to Meichenbaum’s (1996) constructive-narrative ther-
apy which emphasizes the importance to re-construct one’s life
story when suffering from post-traumatic stress disorder. Wilson
(2002) regards introspection as a personal narrative “whereby
people construct stories about their lives, much as a biographer
would” (p.162). This kind of introspection is seen as beneficial for
one’s mental well-being by Wilson. He also notes that the process
is vulnerable to omissions and simplifications—which are, in our
context, not interfering variables, but in fact the effect of interest.
McAdams (1997) even argues that we are in fact the stories we
create.
We devised the narrative construction to be a third way, besides
questionnaires and interviews. Already with three dozen cards
(for example, three suits à 12 cards), there are billions of pos-
sible stories, i.e., combinations. Compared to a questionnaire,
this allows for more diversified, idiosyncratic results. Reading,
evaluating, sorting and laying out multiple cards can be consid-
ered to be more demanding cognitively than serially answering a
number of questionnaire items, and it would allow to assess the
process of opinion formation, too; for example, by asking partici-
pants to think aloud while constructing the story. This comes at a
price: psychometric criteria can’t be applied straightforward here.
Compared to an interview, narrative construction is tighter.
The number of items is limited. A transcription and categoriza-
tion after the experiment is not necessary, as the cards are coded
and the chosen items can easily be written down.However, in con-
trast to an interview, a spontaneous introduction of new items is
not possible. The participant’s attention stays focused on the pro-
cess of story creation in narrative construction, while an interview
introduces a social facet. It depends on the research question if
introducing social interaction is instrumental or a confounder.
A simple evaluation of a narrative construction’s result would
be to count the number of items chosen from each suit (for
example, internal vs. external attribution, when there were two
according suits); and/or to count the number of card faces cho-
sen (e.g., how many participants have included “sports” in their
work-life-balance narration). This evaluation would be straight-
forward and could tell which attributional style is predominant
in the sample, and/or which aspects are most relevant for people
when it comes to balancing their life. By varying specific aspects,
the influence some information exerts onto other information
can be assessed. For instance, by giving some participants an addi-
tional suit, the impact of the availability of this information can
be measured. Another way is handing out some additional cards.
Sticking to the control belief example, we could assess how stories
change when people are offered cards allowing for counseling or
therapeutic advice.
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More sophisticated assessments could aim at the structure of
stories, e.g., look for typical sequences. Also, one could test if
certain aspects nearly always appear together, or turn out to be
mutually exclusive.
In sum, whenever a questionnaire seems too rigid, when a
thorough and attentive process is desirable, and when narrative
structures might be relevant, narrative construction might be an
option. However, when a dyadic social interaction is preferable,
when hypotheses are too vague, and when the topics in focus are
too broad to be represented adequately with a deck of cards, an
interview should be preferred. Yet, there are research questions
where a combination of narrative construction and interview is
appealing. By interacting with a deck of topic-related cards, par-
ticipants might get a grip on a topic, by evaluating all aspects the
researcher likes to consider. This sort of elaborate priming might
help to facilitate a subsequent interview.
CONSTRUCTING A 9/11 STORY
Material
For our research question, we compiled 14 cards for each suit
(see Table 1). With respect to the bottom-up derived elements
of conspiracy theories: two for group of conspirers, one for non-
transparency, one for publicity, three for odd event, three for
evidence and one formyth. Each itemwas present in each suit (i.e.,
3 cards), fueled with contents from typical (1) official, (2) limited
conspiratorial, and (3) unlimited conspiratorial viewpoints. The
official suit card always bore a category-related statement that was
in accordance with official 9/11 reports and documents (drawing
on respectable sources, e.g., governmental reports made public
on the internet). For example, an official group of conspirers-item
was: “9/11 mastermind were Islamist terrorists, led by Osama bin
Laden, to attack the detested Western culture.”
The card in the limited conspiratorial suit was prepared with
an item that contained an explanation describing a conspir-
acy of moderate strength. Specifically, this level was formed in
accordance with Lutter’s (2001) categorization of conspiracies,
corresponding to a conspiracy limited in time and space. This
can also be thought as matching Daniele Ganser’s (n.d.) 9/11-
view “let it happen on purpose” (LIHOP). In this view, the Bush
administration did not initiate the attacks, but knew beforehand
and did not take countermeasures. We compiled information
from web resources like Wikipedia that matched this level. The
“group of conspirers”-item here read: “The US administration
had let happen the 9/11 attack to justify the wars in Afghanistan
and Iraq.”
In the unlimited conspiratorial suit, a card assumed a conspir-
acy with no clear bounds within space and time, or a “make it
happen on purpose” (MIHOP) viewpoint in the sense of Ganser
(n.d.). For example, it read: “The US administration had planned
and conducted the 9/11 attack to justify the wars in Afghanistan
and Iraq.”
So for each of the six categories (odd event, evidence, non-
transparency, publicity, group of conspirers and myth), there was
at least one triplet of cards (one card with an official statement,
one limited conspiratorial and one unlimited conspiratorial);
details in Figure 1.
An exempt was a further category, absurdity, where all items
were completely off-wall: One assumed “thermonuclear devices
hidden in the Twin Towers,” one “killer satellites from outer
space,” and one stated that “the Syrian newspaper Al Thawra has
reported that 4000 Jewish WTC employees were warned before-
hand and did not show up on work on 9/11.” These items were
identical for both experimental groups, included for another
research question and are not considered any further for the
hypothesis discussed here.
Participants
Thirty persons (26 female,Mage = 22.4 years, range: 19–55 years)
took part in the study. They were recruited at and around the
campus of the University of Bamberg; they were naïve to the
aim of the study and had not been involved in any other study
described in this paper. The participants were randomly assigned
to two groups: (1) modest contents group and (2) extreme contents
group.
Procedure
The modest contents group was handed out a card deck with
29 items, containing the official as well as the limited conspir-
atorial suit (plus the three-card subset absurd). The extreme
contents group received the same deck and additionally the suit
with 13 unlimited conspiratorial items. All were asked to “con-
struct a plausible story of the events of September 11th 2001, as
a single coherent story or consisting of coherent or controversial
fragments,” without time restrictions. When the participant had
considered the story finished, the chosen items and their layout
were written down. The participant was then asked to rate “how
plausible the 9/11 story version just laid out is” on a five-point
Likert scale (among other questions related to other hypotheses).
Overall, the participants spend 21min on average to construct
their story, with a range from 8 to well over 30min.
RESULTS
The groups did not differ significantly in terms of age
[Mmodestgroup = 21.3, Mextremeroup = 24.8, F(1, 28) = 2.17,
p = 0.15, n.s.]. Each group consisted of 13 female and two male
participants.
To compare the stories between groups, we summed up the
number of cards chosen from each conspiratorial level (official,
limited and unlimited) over all categories. So for each participant,
we added up all official items, all limited conspiratorial items and
all unlimited conspiratorial items (the latter being trivially zero
for the group of participants who had not received any of these
cards).
In the modest conspiratorial condition, participants on aver-
age selected 7.7 out of 13 official items (SD = 2.6) and 6.8 out
of 13 limited conspiratorial items (SD = 3.3) to construct a 9/11
story (Figure 2). On average, 12.8 items were used, with a range
from 6 to 23 items. When the full set was available, there were 4.9
out of 13 official items selected on average (SD = 3.2), 6.2 limited
conspiratorial items (SD = 2.4) and 3.9 unlimited conspiratorial
items (SD = 3.7). 15.8 items were used on average, with a range
from 6 to 30 items.
With a One-Way Analysis of Variance (ANOVA), we tested if
number of items selected from the official as well as from the lim-
ited conspiratorial item pool (these numbers being the dependent
variables) differed between the two groups. The difference in the
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FIGURE 2 | Comparison of number of official and limited conspiratorial
items for both experimental groups in the to be generated 9/11
stories. Error bars indicate ±1 SEM (standard error of the mean).
number of official items selected was significant, F(1, 28) = 6.92,
p = 0.0137, η2p = 0.198, withM = 7.7 (SD = 2.6) for the official
andM = 4.9 (SD = 3.2) for the limited conspiratorial item pool,
whereas we found no difference in the number of selected limited
conspirational items, F(1, 28) < 1, p = 0.95, n.s.
Importantly, the different composition of items for the single
stories did not lead to different plausibility levels, thus poten-
tial acceptance of the regarding stories. When analyzing the
plausibility ratings of the stories, we could not reveal any dif-
ference between the extreme contents group (M = 4.0, SD = 0.5)
and the modest contents group (M = 3.8, SD = 0.9), F(1, 28) < 1,
p = 0.45, n.s.).
DISCUSSION
THEORETICAL DISCUSSION
People had to generate their own stories for one of the most
dramatic events of contemporary history. The available building
blocks were limited to a number of statements taken from the real
world, i.e., reflecting the official version of 9/11 as well asmild and
extreme conspiratorial views. The stimuli were selected to match
a set of categories that was identified to be typical for conspiracy
theories.
The small number of categories and the three-level design con-
fined the stories’ content. Yet, mathematically the participants
had the opportunity to build one out of over eight billion pos-
sible stories (already when the structure, i.e., the item order of
the laid story, is not regarded). Furthermore, there was no time
restriction.
Our results indicate that people construct a plausible explana-
tion for an important event by integrating all pieces of informa-
tion available, even if this information implies a huge conspiracy.
While one would expect a going to extremes in a discussion
of several persons, the significant drop in the number of canon-
ical items shows that a shift of the bounds of plausibility already
begins in an individual’s mind. Notably, there was no time pres-
sure, and the time people used can be considered well above
the duration of usual media coverage. Consequently, we would
not consider this effect as a heuristics in the sense of a cognitive
shortcut. Indeed, the effect appeared as a result of a thorough con-
sideration of information. The result was not a single-best answer,
but a coherent story.
We asked German people to construct a 9/11 narrative; we
might expect the stories’ content to be influenced by the partic-
ipants’ home country and, going hand in hand, the individual
concern with the 9/11 aftermath. However, we wanted to induce
active story construction, and for our German sample we could
be sure every participant knew of this event; and at the same time
we could be fairly sure there was no personal involvement—in a
sense that a participant might have known one of the 9/11 victims
personally.
As items were taken from real-world sources, they were not
matched in terms of representativeness for a given category or
factor level. Thus, there will very likely have been differences in
conspiratorialness within the groups. Additionally, there were dif-
ferent levels of mutual exclusion: some extremely conspiratorial
items were not compatible with their official counterpart (and
vice versa); for example, a controlled detonation ruled out the
planes as ultimate cause for the collapse of the towers. Other
items, however, were mutually consistent; for example, a gov-
ernment lying about Pearl Harbor can be in accordance with an
Al-Qaeda attack. Further research has to show if a matching of
items is possible; and if it is desirable, as heterogeneous and in
part mutually exclusive information is characteristic of real-world
opinion formation.
Another promising research question would be the stability
of generated narratives. For example, if participants are asked to
construct a story again 1 or 2 days later: will they produce the
same plot?
The shift from a moderate toward an extreme conspiracy did
not come with a decline of self-perceived story plausibility. What
we did not test, however, was to which extent the participants
identified with their story. Would they cling to it when they
were confronted with the necessity to act; for example, when
they would be asked to defend their narrative against critical
questions?
One could object that participants were limited by the story
fragments available, particularly in the non-extreme condition,
and thus not able to produce the “perfect” conspiracy they would
have looked for. If so, however, we would have expected a lower
plausibility rating on average for this group; or, alternatively,
a drop in mildly conspiratorial items when the full set was
presented, with the number of canonical items not affected.
While the method and the results presented here could
undoubtedly be optimized, they indicate that extreme positions
in an alleged conspiracy foster the active acquisition of that con-
spiracy. This indicates a danger we will discuss in the light of one
of the most heated public debates in Germany of recent years.
GERMANY IS ABOLISHING ITSELF: THE PRACTICAL DANGERS OF
ABSURD STATEMENTS
Sarrazin’s (2010) book Deutschland schafft sich ab (Germany is
abolishing itself ) was a “blockbuster”—in a double sense. On the
one hand, it was a huge success in terms of publicity, spear-
heading Germany’s non-fiction bestseller list for 21 consecutive
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weeks (Buchreport.de, n.d.), making it the most successful book
about politics from a German author of the decade (Media
Control, 2010). On the other hand, it has mined public debate
about the integration of people with migration background until
today.
In his book Sarrazin devises a scenario which displays all of
our criteria for a conspiracy theory: While Germany’s population
is diminishing,Muslimminorities keep growing due to constantly
high birth rates (odd event). Thus, Sarrazin predicts that the “real”
Germans—cultural pureness can be seen as the esoteric myth-
element here—will soon be outnumbered by the offspring of
immigrants from Muslim countries. Highly fertile, yet unwilling
to adopt our value system, these people (group of conspirers) are
secretly (non-transparency) taking over the German society, grad-
ually reorganizing it in accordance with their religious beliefs.
Sarrazin’s line of argument mixes facts, opinions and anecdotes
from very different areas and levels of life and knowledge (evi-
dence). Most controversial were his crude assumptions of an “IQ
score being 15 points higher” (Sarrazin, 2010, p.93) among Jews
of European origin; as well as his claim that we “become more
stupid on average for mere reasons of demography” (p.100), as
Muslim immigrants, in Sarrazin’s argumentation, would lower
society’s general intelligence level. Last but not least, Sarrazin
claims that the truth about all this is being suppressed by excessive
political correctness in public debate and that this self-imposed
censorship is a result of collective feelings of guilt dating back to
the “Third Reich” (publicity).
Many protagonists in the debate refuted the extreme state-
ments about a linkage between religion, fertility and religiously
determined intellectual brilliance. Yet, they admitted that Sarrazin
had made some important points about migration in general (as
critically discussed, for example, by Lau (2009), when Sarrazin’s
views had become public for the first time). Notably, the book
review rated helpful by most other users at the British online
bookstore amazon.co.uk, reads as follows: “. . . yes there are ele-
ments that most people will find hard to agree with no matter
how persuasively argued but that shouldn’t detract from the vast
majority of what is being argued in the book” (Thinkforachange,
2010).
Our question here is not if these radical aspects of Sarrazin’s
book had been a means of promotional success, which seems
beyond doubt: he got prime-time attention for months. The
validity (and non-validity) of his assumptions has been discussed
extensively, for example in Foroutan (2010). Also, the social
dimension—has there been a taboo that Sarrazin has dared to
break, or has this alleged taboo just been an excuse for some to
spread xenophobic attitudes—is not in focus here.
On basis of the findings of our empirical study, we have good
reason to believe that the presence of rather extreme statements
shifts peoples’ cognitive bounds when they construct their opin-
ion about complex political events: they will tend to construct a
more radical view when such information is offered. In this case:
even if people won’t adopt the view of Jewish intelligence DNA,
the presence of this statement—say, while reading the book or
while listening to a debate on TV—might result in a more extreme
personal narrative. Adaptation research points us in the direc-
tion of the possible reason for this: As soon as we perceive and
process extreme items, we integrate them into our mental repre-
sentation (e.g., Strobach and Carbon, 2013) yielding adaptations
toward the new items (e.g., Carbon, 2011), thus the whole nar-
rative gets more extreme. What has been shown by these authors
to work in the visual domain, seems to hold for verbal, semantic
information, too.
So a conspiracy theory (in the sense outlined here) bears many
dangers: the complex and anecdotic reasoning immunizes against
falsification. Extreme constituents attract attention and polarize
the debate; and they also might induce a shift of people’s individ-
ual explanatory constructs toward a conspiratorial plot. In sum,
a flavor of oddness might not be a weakness of such theories, but
indeed an integral part and enabler of their persuasive power.
CONSPIRACIES AND REPTILE POLITICAL LEADERS
Extreme and sometimes absurd statements seem to be an ingre-
dient of many conspiracy theories. But what role do reptile aliens
and flyingNazi saucers play in conspiracy theories? Are such state-
ments merely included for dramatic effect in order to attract our
attention, or do they really affect what we believe in the end?
We have shown that the presence of rather extreme statements
does have an effect on people’s story construction. The “official”
view becomes of lesser importance. Moderate items are disre-
garded, and in turn extreme statements are integrated. With a case
study of Sarrazin’s book Deutschland schafft sich ab (Germany is
abolishing itself ) we illustrated the danger of a theory containing
established facts, speculations and rather crude opinions.
We focused on the constructive nature of forming an opin-
ion. Such an opinion was seen as a story—a system of coherent
information—answering key questions related to a given event or
process: Why did it happen? Who is responsible? Who is affected?
We deem this view crucial for research on conspiracy theories.
One does not simply perceive such a theory to accept or refute
it. One will rather match this theory with one’s own eventual-
ity space, that is, all things one deems possible. In the end, the
eventuality space might be recalibrated to incorporate new facts
just as recent findings on the adaptivity of memory representa-
tions have shown (e.g., Carbon, 2011; Carbon and Ditye, 2011).
In turn, the personmight come upwith a new (conspiracy) theory
that shares some, but not necessarily all elements of the original
theory. As Leman and Cinnirella (2007) has already noted, biases
and heuristics play an important role. While he focused on the
cause-effect-relationship, we considered the scope of information
as an influencing factor on the frame of plausibility.
It is these dynamics of reception, alteration and propagation
that account for the many-faceted phenomenon we call conspir-
acy theory. The cognitive effort, i.e., considering information in
the eventuality space, might be rewarding and satisfying in itself;
just like an aesthetic experience or amental exercise (cf. Muth and
Carbon, 2013). Unlike a crossword puzzle, however, reception
and propagation of a conspiracy theory allow for intercommu-
nion. Yet, as many participants reported afterwards, constructing
a story can ultimately be fun.
These results might also explain why some conspiracy theories
are believed—one might think of reptile aliens governing impor-
tant nations in disguise of familiar political leaders—, although
they seem stark mad to outsiders. Given the mechanism found
www.frontiersin.org July 2013 | Volume 4 | Article 453 | 7
A.3 The Sarrazin effect
98
Raab et al. The Sarrazin effect
here holds for an ongoing, long-term cycle of information seek-
ing and opinion formation, it might be possible that a small but
constant shift toward an extreme will not arouse the truth-seeker’s
suspicion.
As a next step, we will take a closer look at the process of
story construction, e.g., by letting participants think aloud. Right
now, we do not know what motifs guide the individual’s con-
structive process. With a larger sample, we will also compare
the structure of the generated narratives to identify whether
there are certain aspects, respectively content categories that are
more likely to be influenced by the presence of extreme opin-
ions. Taking a closer look at individual differences (Are there
predictors for people who will fall for this effect? Are there peo-
ple who might even be deterred by extremist testimonies, thus
responding with a shift in the opposite direction?) is on the
agenda, too.
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Conspiracy belief and personal beliefs 
Exploring the linkage between a person’s value system and the tendency for conspiracy beliefs  
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Abstract 
To believe that Big Pharma, Big Data, the government or a secret society is deliberately endangering 
your health touches your most fundamental views on society: Who is in power, and who should be? 
What about personal freedom and the pursuit to happiness? Does the profit of a few outweigh the 
well-being of the masses? In other words, conspiracy theories affect very important, even 
fundamental beliefs and values, sometimes in an abstracted sense—and portray them as being 
endangered. Building on the example of the Stuttgart 21 protests – mass demonstrations on a 
railway and urban development project in Stuttgart/Germany that dominated Germany’s news 
coverage in 2010 – we hypothesize that a conspiratorial plot is a narrative schema that puts one’s 
most important beliefs at stake in general following a distinct narrative pattern. From this point of 
view, actual conspirers are exchangeable, thus typical stereotypical conspirers cannot be identified—
however, we can recognize characteristic topics conspiracies seemingly want to attack, i.e. basic 
values such as freedom of speech, “democracy”, personal well-being, distribution of wealth and 
healthcare, and self-actualization. Main idea behind this approach is to develop a meta theory of 
conspiracy stories, defocusing from pathological personality traits of conspirers. Such an approach 
could also explain why a singular event like 9/11 is the cardinal point for far-left as well as extreme-
right conspiracy theories: not the event, not even the masterminds, but the values endangered by 
the supposed agenda behind the event make the difference. In a pilot study, we employed the 
method of narrative construction where 35 participants were asked to construct the course of events 
concerning the (fictitious) establishment of a new study course Future Concepts of Humanity at a 
renowned German university. Manipulations relating to the study course were attributed to different 
stakeholders (a left-wing Student’s Union, a famous consulting agency, societal activists, and a 
Christian leader). We found that holding conservative values was positively correlated with choosing 
story fragments implicating a societal conspiracy of the LGBT community. Valuing self-transcendence 
(i.e., being benevolent and favoring higher, general ideas), in contrast, was negatively correlated with 
constructing a LGBT conspiracy. A value system favoring openness for change was negatively 
correlated with conspiracy attributions in general. So, people valuing conservative beliefs tended to 
construct a conspiracy theory that portrayed a very progressive group as mean-spirited, while people 
valuing benevolence and universal principles for all humankind did the opposite. These results 
indicate that a person’s value system might be a predictor for engagement with conspiracy theories; 
even a specific predictor for the content of an individual’s conspiracy theory. 
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Introduction – A Case Study 
What do people stand up for? Usually, for what is dear and important to them. When something that 
is beloved gets endangered, a person’s thoughts and actions will focus on defending those things or 
ideas under attack. Consequently, we might learn much about an individual when we know what 
ideas he or she is willing to advocate. As soon as we learn more about those “desirable 
transsituational goals […] that serve as guiding principles in the life of a person or other social entity” 
(Schwartz, 1994, p.21) – in other words, about the values – of a person, we gain a deeper 
understanding. Our aim is to take a closer look at the guiding principles that are at stake in 
conspiracy theories (CTs); in other words, to shift the focus from the villains appearing in CTs to the 
villains’ targets.  
There has been some research on individual differences concerning the belief in conspiracy theories 
(for an overview, see e.g. Swami & Coles, 2010). Yet, common to these approaches is an emphasis on 
the conspirers appearing in CTs. Wood, Douglas and Sutton (2012) found that believing Osama bin 
Laden to be dead and believing him to be alive need not be mutually exclusive. They conclude that 
“central beliefs, such as the conviction that authorities and officials engage in massive deception of 
the public to achieve their malevolent goals” (Wood, Douglas & Sutton, 2012, p.6) might be behind 
this kind of thinking the authors call monological. We would like to go one step further and 
investigate if the monological thinking is, at least to some extent, better understood as a reflection of 
a person’s constitutive and monolithic most important personal value. 
To illustrate this, we introduce a recent case of a sociopolitical mass movement in Germany. The 
movement had dominated media coverage for months, had mobilized tens of thousands of people, 
and might be considered as protest movement against a perceived conspiracy: a mass protest against 
Stuttgart 21, that is, against the enterprise to re-build the train station in Stuttgart (Baden-
Württemberg, Germany), underground. A huge area, so far occupied by rail tracks, would become 
free and could be used for urban development. Overall cost for this project has reached over six 
billion Euros. Critics accused the federal government of wasting taxpayers’ money and insinuated 
there had been secret deals between politicians and corporations for personal gain. There had been 
demonstrations with over 60.000 (official estimate) resp. 150.000 people (organizer’s estimate), and 
encounters between police and protesters leaving over 100 people severely wounded (e.g., 
Südwestrundfunk, 2014; Stuttgarter Zeitung, 2013). Socio-demographic studies (Bebnowski et. al, 
2010) showed that protesters’ education was about average, with over 40 percent holding a 
university degree; and that over 90 percent reported a very strong identification with democratic 
values like freedom of speech, of assembly, and of press. Over 70 percent reported a political view 
left of the political median (1-4 on a 1-10 scale from extreme left to extreme right). Up to now, there 
are investigations against Baden-Württemberg’s former prime minister about his role in the protest’s 
escalation leaving people severely wounded, and about supposed financial inconsistencies (Zeit 
Online, 2014). 
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Tens of thousands of highly educated people, mainly left-wing, holding democratic values high – are 
protesting against the reconstruction of a train station. This rather unusual constellation might help 
us to shed some light on the relation between personal values and conspiratorial beliefs. 
Defining Conspiracy Theory 
“Conspiracy theories can be defined in a variety of ways, and it appears each scholar refers to their 
own definition.” (Jolley, 2013, p.60) A common denominator might be that a conspiracy theory (CT) 
attributes “the ultimate cause of an event (usually one that is political or social) as a secret plot by a 
covert alliance of powerful individuals or organizations, rather than as an overt activity or natural 
occurrence.” (Douglas & Sutton, 2008, p.211). With minor variations, similar definitions appear in 
most recent publications, like CTs being an “unverified and relatively implausible allegation of 
conspiracy, claiming that significant events are the result of a secret plot carried out by a 
preternaturally sinister and powerful group of people” (Brotherton & French, 2014, p.238). 
While such definitions bear a high face validity and match most well-established conspiracy theories, 
these approaches have severe shortcomings, neglecting fundamental theories of social and 
motivational psychology and the power of narratives as such. Mainly, we identified the problems of 
these approaches, because they  
a)? do not regard the narrative structure of CTs, 
b)? do not allow to compare CTs in terms of strength or potency (is more sinister a relevant 
comparison; is secrecy the key factor; or the power of the powerful individuals?), and they 
c)? do not hint at the peoples’ motivation to believe such theories. 
Already in 1994, Goertzel prompted to look for “underlying psychological processes” (p.739), 
although most definitions still do not incorporate structural, processual and motivational aspects at 
all. A more complex definition would allow for more specific hypotheses (and thus more specific 
empirical approaches), and it would be much easier to attack (and thus would bear more potential to 
be refined and developed).  
For our approach, we suggest the following working definition that incorporates ideas by Melley 
(2000), Ganser (n.d.), Goertzel (1994) as well as some own qualitative empirical approaches (Raab, 
Ortlieb, Auer, Guthmann & Carbon, 2013): 
A conspiracy theory is the story of a hidden process that gets spotted by a small number of people. As 
their life and their personal values are affected by this process, these people try – together with other 
insiders – to uncover the workings of this process and make it public. The story usually includes an 
odd event or threatening status quo, some evidence supporting the existence of this secret process, 
a non-transparency or distrust concerning official and/ or usual sources, information about attempts 
to make the story public, a group of conspirers, and sometimes a myth (that is, beliefs that defy 
rational or empirical verification and are a matter of belief). It makes a difference if the group of 
conspirers has recognized the secret process, but does cover it up to gloss over negligence or 
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incompetence (let it happen on purpose; LIHOP); or if the group of conspirers did actively start and 
support this process for its own benefit (make it happen on purpose; MIHOP).  
Our definition fits the Stuttgart 21 movement where (in the beginning, a few) citizens found it odd 
why billions should be spent to re-build a train station underground. They gathered evidence 
supporting their view that members of the federal state government and the industries might 
actively promote this underground project for personal profit, and that official statements and media 
coverage might be biased. The citizens – mostly highly educated people from all ages holding 
democracy high – saw taxpayer’s billions and values like democratic transparency at stake went 
public and started Monday demonstrations: a MIHOP-CT where values of democracy and good, 
sustainable governance were threatened. The unique feature here: not the conspirers (with 
government and big business being the usual suspects); but the train station that was to be buried 
underground and that became a symbol of backroom politics, buried information and burnt money 
(which can also be read on a metaphorical level, leaving the grounds of purely rational 
argumentation)  
We deem it a promising approach to take the endangered values as pivotal point of a conspiratorial 
narrative here; to better understand why a seemingly trivial project like the re-structure and 
modernization of the infrastructure of a nearly 100 years old train station became the focal point of 
one of Germany’s most dynamic movements of civil society in recent years. 
Values from a psychological perspective 
To relate values to conspiracy theories, we need to make the concept of values more specific. Mainly, 
we want to link values to established psychological theories to make the topic of CT a genuine 
psychological one. Schwartz and Bilsky (1987, p.551) define values as “(a) concepts of beliefs, (b) 
about desirable end states or behaviors, (c) that transcend specific situations, (d) guide selection or 
evaluation of behavior and events, and (e) are ordered by relative importance”. 
Schwartz (2012) postulates six formal key features he deems crucial for values, regardless of a 
specific value’s content. Four of these can be related directly to the Stuttgart 21 protests:  
-? “Values are beliefs linked inextricably to affect. When values are activated, they become 
infused with feeling. People for whom independence is an important value become aroused 
if their independence is threatened […]” (p.3) 
-? “Values refer to desirable goals that motivate action. People for whom social order, justice, 
and helpfulness are important values are motivated to pursue these goals.” (p.3) 
-? “Values transcend specific actions and situations.” (p.3) 
-? “Values serve as standards or criteria. Values guide the selection or evaluation of actions, 
policies, people, and events.” (p.4) 
The protesters were aroused, they had a clear-cut goal (no underground train station), and they 
pursued over the curse of many months over a variety of situations. We might safely assume this was 
based on certain standards and criteria and not just a random group phenomenon.  
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These basic principles Schwartz assumes paramount are like a universal form, becoming idiosyncratic 
for each person when filled with content related to them. Schwartz (2012) gives a rough 
categorization:  Self-direction, stimulation, hedonism, achievement, power, security, conformity, 
tradition, benevolence, and universalism. Simplified even further, the content of values might be 
categorized with respect to openness to change, self-transcendence, self-enhancement and 
conservation (see Figure 1). 
Figure 1: The circumplex model of values, taken from Schwartz, 2012, p.9. 
Being aware that ex-post-adscriptions should be treated with caution, we might at least consider that 
people devoting time and energy in the Stuttgart 21 protests did this for society as a whole 
(universalism) defending established democratic concepts (security and tradition). 
So Stuttgart 21 supports the idea of people tackling a supposed conspiracy that endangers their most 
important values. Although the train station project itself was not stopped, the protest eventually 
went along with the conservative party losing its absolute majority in the parliament for the first time 
in nearly 60 years, and even losing its participation in government. For the first time in the history of 
Germany, a member of the Green Party (called Bündnis 90/Die Grünen) became a federal Prime 
Minister. 
Can a conspiracy theory be regarded a transport medium for personal values then? We tested this 
assumption empirically. 
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Method 
The experiment took place at the University of Bamberg in summer 2014. It was inspired by the 
postulate by Raab et al. (2013) that a person will adapt to (or even construct a) conspiracy theory 
that portrays his or her most important values as endangered.  
Material.  
We compiled a set of statements following the scheme of narrative construction described in Raab, 
Auer, Ortlieb and Carbon (2013). All statements were related to the (fictitious) establishment of a 
new degree program called Future Concepts of Humanity set at a renowned German university (Freie 
Universität Berlin). While this specific institute was fictitious, similar institutions do exist. For 
example, the University of Oxford incorporates a Future of Humanity Institute that aims „to bring 
excellent scholarship to bear on big-picture questions for humanity“ (University of Oxford, 2014) 
Each statement could be attributed to either interest group: 
-? the archbishop of Berlin (representing conservation), 
-? the Lesben- und Schwulenverband in Deutschland [Gay and Lesbian Association Germany], an 
important LGBT NGO (representing openness to change), 
-? the business consultancy McKinsey (representing self-enhancement), 
-? left-wing student organizations (representing self-transcendence). 
There was a statement for each narrative element: 
-? group of conspirers (which stated the motivation of the respective interest group to influence 
the establishment of the degree program), for  
-? evidence (supposed facts about the respective interest group), for  
-? intransparency (alluding to a cover-up) and for  
-? myth (a general belief related to the interest group). 
Furthermore, each statement was flavored in three different ways regarding conspiratorial 
intention: 
-? official version: a statement that is compatible with the image the respective interest 
upholds itself, 
-? LIHOP: a statement that blames the interest group of endangering the planned study course 
by omitting helpful actions, 
-? MIHOP: the interest group is accused of actively undermining the study course project. 
This resulted in 4 [interest group] x 4 [element] x 3 [intention] = 48 cards. Additionally, four cards 
with an odd event (linking each one of the interest groups separately to a sudden stop of 
negotiations concerning the Future Concepts of Humanity school) and four cards with blatantly 
absurd statements were added to the set as control items, resulting in 56 cards. 
For example [interest group + narrative element + conspiratorial intention],  
-? archbishop + group of conspirers + official read: “The archbishop wants a chair for Roman-
Catholic theology to be part of the projected school Future Concepts of Humanity”. 
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-? McKinsey + intransparency + LIHOP read: “McKinsey’s press officer refuses to give any 
statements concerning the school Future of Humanity and a supposed amalgamation with 
the company’s goals”. 
-? left wing student groups + myth + MIHOP read: “Student protests, in the past and nowadays, 
show that these left-wing groups do not refrain from violence. The assassination of Rudi 
Dutschke and Benno Ohnesorg in Berlin are still motivating them to combat.” 
-? the absurd item related to the gay & lesbian association read: “The Gay and Lesbian 
Association has gotten hold of chemicals that turn people gay. They are already infiltrating 
Berlin’s water supply.” 
Additionally, we wrote a short characterization for each interest group. To frame the story, two 
journalistic texts (one about the concept for the projected school; and one about a conflict of 
interest that might lead to an ultimate failure of the school) were written and placed in the web 
layout of a renowned Berlin newspaper (see Figure 2). 
Figure 2: A pseudo-journalistic text about the projected school  
"Future Concepts of Humanity" that was given to participants as a printout. 
Participants. 
Thirty-five students of Bavarian universities (19 female; aged 19 to 30 years, Mage=23.6 years) 
volunteered to take part in the study. Some of them received course credit for participation. 
Procedure. 
Participants were given a printout of a pseudo-journalistic text (Figure 2) about the projected 
establishment of a new academy in Berlin called Future Concepts of Humanity. The text mentions 
that there is “dispute” as different stakeholders try to influence “topics as well as admission 
requirements” according to their own interests. 
Then, they were given 24 cards containing (in random order) the statements for 
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-? 4 [interest group] x group of conspirers x 3 [intention] 
-? 4 [interest group] x evidence x 3 [intention] 
and asked to read them carefully and to sort them into three packs labeled plausible, indifferent and 
not plausible at all. They were told they were free to choose, without time-restriction, and might pick 
solitary statements, but are also free to compile a coherent narration. In contrast to the procedure in 
Raab et al. (2013a), we decided to divide the narrative construction in two parts, to reduce implicit 
pressure a card set with nearly 60 cards might impose. 
When finished, participants were given the second newspaper mock-up that stated the projected 
school was on the brink; but that sources were not willing to identify the stakeholders responsible for 
impending failure. They were then handed out 
-? 4 cards where, on each card, one of the four interest groups is given responsibility for the 
impending failure, 
-? 4 [interest group] x intransparency x 3 [intention] = 12 cards, 
-? 4 [interest group] x myth x 3 [intention] = 12 cards, 
-? 4 absurd statements. 
Again, they were instructed to read them carefully and to sort them into three packs labeled 
plausible, indifferent and not plausible at all. 
After they reported to have finished, participants were asked how plausible they deem the 
statements they have chosen, if they consider the chosen items to be a coherent story, and how 
interesting/ important/ fun/ thrilling they considered their engagement with the given topic. 
After the narrative construction, participants filled out 
-? the German Portraits Value Questionnaire (PVQ) by Schmidt, Bamberg, Davidov, Herrmann 
and Schwartz (2007) that is constructed in accordance with Schwartz’ value approach, the 
-? Short Schwartz’s Value Survey (SSVS), developed by Lindeman and Verkasalo (2005), in a 
German translation by Boer (2014), the 
-? Generic conspiracist beliefs scale (GCB) by Brotherton, French & Pickering (2013), translated 
by us, and finally the 
-? Conspiracy Mentality Questionnaire (CMQ) by Bruder, Haffke, Neave, Nouripanah and Imhoff 
(2013). 
Finally, participants were debriefed, concretely by uncovering the aims of the study and explicitly 
telling them that all events, statements and newspaper articles used in the study were completely 
fictitious and any resemblance to real events would be coincidental. 
Results 
For the narrative construction, only the cards categorized as plausible were regarded. For each 
participant, we calculated four sums: one for the archbishop, one for the LGBT NGO, one for 
McKinsey and one for the student groups. Any card bearing an official statement contributed to the 
respective sum with 0, any bearing a LIHOP statement with 1 and any bearing a MIHOP statement 
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with 2. As this kind of summation does not allow for statements about the underlying distribution, 
Kendall’s ?b is used for correlating the narrative construction sums with the questionnaire results.
Summing up all four sub-scales (general conspiracy index, GCI), participants scored a median value of 
15.00 (SD=10.32), indicating that including LIHOP and MIHOP items was a common occurrence. 
Plausibility of the selected items was rated at 4.89 on average (on a scale from 1=not plausible at all 
to 6=very plausible, SD=.68) and did not correlate with the CGI (?b=.01, p=.92, n.s.) nor any of the
four sub-scales. 
There was no significant correlation between the four sub-scales resp. their aggregated sum with 
either the GCB or the CMQ general indicators. GCB and CMQ correlated with ?b=.52, p<.001.
Comparing the four dimensions openness to change, self-transcendence, self-enhancement and 
conservation from the SVSS to the four sub-scales calculated from the narrative construction, only 
the scale for the Lesbian and Gay Association yielded significant results:  
-? The higher the value for openness to change, the lower the conspiracy score regarding the 
LGBT community (?b=-.289, p=.029),
-? The higher the value for conservatism, the higher the conspiracy score regarding the LGBT 
community (?b=-.317, p=.016),
-? The higher the value for self-transcendence, the lower the conspiracy score regarding the 
LGBT community (?b=-.434, p=.001).
Relating our general conspiracy index to the SVSS scores, there was a negative correlation with self-
transcendence (?b=-.358, p=.006).
There was a number of significant correlations between the four subscales (see Table 1), indicating 
that there might be some general impetus for constructing a conspiracy theory, regardless of 
content. 
Table 1: Intercorrelations for narrative dimension subscales. 
N=35, correlations are Kendall’s ?b
Interest group 1. 2. 3. 4. 
1. Archbishop 1 ?b=.307 
p=.019 
?b=.473** 
p<.001 
?b=.304 
p=.019 
2. LGBT ?b=.307 
p=.019 
1 ?b=.218 
p=.092 
?b=.297* 
p=.022 
3. McKinsey ?b=.473** 
p<.001 
?b=.218 
p=.092 
1 ?b=.342** 
p<.007 
4. Left-Wing Students ?b=.304 
p=.019 
?b=.297* 
p=.022 
?b=.342** 
p<.007 
1 
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The correlations reported here with regard to the SVSS were similar for the Portraits Value 
Questionnaire (PVQ). The PVQ results are therefore not reported here.  
One of the 35 participants included one of the absurd items in his/ her plausible set – the statement 
claiming that the LGBT community has contaminated the Berlin water supply with chemicals turning 
people gay. 
Discussion 
The interest group Gay and Lesbian Association Germany was sensitive to our postulate of expressing 
personal values in conspiracy theories. The more important openness to change and self-
transcendence were for our participants, the less LIHOP and MIHOP items pointing to a LGBT 
conspiracy were included in the course of events deemed plausible. On the other hand, conservative 
values went along with a higher inclination to deem a LGBT conspiracy plausible. Additionally, people 
expressing benevolence and universalism in the SVSS questionnaire were less prone to assume any 
kind of conspiracy. 
The extent to which a participant’s story contained LIHOP and MIHOP items was not related to self-
assessed story plausibility, indicating that people were of the opinion to have constructed a normal 
story. This is confirmed by the fact that only once the absurd statement was held plausible. If 
participants had chosen a tongue-in-cheek attitude towards our study, we would have expected 
these absurd items to be included much more often – to spice up the conspiracy plot. 
For upcoming studies, the interest groups used to represent the four basic value dimensions should 
be refined. While the LGBT items were sensitive, we could not ascertain significant value-conspiracy-
relations for the other dimensions. For our sample consisting of students only, the archbishop of 
Berlin as well as McKinsey might not be related to conservatism resp. self-enhancement at all. And 
while issues of gender justice and alternative ways of life are part of social discourse, there is virtually 
no organized left-wing student activity at a Bavarian university. Defining interest groups matching the 
target sample would be crucial for further research. 
We were surprised that no relation between the narrative construction and the two scales GCB and 
CMQ could be ascertained. In the narrative construction, people have the opportunity to build a 
conspiracy theory – spontaneously and self-directed. We consider this procedure to bear a high 
validity, as the behavior in question – constructing a conspiracy theory – is actually shown. 
Experiments with larger samples would have to explore which aspects of narrative constructions can 
be mapped to the questionnaires, and which aspects make the difference. 
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General Discussion 
The inclusion of personal values into research paradigms on conspiracy theories could help to enrich 
our understanding of this multi-facetted phenomenon: people constructing stories, in which the 
protagonists – by negligence or with full intent – harm people for profit/ for power/ for building a 
New World Order/ just for the sake of being evil. While individual dispositions allow for insights why 
some kinds of person show a stronger inclination for conspiratorial explanations, the content of such 
an explanation will reveal much about the person’s motivation, her fears, her desires, and will also 
tell us something about the kind of society this person wants to live in. 
Thinking and communicating in terms of values, and not in terms of personality traits, might also help 
us to meet people holding up conspiracy theories at eye level. A person who already has lost his or 
her faith in institutions is not very likely to be impartial when traits like neuroticism and 
agreeableness are discussed. The fear of being pegged as a neurotic grumbler would, for example, 
preclude a longitudinal study where mutual esteem is essential. A value-based approach – like the 
one by Schwartz discussed here; yet, psychology does offer more value concepts – offers dimensions 
that do not have a bad end.  
We have considered conspiracy theories as a means of expressing personal values. However, that 
does not mean conspiracy theories are in any case a harmless instrument of self-actualization. With 
Stuttgart 21, for instance, being part of the movement against the underground train station might 
help participants 
-? to become clear about one’s own values, 
-? to stand up for these values and 
-? to become part of a dynamic movement. 
The downside to this: already weak attitudes and latent prejudice might be sufficient to enter a circle 
of value reinforcement, shifting of the range of facts deemed plausible (we have called this the 
Sarrazin Effect, Raab et al., 2013a) and, eventually, radicalization. Portraying the others as disguised 
evil-doers runs the risk of eroding mutual respect. Commitment can become resentment, and, in the 
end, democratic principles might get devalued.   
In the case of Stuttgart 21, this would be somewhat ironic, as the movement’s predominant goal was 
to enhance democratic participation. Yet, the survey by Bebnowski et. al (2010) indicates that even a 
grass-roots movement for the best, framed in a conspiratorial narration, is a balancing act. The 
question “Political parties are still able to solve political problems” (p.17) was asked on a scale from 0 
(“I do not agree at all”) to 10 (“I completely agree”). Nearly half of the 908 valid answers – 45.4 % – 
was 0, 1 or 2; in other words, people reported a substantial loss of trust in our political associations. 
A conspiracy theory about democratic failure has become a self-fulfilling prophecy. 
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